> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
> SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. NO. 20-CV-24294-KMM-LOUIS

RAQUEL CAMPS, in her capacity as the \{ Pages 1-242
personal representative of the ESTATE OF ALBERTO CAMPS,

EDUARDO CAPPELLO, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the ESTATE OF EDUARDO CAPPELLO,

ALICIA KRUEGER, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the
personal representative of the ESTATE
OF RUBEN BONET,
and, MARCELA SANTUCHO, in her
individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal
representative of the ESTATE OF ANA
MARIA VILLARREAL DE SANTUCHO,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERTO GUILLERMO BRAVO,
Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE LAUREN FLEISCHER LOUIS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

## APPEARANCES:

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| 08:34AM | 1 | THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08:34AM | 2 | THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Calling Case No. 20-CV-24294, |
| 03: 42PM | 3 | Raque1 Camps, et al., vs. Bravo. |
| 08:34AM | 4 | Counse1, would you please note your appearances for the |
| 08:34AM | 5 | record. |
| 08:34AM | 6 | MR. KRISHNAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Ajay Krishnan |
| 08:34AM | 7 | for the plaintiffs. |
| 08:34AM | 8 | THE COURT: Good morning. |
| 08:34AM | 9 | MS. MATTHEWS: Good morning, Your Honor. Elzbieta |
| 08:34AM | 10 | Matthews for plaintiffs. |
| 08:34AM | 11 | THE COURT: Ms. Matthews. |
| 08:34AM | 12 | MS. VARGAS: Good morning, Your Honor. Claret Vargas for |
| 08:34AM | 13 | the plaintiffs. |
| 08:34AM | 14 | THE COURT: Ms. Vargas. |
| 08:34AM | 15 | MR. MUZZIO: Good morning, Your Honor. Franco Muzzio for |
| 08:34AM | 16 | the plaintiffs. |
| 08:34AM | 17 | THE COURT: Mr. Muzzio. |
| 08:34AM | 18 | MR. DAVIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Steve Davis for |
| 08:34AM | 19 | the defendant, and Roberto Bravo is here as well. |
| 08:34AM | 20 | THE COURT: Thank you. |
| 08:34AM | 21 | MR. SLADE: Your Honor, Roger Slade for the plaintiffs as |
| 08:34AM | 22 | well. |
| 08:34AM | 23 | THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Slade. |
| 08:34AM | 24 | Counsel, we received your e-mail and proposed verdict, |
| 08:35AM | 25 | which doesn't make sense for us to start with the verdict. It |

$08: 35$ AM
$08: 35 A M$
seems like the only thing that remains not agreed upon by the parties is whether or not to include a separate question regarding theory -- the theories of liability and whether or not to skip after deciding the timeliness. Am I right that those are the only things that remain in dispute?

MR. DAVIS: I put in my e-mail to counsel that it's going to in part depend on how you rule on the tolling instruction and what that's going to look like. Because I think that the 1b or the $b$ question in each of the series should be -- excuse me. Not b. The statute of limitations question in each one, it should be a tolling question.

If Your Honor determines you're going to submit the tolling question to the jury, then -- the point of that being it is something that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So even though it's not on this proposed form, you would advance something along the lines of what you had in your original verdict form?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. Again, it just depends on your rulings on what the final jury instructions is going to look like on the statute of limitations defense. So, yes, is the answer.

THE COURT: Okay. May I ask a couple of questions? Both advanced language that I don't normally include, which is telling them their outcome is a finding in favor of one side or the other as opposed to asking them to advance to another question or skip
$08: 36 A M$
$08: 36 A M$
$08: 37 A M$
another question. But it seems like you both want that. Am I right?

MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, yes. I would actually -- I typically prefer it in cases with multiple questions, particularly this many questions because of jury confusion just given the number of questions is potentially high.

Here, depending on where we land on the other questions -- you know, my concern is if we have multiple statute of limitations questions, things can get confusing. And so having it be clear what the -- what the decision the jury makes, who it favors, I think would be helpful. If it's just a liability question, then a statute of limitations question, then a damages question, I would be fine not including that parenthetical.

THE COURT: Okay. That's helpful. Let me then hear your respective positions on including the other theories of liability.

Mr. Davis, I think I can understand why you'd want to have them on the form. I didn't -- I thought I did when I saw the proposed. Now when I saw the joint, I thought maybe I am wrong. So could I just hear your position?

MR. DAVIS: Sure. The position being that it is our argument, our position that there is no proof of a conspiracy. I mean, obviously I'11 be arguing that and I suspect it's going -Your Honor is going to have it submitted to the jury. But I believe there's been no proof of conspiracy, aiding and abetting at all, and I'm going to argue about just basically a joint
$08: 38 A M$
$08: 38 A M$
criminal enterprise. But I think that these should be separate as opposed to just a simple question about whether he is directly liable for his own personal acts. And so that's why I broke it out because the question 1c is broad. There are other theories that they are traveling on, and they certainly pled them in their complaint, and I just think it should be separately decided by the jury.

THE COURT: I agree that they're separate theories. But they all point to whether or not the defendant is liable. Do you agree? Meaning, if they check yes to the Box 1c --

MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- then it would potentially -- what I'm trying to avoid is first of all setting up a verdict that has inherent conflicts in them. Or is he liable, yes. Is he liable for conspiracy, no, or vice versa. And while I recognize that the jury can make all kinds of findings -- we will deal with that after the verdict comes back -- this form seems to have a tension between those two questions.

So is your position at all dependent on the outcome of a directed verdict on those theories?

MR. DAVIS: In part, yes.
THE COURT: If the -- just for purposes of us figuring out our verdict form, if the evidence -- if they're allowed to advance those theories to the jury and the directed verdict isn't granted, I still would -- I'm trying to figure out why it would be
$08: 40 \mathrm{AM}$
$08: 40 \mathrm{AM}$
either way -- sorry.
Let me just do it this way. Let me ask you one more time why you think it is necessary for the jury to separately indicate whether they find him liable directly or to know that they found him liable on a conspiracy theory.

MR. DAVIS: Because Mr. Bravo testified he acted in self-defense. That was his testimony. A jury could conclude that he acted in self-defense, yet other soldiers acted in a way that was not consistent with -- was an extrajudicial killing, if you will, and that's why that is separated out, and then the jury could find him under these theories alleged under those counts for conspiracy, joint enterprise, or aiding and abetting. And that's why I think this is just -- there is a difference between his personal actions and the actions of the entire -- of the five, six people that the testimony was were present in the room at the time of the deaths of the prisoners.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand your position on the strength of the evidence, but not yet on the necessity of asking the jury two questions.

MR. DAVIS: Just to separate it out, I mean, because it would be two different ways of attacking it, not only post verdict and in appeal but also in the way it could be argued to the jury.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So you're looking to know in the event of -- that there's a guilty verdict, you want to know which theory it was for purposes of being able to pursue
$08: 42 \mathrm{AM}$
$08: 42 \mathrm{AM}$
$08: 42 \mathrm{AM}$
post-verdict relief.
MR. DAVIS: In part, yes.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to table that for a minute and let the plaintiffs digest that as well. I'm not sure that the way that it's advanced on this form does that. At a minimum, it seems to me that that would be accomplished by asking something closer to, is defendant Bravo liable because he aided, abetted, conspired, or participated in a joint criminal enterprise with, but that's -- okay. Since your position is dependent on whether or not the counts survive a directed verdict motion, then I'm still not sure why that would not be there.

MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I didn't hear your question.

THE COURT: That's okay. I'm thinking to myself.
Mr. Krishnan, are you prepared to respond to the defendant's request to have essentially an interrogatory to the jury on what theory they find him 1iable?

MR. KRISHNAN: Yes, Your Honor. So a few points: One is I'm not sure that I follow the rationale that Mr. Davis just advanced with respect to the statute of limitations, what if somebody else in the group not Mr. Bravo is found by the jury to have --

THE COURT: I don't think it was statute of limitations; it was his affirmative defense of self-defense. But just as I understand it, should Mr. Davis want to challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence on behalf of his client, he's asking the jury to specify what theory, meaning that -- they want to be able to preserve their ability -- I guess it's not preserve. But if they want to pursue post-verdict relief to be able to say to the Eleventh Circuit, while the jury said it's conspiracy, I'm showing you why the evidence is insufficient.

MR. KRISHNAN: Right. I understand. I guess -- at that level, I understand. I think that he had articulated a rationale that if the jury believes that Mr. Bravo acted in self-defense -I apologize -- that's what I meant the first time -- but that his fellow soldiers were -- acted in a way that would have given rise to liability. The self-defense defense would be a defense, and so there wouldn't be -- there wouldn't be a basis for liability. So I'm not seeing how that really -- asking separate questions really does anything there.

I think that the -- breaking out a separate interrogatory for every theory that the defense thinks they might have a directed verdict motion on, seems like a little much. Here, you technically have four theories of potential liability, and I don't really want to walk us into having four or five questions now, because there's also the form of liability that has nothing to do with any of aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and whatever, because obvious7y Mr. Camps' survivor's statement says that Mr. Bravo came in and shot him. You don't need any group liability for that.

And, likewise, Mr. Bravo placed himself as the shooter

| 08:45AM | 1 | that was in the front in the middle of the corridor. And so a |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08:45AM | 2 | jury could find that it was more likely true than not true that he |
| 08:45AM | 3 | was ultimately responsible for each of the plaintiffs' decedents' |
| 08:46AM | 4 | deaths. |
| 08:46AM | 5 | So I just think we're going down a path here where just |
| 08:46AM | 6 | because defense thinks they might have a theory for asking |
| 08:46AM | 7 | separate interrogatories -- I will just say that we do have |
| 08:46AM | 8 | significant evidence. I would be happy to mention it if it's |
| 08:46AM | 9 | valuable. But as the -- it's circumstantial evidence, but it's a |
| 08:46AM | 10 | significant amount of circumstantial evidence as to all three of |
| 08:46AM | 11 | the group liability theories. |
| 08:46AM | 12 | THE COURT: I understand. I anticipate that we will be |
| 08:46AM | 13 | doing that shortly this morning. But for purposes of the verdict |
| 08:46AM | 14 | form, if you can articulate why it is not appropriate to ask the |
| 08:46AM | 15 | jury, for example -- I'm looking under -- I'm just going to use |
| 08:46AM | 16 | Mr. Cappello's just because I have it up on page 3 asking if you |
| 08:46AM | 17 | both agree to phrase the question: Is Defendant Bravo liable for |
| 08:46AM | 18 | the extrajudicial killing of the decedent? The next question -- I |
| 08:47AM | 19 | disagree again that this accomplishes what you've suggested it |
| 08:47AM | 20 | should, Mr. Davis, for the purposes that you've advanced it for. |
| 08:47AM | 21 | It seems to me that if it was going to do that, it would |
| 08:47AM | 22 | have to say: Is defendant Bravo's -- I am not the wordsmith in |
| 08:47AM | 23 | the group. But my point would be that they would have to elect |
| 08:47AM | 24 | between conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or be given the |
| 08:47AM | 25 | opportunity for each. I don't see how it helps you to know that |


| 08:47AM | 1 | it was just on a theory other than direct liability without |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08:47AM | 2 | knowing which one you, it seems to me, would not be in a different |
| 08:47AM | 3 | position for your posttrial motions. |
| 08:47AM | 4 | MR. DAVIS: Fair enough. Then that would then get us two |
| 08:47AM | 5 | more questions if I understand what the Court was saying there. |
| 08:47AM | 6 | In other words, you're separating aiding and abetting, |
| 08:48AM | 7 | conspiracy, and joint enterprise -- |
| 08:48AM | 8 | THE COURT: Right. |
| 08:48AM | 9 | MR. DAVIS: -- if I understand the Court. Is that what |
| 08:48AM | 10 | you're saying, Judge? |
| 08:48AM | 11 | THE COURT: That is. I think that's how you originally |
| 08:48AM | 12 | proposed it. That's -- I'11 be candid. While I understand why |
| 08:48AM | 13 | you want it, I'm not getting a lot of guidance from either side |
| 08:48AM | 14 | about why it is or isn't appropriate or necessary on this verdict |
| 08:48AM | 15 | form to make this decision. |
| 08:48AM | 16 | MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, it's two points. It's juror |
| 08:48AM | 17 | confusion in my view and the possibility of an inconsistent |
| 08:48AM | 18 | verdict form. |
| 08:48AM | 19 | THE COURT: The way it is phrased, I agree. It is |
| 08:48AM | 20 | confusing, and I'm not going to give it in the way that it's |
| 08:48AM | 21 | proposed and highlighted for the reasons I said at the very |
| 08:48AM | 22 | beginning. Breaking it out so that it is -- that it specifies, |
| 08:48AM | 23 | you know, is the reason you think he's liable because he joined a |
| 08:49AM | 24 | conspiracy. But I stili -- I tend to agree with Mr. Krishnan that |
| 08:49AM | 25 | asking them that may yet be confusing. |


| 08:49AM | 1 | MR. DAVIS: Wel1, I certainly don't want to confuse the |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08:49AM | 2 | jury. I stated the reason that I want it. |
| 08:49AM | 3 | THE COURT: Okay. |
| 08: 49AM | 4 | MR. DAVIS: And obviousty the Court can disagree. |
| 08:49AM | 5 | THE COURT: Then on the statute of limitations -- wait. |
| 08:49AM | 6 | Let me make sure that that's -- okay. I'm not sure then that I |
| 08:49AM | 7 | understand the disagreement that's highlighted after the statute |
| 08:49AM | 8 | of limitations question. |
| 08:49AM | 9 | Was that just a place holder, Mr. Davis, for you to argue |
| 08:49AM | 10 | that you wanted the statute of limitations questions presented |
| 08:49AM | 11 | differently? |
| 08:49AM | 12 | MR. DAVIS: Well, yes, Your Honor. |
| 08:49AM | 13 | THE COURT: Okay. |
| 08:49AM | 14 | MR. DAVIS: Because our position -- and Mr. Slade wil1 |
| 08:49AM | 15 | speak to it -- but our position is the statute of limitations |
| 08:49AM | 16 | expired in 2002, and it's their burden to prove equitable tolling |
| 08:50AM | 17 | for any time beyond that, and that should be reflected in the |
| 08:50AM | 18 | question. But I will let Mr. Slade speak to that if you want to |
| 08:50AM | 19 | hear argument or discussion on that. |
| 08:50AM | 20 | THE COURT: I do accept that Mr. Slade may want the |
| 08:50AM | 21 | benefit of knowing that I agree that the defense verdict form is |
| 08:50AM | 22 | better on this point and that the jury should be asked on -- until |
| 08: 50AM | 23 | what date the statute of limitations was tolled in a manner very |
| 08:50AM | 24 | similar to what the defendants here have proposed as opposed to |
| 08:50AM | 25 | just asking them whether or not it was timely. |

$08: 50 \mathrm{AM}$
$08: 50 \mathrm{AM}$

MR. KRISHNAN: So, Your Honor, I think that the problem here is -- and maybe just before I jump into that, can I just ask: Are you thinking exactly as proposed so that I have something to shoot at, or is it just sort of something with more -- with two questions? Because I think that they proposed --

THE COURT: They did. They had proposed a number of them. So you're right. I would suggest that it may be unnecessary to ask them whether or not the action was commenced -within ten years the cause of action arose -- well, I would be less inclined to propose that question to them. And I invite your argument on whether or not you want to include the question that -- oh, no. I read this differently.

My inclination would have been to at a minimum ask if plaintiffs -- if they find -- whether or not it's phrased as how they've proven it, but to initially ask if they find extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of limitations, and until what date the statute of limitations they find was tolled. So, again, you're the wordsmiths, it doesn't seem to me that that needs to be any more than two questions.

Have the plaintiffs shown extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of limitations, and if so, if you find -- or even one, if you find that extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of limitations, until what date was the statute of limitations tolled.

MR. KRISHNAN: I think, Your Honor, we're inviting a lot
$08: 52 A M$
$08: 52 A M$
of confusion and, perhaps, a return form that will have contradictions or inconsistencies in this. And there are a couple of reasons why. You have situations, for instance, like Mr. Cappe110, who was not of age of majority at the time the TVPA was enacted.

THE COURT: Could I interrupt you for a split second to ask: It's been advanced by your team that the statute of limitations does not have to be proven by the individual plaintiffs.

At a minimum, why wouldn't we pose a question that -whether or not the statute of limitations -- whether or not they find that extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of limitations and until what date generically.

MR. KRISHNAN: Fair enough. Okay. So on that point, Your Honor --

THE COURT: You will be able to be heard, Mr. Slade. But at a minimum, it seems to me, that if that's the plaintiffs' theory, they should agree that that question should be asked.

MR. KRISHNAN: Fair enough. I think the problem is that there are multiple theories for tolling. So you're assuming that it's getting tolled on sort of the back end versus the front end; right? Because we've put forward that the statute of limitations was tolled for reasons related to fear, starting from let's say 1992 forward, at least through 2005. They might find that it goes past 2005 based on fear. There might be -- you know, jurors might
have found that they could have found him prior to 2008 based on some fact in the record that was stated. There could be -- you know, they could find that some portion of the extradition proceeding counts and some portion doesn't. And so it's -- given the number of theories and the amount of factual evidence on these points that have been presented --

THE COURT: You're highlighting my inclination to include the question. That's precisely it. They have to tell us which one they find tolled and until when.

MR. KRISHNAN: It seems like -- it seems like a very, very hyper-specific question to ask juries to answer, to articulate.

THE COURT: I don't see how that can be so. Hyper-technical is suggesting improper. Since you're asking them to toll the statute of limitations up to a point, they need to actually make that finding. They can't just generically say: Look, these are late, and we're not going to consider -- we're not going to make a finding. I mean, it's your position that if there shouldn't be a directed verdict because there is a factual dispute, that it should go to the jury. We should have the benefit of how they resolve that dispute.

MR. KRISHNAN: Fair enough. Although any -- I mean, there could often be a factual dispute, but we don't ask the jurors to identify -- you know, for instance with respect to liability, we don't ask the jurors to identify their basis for

| 08:55AM | 1 | liability. But if Your Honor is inclined to go in this direction, |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08:55AM | 2 | I think we can live with it. I understand. |
| 08:55AM | 3 | THE COURT: Let me ask your position or preference on my |
| 08:56AM | 4 | suggestion that it is a single question. If you find |
| 08:56AM | 5 | extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of limitations, |
| 08:56AM | 6 | until what date, as opposed to asking several questions of the |
| 08:56AM | 7 | individual -- with respect to each plaintiff? |
| 08:56AM | 8 | MR. KRISHNAN: Yes. We agree with that approach. |
| 08:56AM | 9 | THE COURT: Okay. |
| 08:56AM | 10 | MR. KRISHNAN: By the way, Your Honor, when I said we |
| 08:56AM | 11 | could go along with it, what I perhaps meant to say was that we |
| 08:56AM | 12 | would preserve our objections and submit to Your Honor's position. |
| 08:56AM | 13 | THE COURT: I understood. |
| 08:56AM | 14 | Okay. Mr. Slade. |
| 08:56AM | 15 | MR. SLADE: I think that may be all on the verdict. Is |
| 08:56AM | 16 | there anything further on the verdict? |
| 08:56AM | 17 | MR. DAVIS: I think we agree. |
| 08:56AM | 18 | MR. SLADE: I think we're with you on the verdict form. |
| 08:56AM | 19 | Am I right, Mr. Davis? |
| 08:56AM | 20 | MR. DAVIS: Sorry. We would agree with Your Honor's |
| 08:56AM | 21 | suggested approach as to the statute of 1imitations. |
| 08:56AM | 22 | My question would be: Would you then -- once the date is |
| 08:56AM | 23 | established, do we give them a, say if your date is on or before |
| 08:57AM | 24 | October 20, 2010, which is ten years before the date of the filing |
| 08:57AM | 25 | of the case, then your verdict is for Bravo? Or how do you want |


| 08:57AM | 1 | to address that issue? Because then if it's before - |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08:57AM | 2 | THE COURT: I was going to ask you the same question. |
| 08:57AM | 3 | You go first. |
| 08:57AM | 4 | MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. My suggestion would be that |
| 08:57AM | 5 | that would be actually the precise question. We say: If it was |
| 08:57AM | 6 | tolled on or -- I guess when they establish the date, if you say: |
| 08:57AM | 7 | If it's on or before October, I guess, 19, 2010, then sign and |
| 08:57AM | 8 | date the verdict form. |
| 08:57AM | 9 | If it's after that, then questions four and five, |
| 08:57AM | 10 | whatever the next two damages questions are. That's a suggestion, |
| 08:57AM | 11 | thinking how the jury would proceed. Because if they came back |
| 08:57AM | 12 | with a statute of limitations finding and then didn't consider the |
| 08:58AM | 13 | damages questions, then we would have some pretty big posttrial |
| 08:58AM | 14 | issues, I think. |
| 08:58AM | 15 | THE COURT: If they went which way? If they came back -- |
| 08:58AM | 16 | MR. DAVIS: In other words, if they said the -- if the |
| 08:58AM | 17 | questions were worded in such a way that if they basically found |
| 08:58AM | 18 | in favor of the defendant on the statute of limitations, but the |
| 08:58AM | 19 | verdict form wasn't clear how to get to the damage questions and |
| 08:58AM | 20 | then they went ahead and answered the damage questions anyway, |
| 08:58AM | 21 | that's what I'm saying. |
| 08:58AM | 22 | I don't know if I'm making -- you're looking at me in a |
| 08:58AM | 23 | way that - |
| 08:58AM | 24 | THE COURT: No. I'm just thinking it through, because I |
| 08:58AM | 25 | can see issues on both -- in both directions there. |

$08: 58 \mathrm{AM} \quad 1$

I think that the parties -- am I right that previously you wanted and advanced -- yeah. So you both had previous7y said that with respect to whatever statute of limitations question is asked, that the jury be told that that's outcome determinative for one side or the other. So that's your position?

I'm looking at the proposed form, Mr. Krishnan. If we look together at what's 1c or 1d: Did the estate of plaintiff Alberto Camps file its claims against defendant Roberto Bravo too late under the statute of limitations; whereas answering, yes, is a finding in favor of defendant Bravo.

The suggestion here -- then, perhaps, we would have to break it into two questions. Okay. So just work with me.

If it were two questions, the first would be: Do you find the plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence -or whether or not you include that -- but has the plaintiff demonstrated extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of limitations in this case? Yes or no. If you find extraordinary --

I mean if the answer there is no, then they would go on to -- if it's the first question, it would be a sign and date. If you find yes, then you go on to the next question, which is; until what date was the statute of limitations tolled. They fill that in, and they go through the rest of the verdict form.

MR. KRISHNAN: Right. Your Honor, let me -- I'm not sure I followed the entire thought process there. I think I certainly
$09: 00 \mathrm{AM}$
$09: 00 \mathrm{AM}$
got the end part. One issue is -- I think we would ask that regardless of how the jury finds on statute of limitations, that they be instructed to answer the damages questions. And the reason why I think as Your Honor has noticed -- mentioned before is that we will be making new law here one way or the other. And my concern is a situation where we have a favorable verdict on liability, we have an adverse finding on statute of limitations, and no finding on damages, we go up the statute of limitations --

THE COURT: Sorry. But under the verdict form I just proposed, there wouldn't be a finding on liability. If the first question is: Have the plaintiffs proven extraordinary circumstances tolled the statue of limitations, if they answer that, no, they sign and date.

MR. KRISHNAN: I think we would object to that, Your Honor, to have the -- to have the defense interrogatory before the liability interrogatory. It's --

THE COURT: But I was thinking about that. This is what prompted me when I was looking at your joint proposed -- liable is a legal word. So he's not liable if the claim was untimely. So even as I was looking at how you both proposed it, I couldn't quite frankly make sense of how it was that you wanted the jury to find out, first, if he's liable and --

MR. KRISHNAN: Right.
THE COURT: -- and then ask if the claims were untimely. But either way, your verdict form proposed that if they find it's
not timely, that they know it's a verdict for the defendant, move on. So I'm trying to understand; that was your position, and I'm trying to understand it now.

MR. KRISHNAN: I guess why I don't believe that we ever advanced the position that if the -- that if the jury found in favor of the defense on statute of limitations that they should skip the damages questions. We never proposed that. Certainly in our original verdict form, that was the opposite of what we proposed.

THE COURT: I'm looking at -- the original verdict form says: Answering yes is a finding in favor of defendant Bravo.

MR. KRISHNAN: That's simply for that question. That's just to clarify that question that if you answer yes to that question, you are siding on that question -- it wasn't with Mr. Bravo. That wasn't intended to mean finding as in a final finding. It was just a finding on that question. We never intended that to mean it's outcome determinative.

## THE COURT: Isn't it?

MR. KRISHNAN: We11, legally, it would be outcome determinative if that -- if that finding were to be upheld. I mean, both parties are going to be filing motions with respect to the statute of limitations issues.

THE COURT: Why wouldn't the jury's finding be upheld?
MR. KRISHNAN: If there was error in the jury instruction, if as a matter of law, the -- because no reasonable

| 09:03AM | 1 | jury could find that - in favor of the defense on the statute of |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09:03AM | 2 | limitations question -- if any of those things happened, we would |
| 09:03AM | 3 | then be in a position where we don't have an answer on damages, |
| 09:03AM | 4 | and we would then be back here for a trial on damages. |
| 09:03AM | 5 | THE COURT: Okay. Let me make sure that I understand |
| 09:03AM | 6 | then how you want this presented. I understand Mr. Davis' |
| 09:03AM | 7 | preference that if they find statute of limitations not tolled, |
| 09:04AM | 8 | they not answer anything further. And your preference? |
| 09:04AM | 9 | MR. KRISHNAN: Is that they just go ahead and answer the |
| 09:04AM | 10 | damages questions. We have the answers on damages. If they don't |
| 09:04AM | 11 | find for us on liability, obviously, they can skip everything |
| 09:04AM | 12 | else -- in favor of our claims. And we don't have to phrase that |
| 09:04AM | 13 | initial question as liability. It can be whether or not |
| 09:04AM | 14 | THE COURT: I mean, you both proposed that language. I |
| 09:04AM | 15 | don't want to upset the apple cart on something that's apparently |
| 09:04AM | 16 | been long-since agreed in terms of how to phrase the liability |
| 09:04AM | 17 | question. |
| 09:04AM | 18 | MR. KRISHNAN: Right. |
| 09:04AM | 19 | HE COURT: But -- so your suggestion is that the jury |
| 09:04AM | 20 | should be asked as I proposed it: Do you find that the plaintiffs |
| 09:04AM | 21 | have shown extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of |
| 09:04AM | 22 | limitations, yes, no. The next question: Until what date. They |
| 09:04AM | 23 | fill it in, and then they fill in the rest of the verdict form |
| 09:04AM | 24 | regardless of how they've answered those two questions. |
| 09:05AM | 25 | MR. KRISHNAN: I see. |


| 09:05AM | 1 | If we are asking the statute of limitations question |
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| 09:05AM | 2 | first, then, yes, we would ask that the jury fill out the rest of |
| 09:05AM | 3 | the verdict form as well. |
| 09:05AM | 4 | THE COURT: And alternatively what you're really saying |
| 09:05AM | 5 | is you would want them to be asked that question last. |
| 09:05AM | 6 | MR. KRISHNAN: Last -- I don't particularly -- I think |
| 09:05AM | 7 | last would be best. It could be second. It could be after |
| 09:05AM | 8 | liability. You could do liability then statute of limitations. |
| 09:05AM | 9 | THE COURT: Then that would be individual -- we would ask |
| 09:05AM | 10 | it after each plaintiff. |
| 09:05AM | 11 | MR. KRISHNAN: Right. |
| 09:05AM | 12 | THE COURT: And before they got to damages. |
| 09:05AM | 13 | MR. KRISHNAN: Right. |
| 09:05AM | 14 | THE COURT: But you said you want them to do damages |
| 09:05AM | 15 | anyway, so I don't know that there is any value in that placement; |
| 09:05AM | 16 | right? |
| 09:05AM | 17 | MR. KRISHNAN: Fair enough, fair enough. |
| 09:05AM | 18 | THE COURT: Okay. Last word, Mr. Slade? |
| 09:05AM | 19 | MR. SLADE: Not on the verdict form. We were going to |
| 09:05AM | 20 | talk about the jury instructions next. |
| 09:05AM | 21 | THE COURT: Oh, no. Do you want to respond to Mr. |
| 09:05AM | 22 | Krishnan's position that they should fill the whole form out no |
| 09:05AM | 23 | matter how they answer on the statute of limitations? |
| 09:06AM | 24 | MR. DAVIS: I disagree. I have not seen that in any case |
| 09:06AM | 25 | that I have ever been involved in where if a defense -- an outcome |

determinative defense interrogatory has been checked in favor of the defendant, that they consider damages anyway. I mean, maybe that has happened, I don't know. But I've not seen it in my practice. I don't think that would be appropriate for them to be considering damages if that's -- if that's the, you know, the position argued by plaintiff. I think that's --

THE COURT: As a middle ground, this is what I am now considering. Including the question that has been posed about whether or not a respective plaintiff's claims are timely and concluding the form as I just did with my proposal for essentially an interrogatory which will then let us -- require the jury to tell us the basis for their finding that it was timely or not timely and treat it functionally like an interrogatory. If it comes back and they weren't able to fill it out or there wasn't a basis or it reveals something else, then you have the matter preserved then to take up.

But if they identify that they found extraordinary circumstances and a date at or beyond November 1st, 2010, then, you know, they did their job. I mean, you know that there is a factual finding that supported their conclusion that the claims were timely but that the form is otherwise filled out.

I mean, you both know my position. I intend to ask the jury to answer those two questions, and as Mr. Krishnan asked me to do, come here with an open mind about exactly how that's presented to them. But I think it needs to be asked, and that's
$09: 07 A M$
$09: 08 A M$ my proposal.

MR. DAVIS: That's acceptable to us, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Give me one second just to tie that up.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I do -- well.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. DAVIS: It's another issue related to it, and that is just the stipulation of dates. I just think we ought to put that in front of the jury. We talked about it yesterday. Stipulate the date that the extradition was filed, the date that it was denied, and the date you filed the lawsuit.

MR. KRISHNAN: I wasn't thinking that would go in the verdict form.

MR. DAVIS: What?
MR. KRISHNAN: I wasn't thinking that would go in the verdict form.

MR. DAVIS: I agree. I wasn't either.
MR. KRISHNAN: But before we move off the verdict form, Your Honor, there is actually another issue that's related between the verdict form and the jury instructions.

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. KRISHNAN: Which is self-defense as an affirmative defense.

THE COURT: Neither of you proposed it. What were you thinking? Oh, that was a bad question. What is it now, Mr.
09:08AM 1

Krishnan, that you're proposing?
MR. KRISHNAN: Oh, I'm sorry, I -- honestly, Your Honor, we weren't fully following where Your Honor was landing in the proposed jury instructions with self-defense as an affirmative defense versus --

THE COURT: Negating an element?
MR. KRISHNAN: Yes. And so because we had confusion about that, it wasn't -- it wasn't literally raised in this form. This form that we submitted last night was simply a red line of our original form with areas -- it was a red line that defendants presented on our original form.

THE COURT: No problem. But I mean none of the proposed verdict forms, including pretrial from either side, included a space for: Do you find that he acted in self-defense. So I just thought -- not every affirmative defense requires a different interrogatory, I understand that. But I just assumed that the parties decided they didn't want to ask the jury that. So what are you proposing?

MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, I think we could live with -the way you phrased has convinced me that we can live without a self-defense question.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Krishnan. Shall we do the jury instructions?

MR. SLADE: Sure, Your Honor. I'm ready to listen.
Where do you want to go with that, Your Honor?

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| 09:11AM | 1 | proceedings in Argentina. There was a truth and reconciliation |
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| 09:11AM | 2 | process, according to Mr. Langer yesterday, but that was in 1983. |
| 09:11AM | 3 | And Mrs. Camps testified yesterday that what she did with |
| 09:11AM | 4 | respect to the criminal proceedings was nothing that's any |
| 09:12AM | 5 | different than any criminal complaining witness would do in any |
| 09:12AM | 6 | criminal case, participate with the prosecutors, attend some |
| 09:12AM | 7 | hearings, travel back and forth to the trial itself, and so there |
| 09:12AM | 8 | hasn't been a sufficient showing that this is something that |
| 09:12AM | 9 | should justify tolling or would justify this type of instruction, |
| 09:12AM | 10 | which I think as Mr. Krishnan said, and I agree with him, we were |
| 09:12AM | 11 | all in agreement, this is an issue of first impression. Why put |
| 09:12AM | 12 | it in the jury instruction when there is no legal support for you? |
| 09:12AM | 13 | What you would be doing here would be inviting an appeal on this |
| 09:12AM | 14 | one issue. Of course, there will be an appeal anyway. |
| 09:12AM | 15 | HE COURT: Can I make an observation that I am not sure |
| 09:12AM | 16 | that there is not legal support for it. I think if I understand |
| 09:12AM | 17 | your argument correctly that there is not factual support for it. |
| 09:12AM | 18 | The bullet point is an accurate statement of the law that's |
| 09:12AM | 19 | developed. You take issue with the jury here being able to find |
| 09:13AM | 20 | that such an accountability process is taking place, because as a |
| 09:13AM | 21 | matter of fact, the on7y proceeding was criminal; right? |
| 09:13AM | 22 | R. SLADE: We11, I do take issue with that. And I also |
| 09:13AM | 23 | take issue with the fact the nomenclature here, which says, |
| 09:13AM | 24 | accountability processes, which I think we all know is just |
| 09:13AM | 25 | another way of saying criminal proceedings. And there is no |


| 09:13AM | 1 | authority that we have been able to locate, and that's in our |
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| 09:13AM | 2 | reply brief which we filed this morning, that says that a criminal |
| 09:13AM | 3 | proceeding pending in another country is sufficient to become an |
| 09:13AM | 4 | extraordinary circumstance sufficient to toll the statute of |
| 09:13AM | 5 | limitations when there was nothing preventing the plaintiffs from |
| 09:13AM | 6 | filing a lawsuit here. |
| 09:13AM | 7 | They stil1 have in their instruction the other |
| 09:13AM | 8 | circumstances, which the Eleventh Circuit and other circuits have |
| 09:13AM | 9 | recognized, would potentially provide a basis for equitable |
| 09:13AM | 10 | tolling, but not this one. This accountability process, they've |
| 09:13AM | 11 | already said that there was no Truth and Reconciliation Commission |
| 09:13AM | 12 | going on now. That is not what Ms. Camps participated in. She |
| 09:14AM | 13 | participated in the criminal proceedings, which started in 2005, |
| 09:14AM | 14 | resulted in a guilty verdict in 2012, but that has nothing to do |
| 09:14AM | 15 | with whether she could file a lawsuit here. So we think that |
| 09:14AM | 16 | putting this instruction in here is devastating to our case and |
| 09:14AM | 17 | gives the jury an incorrect instruction on the law. |
| 09:14AM | 18 | THE COURT: Well -- |
| 09:14AM | 19 | MR. SLADE: Maybe there is another way to phrase it. |
| 09:14AM | 20 | THE COURT: Beg your pardon? |
| 09:14AM | 21 | MR. SLADE: Maybe there is another way to phrase it. |
| 09:14AM | 22 | THE COURT: You knew exactly what I was about to ask you, |
| 09:14AM | 23 | Mr. Slade. So if the issue turns on the term, accountability |
| 09:14AM | 24 | process, and your argument or position here is that that |
| 09:14AM | 25 | overstates the law that's been developed -- am I accurately |



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different than the United States criminal process, at least.
And while I anticipate your objection to my reliance on this, Mr. Langer did testify that the criminal trial that occurred beginning from 2005 forward was the kind of proceeding that took place for Trelew that was -- it was the same kind of proceeding that otherwise would have been a truth and reconciliation process.

I have more precisely in my notes how he said it. But he offered his opinion based on his legal expertise that drew an analogy -- I'm sorry. I am being imprecise.

He offered evidence that that proceeding that started in 2005 was similar to a proceeding on which courts have previously relied for tolling.

MR. SLADE: Your Honor, the way I heard his testimony was that when he was talking about truth and reconciliation, he was talking about the 1983 CONADEP. He wasn't talking about the 2005 process. And when I asked him or when Mr. Muzzio asked him -- and I think I have some testimony here.

THE COURT: Here's what my notes reflect -- and I know poor Vernita is giving you daily transcripts, so this could be more precise -- but he was asked if Argentina had a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Yes, but it did not cover Trelew. The only accountability process was a criminal investigation. Those criminal proceedings were the equivalent of --

And then I've bracketed here his actual words were "the kind of, the truth and reconciliation proceedings." Those were my

| 09: 18AM | 1 | notes from yesterday. And whether or not there is additional |
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| 09:18AM | 2 | evidence that the parties might argue at the directed verdict for |
| 09: 18AM | 3 | tolling beyond that point, it was my observation at the time that |
| 09:18AM | 4 | that was evidence on which a jury could base a finding that |
| 09: 18AM | 5 | extraordinary circumstances existed until November 1, 2010, when |
| 09:19AM | 6 | the extradition was denied. |
| 09: 19AM | 7 | MR. SLADE: Your Honor, we also briefed this issue. |
| 09:19AM | 8 | THE COURT: I know. Like I said, I'm so sorry, I have |
| 09:19AM | 9 | not had a chance to see your reply. |
| 09: 19AM | 10 | The directed verdict motion was excellent and absolutely |
| 09: 19AM | 11 | honed the issue exactly where it needed to be. I'm sorry. |
| 09: 19AM | 12 | MR. SLADE: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt. |
| 09:19AM | 13 | THE COURT: No. I just -- I regret -- |
| 09: 19AM | 14 | I needed the benefit of your legal research, but I regret |
| 09: 19AM | 15 | that I pushed you as hard as I did to file it before the evidence |
| 09: 19AM | 16 | was in because you filed it before you had the benefit of all the |
| 09: 19AM | 17 | evidence. I am sorry for that. And it is without prejudice to |
| 09: 19AM | 18 | you making your argument at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, |
| 09: 19AM | 19 | of course. |
| 09: 19AM | 20 | MR. SLADE: I understand, and we'11 do that. And I want |
| 09: 19AM | 21 | to point out something that is in the directed verdict motion, |
| 09: 19AM | 22 | which I don't think maybe the Court -- I'11 just remind you what's |
| 09:19AM | 23 | in there. |
| 09:19AM | 24 | THE COURT: Please. |
| 09:19AM | 25 | MR. SLADE: Page 18, there is a description from law |


| 09:19AM | 1 | review articles that we were able to locate about what a truth and |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09:20AM | 2 | reconciliation process is. Okay. |
| 09:20AM | 3 | And that is: The purpose of the commission is promoting |
| 09:20AM | 4 | truth telling and reconciliation, psychological healing for |
| 09: 20AM | 5 | victims, establishing an accurate historical record, recommending |
| 09:20AM | 6 | reparations for victims, restoring minimal accountability, |
| 09:20AM | 7 | restoring dignity to victims, making recommendations for |
| 09:20AM | 8 | institutional reform, as well as preventing violence and |
| 09:20AM | 9 | repetition of abuses. |
| 09:20AM | 10 | So when Mr. Langer testified yesterday, he did not touch |
| 09: 20AM | 11 | on any of those issues, and he simply was able to distinguish, |
| 09:20AM | 12 | when he was asked by Mr. Muzzio, the difference between a civil |
| 09:20AM | 13 | and criminal proceeding generally in Argentina. One is for |
| 09:20AM | 14 | punishment, and one is for damages; just like here. |
| 09:20AM | 15 | So I don't think that what happened in Argentina -- nor |
| 09:20AM | 16 | do I think there has been sufficient development in this record |
| 09:20AM | 17 | was the equivalent of a truth and reconciliation process that had |
| 09:20AM | 18 | been identified in the case law. So our position is that this |
| 09:20AM | 19 | instruction is only -- basically, it's been initiated based upon a |
| 09:21AM | 20 | first time |
| 09:21AM | 21 | THE COURT: Mr. Slade, I would just make the observation |
| 09:21AM | 22 | that from that list, the only goal or objective that I would say |
| 09:21AM | 23 | there is no evidence of on this record is reparations; meaning |
| 09:21AM | 24 | that to the extent that this is as the phraseology suggests it is, |
| 09:21AM | 25 | a noninclusive list, meaning that in order for the accountability |

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process on which the plaintiffs have reasonably relied to be qualitatively that which they could have relied, that these are -they don't have to check every one, there has been evidence that hits every other one of these objectives.

With respect to that criminal proceeding in 2005, they testified that this was the investigation that developed the record, that identified the participants, that identified the witnesses, that enabled the forensic to go in and examine the military base. The plaintiffs testified to the impact that it had with respect to their healing process. It's just the only piece it didn't touch upon was reparations.

And I will tell you that I personally, and to the detriment of my poor law clerks, have looked hard to try to see the extent to which that remedial piece, that monetary piece is determinative; meaning that the remedy they seek in this suit had to have been available to them in those other proceedings on which they reasonably relied, and I didn't have it. And if your reply did, that will be very meaningful support for me to look at.

MR. SLADE: We'll take another look at it, Your Honor. But I still think there are things about this process that I did not hear testimony about such as the psychological issue to victims. I'm not aware that there was an issue with historical record.

THE COURT: Mr. Slade, I am just going to respond to that one. Ms. Camps did testify -- and in response to at least some of

| 09: 23AM | 1 | the questions over the defense objection -- to the impact of the |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09:23AM | 2 | trial on her and the families. |
| 09: 23AM | 3 | MR. SLADE: I understand that. But what this is |
| 09: 23AM | 4 | suggesting is that there is -- the purpose of the Truth and |
| 09: 23AM | 5 | Reconciliation Commission is for the Commission to provide |
| 09: 23AM | 6 | psychological healing for the victims. |
| 09: 23AM | 7 | THE COURT: On what do you rely for that narrow |
| 09: 23AM | 8 | interpretation? That's fairly specific. |
| 09: 23AM | 9 | MR. SLADE: We cited law -- some review articles that |
| 09:23AM | 10 | have gone into some analysis of this. And, again, it's at |
| 09:23AM | 11 | page 18. |
| 09: 23AM | 12 | THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I misunderstood your proffer. |
| 09: 23AM | 13 | I understand you now. |
| 09: 23AM | 14 | MR. SLADE: I think it's a different issue of whether Ms. |
| 09: 24AM | 15 | Camps was able to achieve psychological healing on her own as a |
| 09: 24AM | 16 | result of what happened at the criminal proceedings. I'm not |
| 09: 24AM | 17 | aware that there was any recommendation for constitutional reform |
| 09: 24AM | 18 | that took place as a result of the criminal findings. I'm not |
| 09: 24AM | 19 | aware that there was anything going forward which would prevent |
| 09: 24AM | 20 | violence and repetition of abuses. Remember of course, this |
| 09: 24AM | 21 | started in 2005, ended in 2012, and the events that are at issue |
| 09: 24AM | 22 | here took place in 1972. So things had already changed anyway. |
| 09: 24AM | 23 | But these recommendations, as far as I know, from the record we |
| 09: 24AM | 24 | have were not made. That's why I think this is a different type |
| 09: 24AM | 25 | of thing. We're talking about Liberia. We're talking about |

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Somalia, where there is a complete breakdown in the government in total. And because of that, the government made the determination that we need to have some psychological national healing that has to take place.

My understanding of the criminal proceedings in this case, there was conviction of three of Mr. Bravo's compatriots, and that was it. I'm not aware that any of these things took place as part of that process, and I don't think that Mr. Langer went into that kind of detail, although he did make clear the distinguishing factor between criminal and civil proceedings in Argentina. One is for money. One is for punishment. It was that simple, and he did -- I will go back and look at the transcript.

THE COURT: No. I agree. That's how I remember his testimony on that point.

MR. SLADE: Yeah. And he talked about truth and reconciliation with respect to the 1983 CONADEP.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. SLADE: But that related to something completely different and did not involve Trelew.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. SLADE: So that's a different issue. So we're going to just make our argument that this instruction should be struck from the form in its entirety. The jury should not be instructed on this. Because, again, as you wil1 see in our reply brief, we make the argument, that there is no case in the United States that
$09: 25 A M$
$09: 26 A M$
you're going to be able to find that relies upon a criminal proceedings should somehow toll the statute of limitations in a 50 -year-old incident case. I mean, this has got to be the longest case of tolling in history, so far as I can see from the cases that I read.

So like you said yesterday -- and I looked and read what you said, which I think you were very well informed, and you had very good points to make -- it can't be up to the plaintiffs to make the determination about when the statute of limitations starts, because they were relying on this, and they were relying on that. There has to be an end point. But Mr. Bravo has rights too. His rights are that there have to be some type of statutory federal case law cutoff as to how long this can go on.

THE COURT: I agree with you. I mean, I think that you heard that from yesterday.

## MR. SLADE: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: As a practical matter, if they get any jury instructions, then they'11 also get the statute of limitations instruction; right? Meaning, if you prevail on this, they're getting no instructions. But if we're instructing them, they're going to get a statute of limitations tolling. And I'm sure that you would want them to be told how they figure out if the plaintiff met their burden on tolling. So under that hypothetical and for our purposes this morning and without prejudice to your directed verdict motion, is your objection to the statute of
$09: 27 A M$
$09: 27 A M$
limitations instruction that I have advanced in this set limited to use of the term "accountability processes?"

MR. SLADE: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have a different proposal?
MR. SLADE: No. But I would like an opportunity to confer with my cocounsel, and I would like to make one.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me turn then to the plaintiff team and ask them to respond to the use of the word "accountability processes." While Mr. Langer used it yesterday, where else does it find its source?

MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, I stood up because I had something slightly bigger picture on this point to say.

THE COURT: What was that?
MR. KRISHNAN: Which is that -- I try to do this artfully when I can. Although -- but it's probably too late in the week for me to do this artfully. But given where Your Honor appears to be leaning, we understand that -- you know, in a situation where we're only going to the jury on that first piece up until the first extradition denial, we understand that where Your Honor is leaning on that and would preserve our objections with respect to anything later, but would -- I don't know that we need to argue further depending on where Your Honor is on this particular point. So I have obviously not done that artfully. Maybe I just missed where Your Honor is on this.

THE COURT: I don't know what you want, Mr. Krishnan.
09 : 28AM ..... 1

MR. KRISHNAN: Okay. I -- why don't we go ahead and answer the question that you asked then.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. KRISHNAN: Which is -- go ahead.
MR. MUZZIO: Your Honor, the only evidence in the record is Mr. Langer's testimony.

THE COURT: Oh, no. Sorry. First, can I just ask -have an answer to the legal question, which is: From where do you get that word -- or that phrase? Is it just from Mr. Langer? Or does it find a source in the law that we can look at together or otherwise consider if we should be using a different phrase to describe the thing on which they relied in Argentina?

MR. MUZZIO: I believe it is not used in the two cases we have cited. But I would like an opportunity to review them. However, Mr. Langer's legal expertise and testimony is in the record.

## THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MUZZIO: And he used the phrase, and not only did he use the phrase, but as Your Honor noted correctly this morning, he described the Trelew criminal proceedings as the equivalent to the truth commission. And so he described both of these proceedings as accountability processes, and I think the law is undisputed that Truth and Reconciliation Commissions fall within this category, and so we would offer that. So the 2005 and 2012 --

THE COURT: So that we're moving efficiently, you both
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will have the opportunity to look at the sources, advance an alternative. It is without prejudice to your position that your position was the right one in the first instance, but I think we would benefit from knowing what you would want if you lost.

I likewise feel like I have seen in list form other courts describe in a succinct way a thing going on in another country. And if there's consistency in the case law that is factually applicable to what we've heard described here, it would be my inclination to borrow it from established law. So that's where I'm going to look. But I will otherwise be giving this instruction. And at our final charge conference, we will talk about what the language should be.

MR. SLADE: Can we put on one other thing from the transcript, and then I will sit down?

And that is that on page 133 of our transcript -- this was yesterday -- the Court said: Okay. So even though -- so even though in that proffer you're saying the truth and reconciliation --

THE COURT: Slow down, Mr. Slade. Sorry. Even though --
MR. SLADE: I'm sorry. I have been told that before.
THE COURT: That's okay. Even though in that proffer --
MR. SLADE: I have a copy of the transcript too, Your Honor, and we'11 provide that.

It says at page 133, the Court: Okay. So even though in that proffer you're saying truth and reconciliation, you're

| 09:31AM | 1 | referring to the CONADEP? And Mr. Muzzio says: Yes, Your Honor. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09:31AM | 2 | So I think that's the point that I was making, and that was my |
| 09:31AM | 3 | recollection of the testimony. But -- or the colloquy rather. |
| 09:31AM | 4 | And I can provide -- we can provide that next break. |
| 09:31AM | 5 | THE COURT: It's on the docket. I appreciate it so much, |
| 09:31AM | 6 | but I have it. |
| 09:31AM | 7 | Let me then turn to the plaintiffs, who wanted to talk |
| $09: 32 \mathrm{AM}$ | 8 | about conspiracy. What's wrong with conspiracy? |
| 09:32AM | 9 | MR. KRISHNAN: I can just address it quick7y, Your Honor, |
| 09:32AM | 10 | which is it has to do with the first of the three elements of |
| 09:32AM | 11 | conspiracy. I believe the way that conspiracy typically works, |
| 09: 32 AM | 12 | and I think it's even reflected in the remainder of this |
| 09:32AM | 13 | instruction, is that for the first requirement, two or more |
| 09:32AM | 14 | persons agreed to -- I believe it's committing a wrongful act. |
| 09:32AM | 15 | They don't have to agree to the violation. The violation is |
| 09:32AM | 16 | the -- it comes up in number 3. The violation is the natural |
| $09: 32 \mathrm{AM}$ | 17 | if -- if the violation is caused by the conspiracy to commit the |
| $09: 32 \mathrm{AM}$ | 18 | wrongful act, that's how conspiracy typically works. So that's |
| 09:33AM | 19 | the major issue. There are a couple of other wordsmithing things. |
| 09: 33AM | 20 | THE COURT: Okay. But before you go any further, so |
| 09:33AM | 21 | conspiracy is two or more people agreeing to do something the law |
| 09:33AM | 22 | forbid -- expressly forbids. And that knowing its unlawful |
| 09: 33AM | 23 | purpose, he joined it. The parties in both of their instructions |
| 09:33AM | 24 | seem to take what in criminal law would be two elements and made |
| 09:33AM | 25 | it sort of one. So I've done the best that I could, and I tracked |


| 09:33AM | 1 | this from a number of instructions that have been given in our |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09:33AM | 2 | district. |
| 09: 33AM | 3 | Pat, did this come right out of Emami? |
| 09:33AM | 4 | MR. DARCEY: Yes. |
| 09:33AM | 5 | THE COURT: So if you want to tell me where you drew your |
| 09:33AM | 6 | language from, I thought it was too general. |
| 09:33AM | 7 | MS. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, it's taken directly from |
| 09: 33AM | 8 | Cabello, which is the controlling case on secondary liability in |
| 09:34AM | 9 | the Eleventh Circuit in TVPA cases. The Cabello court didn't go |
| 09:34AM | 10 | on to give the remainder of the instruction, which the Mamani |
| 09:34AM | 11 | court gave. |
| 09:34AM | 12 | THE COURT: But a lot of the Cabello instructions were |
| 09:34AM | 13 | really succinct and very different than |
| 09:34AM | 14 | MS. MATTHEWS: Right. |
| 09:34AM | 15 | THE COURT: I could not customize the parties' proposed |
| 09:34AM | 16 | consistent with Cabello. They were just too far apart. So this |
| 09:34AM | 17 | was closer to that which had been proposed. But the - |
| 09:34AM | 18 | So tell me: The specific objection is to -- |
| 09:34AM | 19 | MS. MATTHEWS: I mean -- |
| 09:34AM | 20 | THE COURT: -- the inclusion of what the unlawful purpose |
| 09:34AM | 21 | of the conspiracy is? |
| 09:34AM | 22 | MS. MATTHEWS: Yes, Your Honor. We think it should say: |
| 09:34AM | 23 | Agreed to commit a wrongful act, which is what it says in the |
| 09:34AM | 24 | Cabello instruction, and that is implied by the fact that the |
| 09:35AM | 25 | conspirators do not have to know the scope of the plan or the |

exact limits of the plan when they join the conspiracy.
THE COURT: We11, the scope of. But they need to know its unlawful purpose. That's required by conspiracy law.

MR. KRISHNAN: But I'm not sure that they need to know that the unlawful purpose is the very thing that would be the violation; that if there was -- so for instance, if we --

THE COURT: Do you have authority on that?
MR. KRISHNAN: I think --
THE COURT: And I mean -- sorry. Go ahead.
MR. KRISHNAN: I think Cabello would be it.
THE COURT: Well, no. So you're inferring from the fact that that was the instruction given that -- I'm disinclined.

MS. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, one of the more recent cases in this district on conspiracy in the TVPA case is Harramio (phonetic) v. Narango (phonetic). I'm mispronouncing that I'm sure. There the court specifically found that the conspiracy was to use paratroop force to combat the illegal drug trade and guerrilla forces, and that was the agreement, the plan.

THE COURT: Do you want to give me a cite?
MS. MATTHEWS: Sure. The case is 2021 WL 4427, 455.
THE COURT: I'm so sorry. My keyboard wasn't with us, 2021 Westlaw. Go ahead.

MS. MATTHEWS: 2021 Westlaw, and 4427,455.
THE COURT: And you're citing that for the proposition that a conspiracy is just the agreement to do something unlawful?

MS. MATTHEWS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: To commit a wrongful act actually.
MS. MATTHEWS: Yes. That's the controlling standard in the Eleventh Circuit at the moment. That's the recitation of the elements that all the courts that I have read use other than I think Mamani. And that's how it's been applied.

THE COURT: Okay. I'11 take a look at that one. What were the wordsmithing issues?

MS. MATTHEWS: On point 3, we think it should be torture, attempted extrajudicial killing, or extrajudicial killings of plaintiffs' relatives. It should be disjunctive, not conjunctive.

THE COURT: I think that's accurate.
Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: I agree, Your Honor.
THE COURT: A11 right. Keep going.
MR. DAVIS: Did you hear me? I said I agree.
THE COURT: Beg your pardon?
Thank you. When I said keep going, I'm sorry. I meant to the plaintiffs.

MS. MATTHEWS: That's the only one. That's the only wordsmith gone.

THE COURT: A11 right. So conspiracy down. And then damages were next, right?

MS. MATTHEWS: Yes, Your Honor. I think this is a minor point, but on compensatory damages, the instruction just
plaintiffs' burden of proof twice. I think that that's just not necessary.

## THE COURT: On page $26 ?$

MS. MATTHEWS: Sorry, page 26. It stated in the introduction. In considering the issue of compensatory damages, you should determine what amount has been proven by the plaintiffs by a preponderance of the evidence. And then below, it states it again with respect to the elements of damage.

THE COURT: Actually, it says it three times, and I think that the standalone sentence is the one that I would be amenable to removing. So it starts by saying that you should look at damages, if any, that have been proven by a preponderance. Then there is a standalone sentence that the plaintiffs have the burden of proof of proving by a preponderance. Then it tells them that you should ask upon the extent to which they have been proved by a preponderance.

So I would be amenable to taking that standalone sentence in the middle bottom of the paragraph that says the plaintiffs have the burden of proving?

Any objection from the defense to removing one of the three references to the burden?

MR. DAVIS: No objection.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. What, if anything, else?
MS. MATTHEWS: And then on the issue of punitive damages, our proposed instruction had accurately stated that it is

| 09: 40AM | 1 | defendant's burden to show that his financial resources should be |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09:40AM | 2 | considered in fixing the amount of punitive damages. That's not |
| 09: 40AM | 3 | currently included in the instruction. |
| 09:42AM | 4 | THE COURT: Okay. Let me just ask the defense response |
| 09:42AM | 5 | to -- I wil1 look back at the Jarra (phonetic) instruction. |
| 09:42AM | 6 | That's where you pulled this from; is that right? |
| 09:42AM | 7 | MS. MATTHEWS: My recollection is we added it based on |
| 09: 42AM | 8 | the case law. |
| 09:42AM | 9 | THE COURT: Okay. I was going to say, I didn't remember |
| 09:42AM | 10 | seeing that language, and it's not consistent at least with the |
| 09:42AM | 11 | phraseology of how I -- if I agree would tell them -- if I agree |
| 09:43AM | 12 | it should be -- that they should be told the defendant has the |
| 09:43AM | 13 | burden, it will be much closer to how they were told the plaintiff |
| 09:43AM | 14 | has the burden on compensatory. But what is the defense position |
| 09: 43AM | 15 | on advising the -- including in the instruction that to the extent |
| 09:43AM | 16 | financial circumstances warrant a limitation of the award of |
| 09:43AM | 17 | punitive damages, the burden bears -- defendant bears the burden |
| 09:43AM | 18 | of proof with respect to his financial circumstances? |
| 09: 43AM | 19 | MR. DAVIS: I wasn't prepared to discuss on the burden of |
| 09: 43AM | 20 | proof. I know that every punitive damage award relates to the |
| 09:43AM | 21 | amount of punitive damages. But that being said -- |
| 09:44AM | 22 | MR. SLADE: Compensatory damages. |
| 09:44AM | 23 | MR. DAVIS: No. But the amount of punitive damages. |
| 09:44AM | 24 | THE COURT: Okay. Then I hear you when you say that you |
| 09:44AM | 25 | weren't ready. But we still need to talk one more time on -- let |


| 09:44AM | 1 | me just try to tic back the issue I've asked you both to propose |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09:44AM | 2 | on statute of limitations, the first element of conspiracy, and |
| 09:44AM | 3 | this. And then so we stil1 have -- am I correct that those are |
| 09:44AM | 4 | the only three things that remain in play on the jury instructions |
| 09:44AM | 5 | from the plaintiffs? |
| 09:44AM | 6 | MR. DAVIS: Yes, Judge. Just so I'm clear on the |
| 09:44AM | 7 | question on the last punitive damages, I haven't researched that. |
| 09:44AM | 8 | THE COURT: Yes, sir. |
| 09:44AM | 9 | MR. DAVIS: You want my position on whether or not it's |
| 09:44AM | 10 | the defendant's burden of proof for their financial resources? |
| 09:44AM | 11 | THE COURT: Yes. Whether or not the jury should be |
| 09:44AM | 12 | instructed that the defendant bears the burden of showing that his |
| 09:44AM | 13 | financial circumstances weren't a limitation on the award of |
| 09:45AM | 14 | punitive damages. That's the position the plaintiffs are |
| 09:45AM | 15 | advancing. |
| 09:45AM | 16 | And I, like you, did not know what the challenge to |
| 09:45AM | 17 | punitive damages was going to be; so I need an opportunity to go |
| 09:45AM | 18 | back. |
| 09:45AM | 19 | And maybe, Ms. Matthews, you could hone us in on your |
| 09:45AM | 20 | best case for that proposition that we should look at, because |
| 09:45AM | 21 | it's a number of cases cited here. |
| 09:45AM | 22 | MS. MATTHEWS: Yes, Your Honor. They're in the argument |
| 09:45AM | 23 | in support. There's two Southern District of Florida cases, LaBoy |
| 09:45AM | 24 | vs. Florida Department of Children and Family Services, and Paul |
| 09:45AM | 25 | vs. Avri11 (phonetic). |


| 09: 45AM | 1 | THE COURT: I'm struggling to find those in this -- in |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09: 45AM | 2 | your advanced -- I'm sorry -- in the support you advanced to your |
| 09:45AM | 3 | instruction, are they there? |
| 09:45AM | 4 | MS. MATTHEWS: They're in the argument section, Your |
| 09:46AM | 5 | Honor. |
| 09: 46AM | 6 | THE COURT: Okay. I see LaBoy. And the other one was? |
| 09:46AM | 7 | MS. MATTHEWS: On the next page, it's Paul. |
| 09:46AM | 8 | THE COURT: Okay. |
| 09: 46AM | 9 | So, Mr. Davis, do you get that? It's page 149 and - |
| 09:46AM | 10 | MR. DAVIS: Sorry, Your Honor. |
| 09:46AM | 11 | THE COURT: Page 149 and 150 of the parties' proposed |
| 09:46AM | 12 | jury instruction cites to two cases there, LaBoy is at 2008 |
| 09:46AM | 13 | Westlaw, 11408625. The parenthetical that follows says: It is |
| 09:46AM | 14 | the defendant's burden of proof to show grounds warranting a |
| 09:46AM | 15 | punitive award reduction. |
| 09:46AM | 16 | The next case is Paul, and it's 901 F.supp 3d, quote: |
| 09:46AM | 17 | Although in assessing punitive damages the Court must consider the |
| 09:46AM | 18 | defendant's financial condition, the burden is on the defendant to |
| 09:47AM | 19 | introduce evidence of his modest means. |
| 09:47AM | 20 | If that's what those two cases say, I'm not sure, Ms. |
| 09:47AM | 21 | Matthews, that I agree that that's the instruction we should give. |
| 09:47AM | 22 | But I'm going to look at it and keep the open mind that I've |
| 09:47AM | 23 | promised Mr. Krishnan. |
| 09:47AM | 24 | MR. DAVIS: I would just say the jury is allowed to |
| 09:47AM | 25 | consider his financial resources. There is evidence in there. |

There wasn't really a lot of challenge on it by the plaintiffs on $i t$, and we haven't challenged it beyond -- in fact, we haven't challenged it. And so the jury can consider those financial resources, which I think is the standard in every punitive damages case I am aware of.
THE COURT: I agree. I think as I understand it, I'm just going to repeat back the three things that I understand to still need to be decided; that is, the inclusion of the phrase "accountability process" or a replacement therefor in the equitable tolling instruction; the first element of the conspiracy charge whether or not it should be left as broad as wrongful acts; and last, punitive damages whether the jury should be told that the defendant bore burden of proof with respect to his financial condition.
Is the plaintiff aware of any other undecided issue with respect to the jury instructions?
MR. KRISHNAN: I don't think so, Your Honor. There is another opportunity for us to put things that are kind of below the threshold on the record objections; is that right?
THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't understand that.
MR. KRISHNAN: Yes.
THE COURT: Are we going to go page by page and wordsmith; is that what you're asking?
MR. KRISHNAN: No, no. I don't think so. It sounds like we have nothing else at this point, Your Honor.
09 : 48AM
09 : 48AM

THE COURT: Okay.
Mr. Davis, are you aware of any other outstanding issue with respect to the jury instructions that needs to be decided?

MR. DAVIS: There is one last issue which relates to compensatory damages for Mr. Cappello; that he is the nephew of the decedent, and he was unborn when the decedent died, and his testimony was that the grandmother received reparations, and under -- like in the wrongful death statute, which is what the courts typically look to, is it would be the grandmother bringing the claim. And I don't know that he would have a basis to claim damages because it's limited to spouse, the children, and the parents under the wrongful death statute. It doesn't go to other relatives.

THE COURT: I don't either. As I sit here, I don't know the answer to that. If you're asking for a ruling on something, I don't --

MR. DAVIS: I'm going based upon what -- I'm just reading the statute, 28 U.S.C., 1350, which is this, and it just talks about --

THE COURT: But tell me, Mr. Davis: Is there an ask at this time? Are you asking me to revisit a jury instruction or --

MR. DAVIS: It just --
THE COURT: Beg your pardon?
MR. DAVIS: It would be a directed verdict as to his damage claims.

| 09: 50AM | 1 | THE COURT: Oh, we wil1 get there. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09: 50AM | 2 | MR. DAVIS: Okay. |
| 09:50AM | 3 | THE COURT: But why don't we finish the plaintiffs' case, |
| 09: 50AM | 4 | shal1 we? I assume you need a break before I bring the jury in. |
| 09: 50AM | 5 | MR. DAVIS: Please. |
| 09:50AM | 6 | MR. MUZZIO: Yes. Your Honor, there's a couple documents |
| 09:50AM | 7 | we wanted to move into evidence. We don't have to do it right |
| 09: 50AM | 8 | now. We just -- I wanted to note that. |
| 09: 50AM | 9 | THE COURT: Please. |
| 09: 50AM | 10 | MR. MUZZIO: So the first one is PDX9. It is the |
| 09: 50AM | 11 | demonstrative that Mr. Bravo used during his testimony where he |
| 09:50AM | 12 | drew the positions. |
| 09:50AM | 13 | THE COURT: Okay. Any objection to PDX9? |
| 09: 50AM | 14 | MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor. |
| 09: 50AM | 15 | THE COURT: So admitted. |
| 09: 50AM | 16 | (Plaintiffs' Exhibit PDX9 received.) |
| 09:50AM | 17 | MR. MUZZIO: Then the other one is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 79 |
| 09: 50AM | 18 | and 79T. There were no objections preserved to this exhibit. |
| 09:50AM | 19 | It's the Interpol document. |
| 09:50AM | 20 | MR. DAVIS: I would object to that. There's been no |
| 09: 50AM | 21 | sponsoring witness that they put up to introduce the Interpol |
| 09:50AM | 22 | document. You can't -- anyway, I would object to the Interpol |
| 09: 50AM | 23 | document. |
| 09: 50AM | 24 | MR. MUZZIO: It was Apostille, Your Honor. So its |
| 09:50AM | 25 | authenticity is not in question, and no objections were preserved. |


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THE COURT: When you say no objections were preserved, you're moving to admit it now. This is the moment where I turn to Mr. Davis and say: Is there an objection to PX79 and 79T?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And those are?
MR. DAVIS: There is no sponsoring witness for it.
There's no basis --
THE COURT: I'm going to admit that I don't understand that objection. Are you contesting its foundation? I'm sorry. I don't know what evidentiary objection that is.

MR. DAVIS: I'm trying to think what the true grounds would be. I don't have it in front of me.

Chanel, can you give me Exhibit 79, please?
I wasn't aware they were going to move this in, Judge. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to make this suggestion then.

Take your break. Let's have the jury come in.
Were you planning on using this document? Was anyone planning on using this document with Ms. Camps?

MR. MUZZIO: I don't believe so, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So we will conclude her cross and excuse the jury and take that argument up and flow directly into directed verdict argument. Sound like a plan? Okay.

A11 right. You are excused. If you could make your way
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you, ma'am.

And if we -- I'm going to be relatively short, I hope. But if for some reason if we get into an emotional area, I will try to be very sensitive to your needs.
A. Thank you very much.
Q. I'd like to go back and talk a little bit about you.

Can you tell me what is your educational background?
A. I went to elementary school, high school, and I went to advanced school but not university level.
Q. Did you have any particular study once you completed your education, or is it a general education completion?
A. General.
Q. And I know you told us a little bit about your current job.

Can you give me just a little high-level background of the kind of jobs you've held in your lifetime?
A. As I stated yesterday, I work with the judiciary system in the city of Buenos Aires.
Q. Yes. I understand that's what you currently do. But is that the only job you've ever had?
A. No.
Q. So I'm asking you before that job -- can you tell us what kind of work did you do?
A. I have worked at a tollbooth on a highway, at the civil registry, which is vital statistics department.
Q. Were both those jobs -- and I want you to continue, but were both those jobs for a government entity?
A. I don't quite understand what a government agency is.
Q. Well, I will try to do the best I can, because I don't -- you know -- okay. There is a federal government and then there's local government. There is a district of Buenos Aires; correct? A. Yes.
Q. Did you work for any -- and I'm talking about entities like that. And I don't know the Argentine government structure, but there may be -- based on the jobs you just described that you worked in, you may have worked for some -- a city or a county or some other governmental subdivision?
A. Not directly.
Q. Okay. Al1 right. So you were telling me you had -- you worked for a tollbooth; a toll collector?
A. Yes.
Q. And then what other jobs did you have before your current position?
A. Just those.
Q. When did you finish -- what year did you finish your education?
A. 2000, approximately.
Q. And you would have been born in 1970 -- excuse me. What year were you born?
A. 1976.
Q. And we saw yesterday the picture of you with your father, we saw that picture. And your father passed away in $1977 ?$
$10: 11 \mathrm{AM}$
$10: 11 \mathrm{AM}$
$10: 11 \mathrm{AM}$
$10: 11 \mathrm{AM}$
$10: 11 \mathrm{AM}$
A. He was killed in 1977.
Q. Understood. But the date of your father's death was in $1977 ?$
A. Yes.
Q. And your father was born in 1948?
A. Yes.
Q. And you would have been 28 years old -- excuse me.

He would have been 28 years old when you were born?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what your father did to make a living?
A. No.
Q. Were you ever given any information about his political activities?

MR. MUZZIO: Objection, Your Honor. Hearsay.
THE COURT: Response.
MR. DAVIS: Yesterday, she -- I'm just testing what she knows about her father. That's all, Your Honor. And obviously -well, that's what I'm doing.

THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. DAVIS:
Q. Please answer.
A. No.

MR. DAVIS: Could you bring up PX 128T? And, Judge -I'm sorry. Before we bring that up, this is a document that's not in evidence, although I will be offering it in evidence. And is there any objection?

| 10:13AM | 1 | MR. MUZZIO: I need to see it. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10:13AM | 2 | MR. DAVIS: It's the letter. |
| 10:13AM | 3 | (Brief pause for counsel to confer.) |
| 10:13AM | 4 | THE COURT: Any objection to the admission? |
| 10:13AM | 5 | MR. MUZZIO: Actually, Your Honor, we would probably have |
| 10:13AM | 6 | some redactions to this document. We think there may be the |
| 10:13AM | 7 | propensity issue with this document. |
| 10:13AM | 8 | MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, do you want us to give you a copy |
| 10:14AM | 9 | of that document? |
| 10:14AM | 10 | THE COURT: I have it up here. I just see that it's |
| 10:14AM | 11 | listed as a document plaintiff expects to offer but objects to. |
| 10:14AM | 12 | MR. MUZZIO: Your Honor, I know that we have some |
| 10:14AM | 13 | objections to specific language in this document. And I would |
| 10:14AM | 14 | want to address that language with you outside the presence of the |
| 10:14AM | 15 | jury. |
| 10:14AM | 16 | THE COURT: What I'm grappling with is that you have it |
| 10:14AM | 17 | listed as a document you expect to offer on your exhibit list, but |
| 10:14AM | 18 | you, nonetheless, object to it. |
| 10:14AM | 19 | MR. MUZZIO: Your Honor, we have this document on our |
| 10:14AM | 20 | exhibit list, but we did not want to open the door to any of the |
| 10:14AM | 21 | propensity issues we previously discussed and this Court has ruled |
| 10:15AM | 22 | On. |
| 10:15AM | 23 | MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I think for my purposes -- I |
| 10:15AM | 24 | don't know what the redaction is they wish. And so maybe I can |
| 10:15AM | 25 | just show this to the witness and ask my questions, and then we |

could take it up after the witness steps down, because it's going to come up with witnesses on my case as well.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Muzzio, can you direct me to where on the page you think there is an issue that you think affects the admissibility of this document?

MR. MUZZIO: The third paragraph, Your Honor, we would have issues with that.

THE COURT: The number 3 or the third paragraph listed on the page?

MR. MUZZIO: The third paragraph that appears on the page. Oh, I see. Yes. The third paragraph that appears on the page, not the number 3 at the bottom of the page. It's the third paragraph from -- starting at the top.

THE COURT: Mr. Davis, do you have other areas to go into? I don't understand the objection. But it is something we should take up outside of the presence of the jury. Do you have a few other areas that you can do?

MR. DAVIS: I have a few others, Your Honor, so I'11 go ahead and move on to that. But I would like to ask this witness about this document if we can get there.
BY MR. DAVIS:
Q. Ma'am, as you understand it, your father survived the injuries he had at Trelew?
A. Yes.
Q. And his death in 1977 was caused by other people?
$10: 17 \mathrm{AM}$
$10: 17 \mathrm{AM}$
$10: 17 \mathrm{AM}$
$10: 17 \mathrm{AM}$
$10: 18 \mathrm{AM}$
A. Yes.
Q. In fact, it was the military who killed your father in 1977, the Argentine military?
A. Yes.
Q. In your direct yesterday, you testified that you -- I think it was 1999 or 2000 you received reparations from the Argentine government in connection with your father?
A. Yes.
Q. How much did you receive?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Do you have an estimate? Was it more than 100,000 pesos?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it more than a million pesos?
A. No.
Q. Was it almost a million pesos?
A. No. I believe -- I believe -- I believe it was 200,000 pesos, approximately.
Q. And in connection with the reparations you received, did you also receive reparations for your mother?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you have brothers and sisters?
A. One older brother.
Q. And did your older brother also get compensation?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he get the same amount as you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you only receive the one payment of reparations from the Argentine government in connection with your father's death?

MR. MUZZIO: Objection, Your Honor, relevance, given the withdrawal of the affirmative defense.

THE COURT: On exhaustion?
MR. MUZZIO: Yes.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. DAVIS:
Q. And have you always lived in the country of Argentina throughout your 1ife?
A. Yes.
Q. And yesterday, you mentioned that you had children. How many children do you have?
A. Three children.
Q. And are you married?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever been married?
A. Yes.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I'd like to get back to the letter now. So you tell me.

THE COURT: I would -- yes, I need the plaintiff to articulate if the concern about the third paragraph falls into the scope of the pretrial ruling with respect to what we've been
calling the motion in limine. Do I understand your objection correctly?

MR. MUZZIO: Yes, Your Honor, and 404.
THE COURT: 404(a) or (b)? What are you --
MR. MUZZIO: It's the Mill's on propensity, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled on that basis. This is the letter that Ms. Krueger testified about; right?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. DAVIS: Then, Your Honor, I would move for the admission of 128 T .

THE COURT: So admitted over plaintiffs' objection.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 128T received.)
MR. DAVIS: And, Dan, can you bring it up?
BY MR. DAVIS:
Q. Ma'am, I would like you to look at what we've marked as Exhibit 128T. This is the English translation of the document.

MR. DAVIS: Could you scroll to the Spanish version of it, Dan? It's part of 128.

BY MR. DAVIS:
Q. So my question to you, ma'am --

THE COURT: Mr. Davis, I'm going to just suggest consistent with the Court's rule that the jury rely on the English translation. I suggest that you publish the English and show Ms. Camps the Spanish, which I have a copy of here if you'd like me to
hand her.
MR. DAVIS: I have an extra copy too.
BY MR. DAVIS:
Q. Ma'am -- well --

MR. DAVIS: May I approach the witness?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. DAVIS: Is it okay if I hand this to her?
THE COURT: Yes, please.
THE WITNESS: Please forgive me. I cannot see a thing. I don't see it. I can't see it.

BY MR. DAVIS:
Q. It is the copy that was produced in the case. And it's the quality of the copy that we have. And so, ma'am, do you know who Ms. Krueger is?
A. Yes.
Q. She's one of the fellow plaintiffs in this lawsuit?
A. Yes.
Q. And are you aware of a letter that she wrote? It's this 1etter of August 24, 2005?
A. I don't know.
Q. So you're -- and I will agree with you --
A. I can't see it.
Q. I'm sorry. What?
A. I can't see it.
Q. So without regard to looking at the document which I wil1
admit -- the Spanish version is a lousy -- is a dark copy. Ma'am, are you able to read English?
A. No.
Q. Now, I'm going to ask you some questions. I'm going to read from the English version, see if that refreshes your recollection about this document, and I'11 go that way.

The letter is dated August 24, 2005, and it's addressed to: Dear Mr. President, and it's the president of Argentina. But it says -- the letter says, quote --

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Davis, from the interpreter, I am not able -- oh, I apologize. Strike that. Go ahead. I apologize.

MR. DAVIS: I don't think I ever could strike anything on the record. Only the judge could.

THE INTERPRETER: No, I apologize for interrupting you.
I see it on the screen now. Please forgive me.
BY MR. DAVIS:
Q. I guess it would be for you as opposed to Ms. Camps, this says: "We, the undersigned, are immediate family members of the young patriots murdered in Trelew on August 22, 1972. A11 of whom offered their life for a fairer, freer, and more equal country."

And it says: "Their execution 33 years ago remains unpunished, and events have not been elucidated by an official investigation." Does that refresh your recollection at all about this letter, ma'am?
Q. I can't have you talk over each other.
A. I cannot discern the signatures. I do see that this is a request for justice, similar to many others that we have presented.
Q. Ma'am, do you remember being asked to sign this letter or a letter like this that was being sent to the president of the country?
A. No, I don't remember.
Q. A11 right.

MR. DAVIS: Judge, that's all I have.
THE COURT: Okay. Is there any redirect?
MR. MUZZIO: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
Ms. Camps, that concludes your testimony. You can return to your counsel's table.
(The witness is excused.)
THE COURT: Mr. Krishnan, are there any other witnesses? MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, I believe that there was that last document that had held over, but there are no more witnesses.

THE COURT: Okay. A11 right.
So, ladies and gentlemen, as you have seen is our practice, we take up oral argument without you. And today is going to be a day when we have in addition to the argument we heard this morning, there are -- the way the trial is structured, we cannot avoid the necessity for us to take this oral argument now; even though you're with us.

So I'm going to give you a longer -- much longer morning break in the hope that you might be able to get a good snack, and then we might be able to have a later lunch break.

Would that work for you?
Okay. So we're going to need 45 minutes, okay. And so I'm going to ask you to be back -- it's now 10:30 -- at 11:15, and
we'11 keep going from there. And I promise you we are making every minute count when we have sent you away to move this as quickly as we can. We will do our very best. I'11 see you at 11:15.
(Jury out at 10:30 A.M.)
THE COURT: Let's take up the document, 79.
MR. MUZZIO: Yes, Your Honor. There is a translation at 79T.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Davis, the objection?
MR. DAVIS: Actually, Your Honor, no.
THE COURT: I beg your pardon?
MR. DAVIS: I'm withdrawing our objection.
THE COURT: Okay. 79 and 79T then admitted without objection. While I'11 ask you to repeat it in front of the jury, does that then conclude the plaintiffs' case?

MR. MUZZIO: I believe we would want to read portions of 79.

THE COURT: So you're going to publish when the jury comes back?

MR. MUZZIO: Yes.
THE COURT: As a technical matter, and I apologize, I didn't know that. So that's why I sent them away for 45 minutes. Recognizing that the evidence is now on -- is now all in, is there any impediment to us moving to the arguments on directed verdict even though you will publish and technically close in front of the
jury when they come back; from the plaintiffs' perspective?
MR. MUZZIO: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: From the defense perspective?
MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Then with that, you'11 please remind me when they come back that you'11 do those two things and then -so conditioned on that the plaintiff has now rested and advanced all of its evidence in the case, does the defense have any additional motion?

I've read of course your written motion, but that is, as I told you before, without prejudice to you making a fulsome motion for a directed verdict at this time.

MR. SLADE: Yes, Your Honor. Defendant was going to move for directed verdict on several grounds.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SLADE: One of which is obviously the statute of limitations, which I will be addressing. There are other issues which Mr. Davis will be addressing with respect to the other substances of the claims.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SLADE: As Your Honor knows, we have briefed these issues. We have been discussing them in the context of the jury instructions and the verdict form. But we don't think that this plaintiff -- that these plaintiffs can prove any set of facts that's going to establish equitable tolling for a statute of
limitations that clearly expired in 2002. This case, as I mentioned earlier, would be the oldest TVPA case on record since the events in question occurred in 1972. If the statute of limitations had been ten years from that date, we would be in 1982. We think that the evidence has shown that, first of all, Mr. Bravo did not conceal himself, which distinguishes it from any other factors in many other cases.

Mr. Bravo moved here to the United States in 1973. He was employed during that time. He went to school. He was involved with the military of the United States. He started a business, he started a family. He bought and sold homes, properties. He was an open and notorious person here in the United States.

So there was no effort to conceal himself. Of course as we know, plaintiffs have withdrawn that argument. So I don't think that's on the table either.

I don't think the plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing of an effort that they have made since 1973 to locate Mr. Bravo or to understand where he was. We argued a little bit earlier today about the difference in the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and we will revisit that. But if we look at the timeline, the date of the incident here was August 22, 1972. Even the claims that they're making with respect to intimidation, witness intimidation, lawyers being killed, these date back to 1974. Mr. Lanusse, President Lanusse left office in 1973, and it
has been established that democracy was restored for a period of time after that. 1983, there was also democracy in Argentina.

Mr. Cappello when he testified talked about the issues that he had with his family; unfortunate where his family home was raided and kidnapped, but that was in 1977.

The Argentine Supreme Court started acting upon what they perceived to be crimes committed earlier during the presidency of Mr. Lanusse and that was between 2004 and 2005 and that certain officers were indicted in connection with trial and potentially other crimes in 2006.

Now, the arrest warrant, as I am told and the evidence seems to have shown, from Mr. Bravo was issued in 2008. So at that point, that's something that certainly could have been discovered or should have been discovered by plaintiffs, the location, whereabouts of Mr. Bravo; that they knew he was in the United States. This was followed by an extradition request made by the government in Argentina in 2008 for Mr. Bravo. And of course the extradition was finally denied in November of 2010.

Now, the Trelew incident is distinguishable from many of the other incidents that you will find in the case law. And why is that? This was a national public scanda1 in Argentina. It was televised on the news. It was in the newspaper. There were protests, which we heard testimony about, at the funerals. There was no cover-up of the bodies like there were in many of the other cases that you see. The bodies were delivered to the family
members. In fact, photographs were taken, autopsies performed at that time. Pictures were taken. So there was no deliberate concealment of the events at Trelew.

Now, people might differentiate or disagree with the results of the investigation, but what happened, everyone knew what happened.

Your Honor, the Eleventh Circuit has been pretty clear about this, even though I think that we've talked about this before, that there's not a case around where the equitable tolling is actually applied, but we would suggest that this is the case for that. This is a case of first impression. The Eleventh Circuit has been clear that equitable tolling must be applied sparingly.

Now, they did not even sue until 2020. And I think as we've gone through the course of the trial, we've seen the problems that this has created and the reason that we have a statute of limitations; because witnesses disappear, their memories fade, documents are hard to locate. This is the reason for that; because to reconstruct the events of what happened in 1972 had to be and was for this trial for all parties a Herculean effort, but that goes to my argument of this is out of time. They must show extraordinary circumstances. And these plaintiffs apparently have changed their theory about why equitable tolling applies, respectfully, dancing from one foot to another by any basis to toll the statute.

They started off -- when they started to talk about extradition, they were relying on the extradition proceeding, but there's an illogic in that. The illogic in that is that if Mr. Bravo was brought to Argentina, they would be unable to get some type of monetary compensation from him. The monetary compensation that they needed to get from him that, if they ever do get from him, would be here where his assets are.

The United States courts were open for business from 1972. There wasn't one day that I am aware of that you could not file a lawsuit. All you needed to do was put together whatever the price is now 400 , $\$ 500$ to file a complaint in this court, and it could be done. They didn't do it. There is no case law that we were able to find, and I think we have talked about that too, that says the statute of limitations for a TVPA claim has anything whatsoever to do with the grant or the denial of a TVPA -- I'm sorry -- with an extradition request.

There is no case law, as we talked about before, about anything having to do with a criminal trial in a foreign country. And that makes sense; because they didn't need extradition or a criminal trial in order to sue Mr. Bravo here. In fact, extraditing him and bringing him back to Argentina would have hurt their claims, because their best way to handle it was the way these lawyers did, was to file a lawsuit here where Mr. Bravo is -- he's been a United States citizen for many years. There is no question that there is jurisdiction here. Jurisdiction has been
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upon his arrival in the United States in 1973? Ever since then, all the man did was work for the military, get himself an education, raise a family, buy a house, start a business, become involved in the community with charities, and not do anything to hide or conceal his whereabouts.

In the Arce case that the Eleventh Circuit considered, the defendants were leaders in the Salvadorian military. And in that case, the jury instructions did not include an instruction on
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the statute of limitation defense.
THE COURT: Isn't that though because the court decided it as a matter of law before it went to the jury, because there was an absence of disputed fact?

MR. SLADE: I believe that's correct, Your Honor.
I wanted to go through a listing of what the Eleventh Circuit, and we put these in our papers, has --

THE COURT: But to be clear though they found -- the Court in Arce found it in the plaintiff's favor, and that's why it didn't go to the jury; meaning that as a matter of law, the Court found the claims tolled; that the plaintiffs were entitled to equitable tolling.

To the extent you're asking me to make this finding that there are no disputes and that it should be entered, it seems to me that there having been -- I understand your disagreement on the law. But if there was a judgment as a matter of law on this, I think that the case law would thus far suggest that I would be -that would be a finding in the plaintiffs' favor on tolling.

MR. SLADE: I think Your Honor could certainly find in defendant's favor. That's what we have directed verdict motions for, because I don't think any set of facts that they could prove would demonstrate that they're entitled to equitable tolling. And let me take you through what the bases for equitable tolling are.

Would you mind passing me my glasses? I'm sorry. My eyesight is not what it used to be.

The equitable tolling considerations that the Eleventh Circuit has indicated include a time when defendant was absent from the United States.

Now, Mr. Bravo has been here. He's testified to that. He hasn't left for any period of time. He hasn't fled.

Now, there was a period of time when Mr. Bravo had immunity from suit, but that expired years ago, and that was also in Argentina. I don't believe that there was ever any immunity entered for Mr. Bravo here in the United States. Any period of time in which a plaintiff was imprisoned -- as far as I know, none of the plaintiffs in this case were imprisoned. There was no testimony about that.

THE COURT: May I suggest, Mr. Slade, that we know the list of factors a court can rely upon are nonexhaustive. So it seems that the most constructive way for us to focus the argument is whether the facts the plaintiffs, in fact, rely on here are supported by record evidence and sufficient to go to the jury. No?

MR. SLADE: I don't disagree with that. I was just giving you the whole shebang. But if you want me to shorten it, I understand that.

THE COURT: I mean, I just don't think there is a dispute that the plaintiffs haven't been to prison.

MR. SLADE: Okay. So what's in the jury instructions, and we can get to the meat of this. What's in the jury
instructions at least as proposed right now where litigants or witnesses -- these are the tolling considerations -- where litigants or witnesses fear or face danger pursuing claims related to human rights violations. There has been no real credible evidence that those fears persisted or had in any way any type of justification. In other words -- I'm sorry -- it may have made sense at or about the time in question, 1972, even through maybe a little bit later, that there would have been a reason for fear. But you can't have that subjective criteria of fear -- which is up to a plaintiff to make that decision when their fear starts and when their fear ends -- toll the statute of limitations indefinitely.

There has to be some objective way for a court to determine when that ends.

So it's very easy to get up there behind the witness stand and say: Well, I'm still in fear today. I've been in fear for 50 years. I'm going to be in fear my whole life. But that gets to your argument of an indefinite tolling. We can't have that.

We have to have an objective cutoff period. And I don't think that the evidence has shown that the fear that they claimed -- and it's all been a little different -- was either significant enough or realistic enough or recent enough to justify a tolling up unti1 let's say past 2008.

There is also a question about whether plaintiffs can
investigate their claims in their home country. While this process, the criminal investigation started in 2005, so at that point, the government was involved in looking into that. So how long it took the government to investigate the claims, I mean, if the government investigation goes on for 20 years, does that mean that the statute of limitations is tolled for 20 years?

I think the question is whether they were prohibited or precluded in some way from investigating their claims. And when the government investigation started, it shows us that there was nothing precluding them at that point. Things have changed in Argentina from the testimony that I understood from the witnesses, even from Professor Brennan, things have changed.

Now, we also know that Mr. Bravo -- I think that there was a document indicating Interpol located Mr. Bravo in 2008, and that was made available information to the prosecutorial authorities in Argentina. So if that's the case -- I'm sorry -and it was made known to the plaintiffs in 2008. So that criteria is not met because they knew where Mr. Bravo was. He wasn't in hiding. And I think Mr. Cappello's testimony was very interesting, because we heard a lot of objections and efforts to keep evidence out about the public availability, the public knowledge of where Mr. Bravo was.

At some point, we have to say, we're in the 21 st century. We're in 2020, or at this point, we were in, you know, 2005, 2008. We do Internet searches on people, the public records of housing
records in Florida is public, Sunbiz is public. We can find anybody we really want if we make the effort.

Now, there has been no effort -- there's been no demonstration or proffer that they looked for Mr. Bravo and they couldn't find him. They didn't even have to leave their desks. They didn't have to come to the United States and start looking around neighborhoods. They didn't even have to leave their desk. All they had to do was log onto the Internet and do a search for Mr. Bravo. They would find RGB Group. They would find out where he lived. But they didn't do that.

We don't think there has been sufficient evidence in this case to show that this could go to the jury. As I said before when I talked about the jury instruction about criminal processes, I think we are bending the law a lot farther than it was intended to go, because if we start basing -- if our analysis of a statute of limitations upon when criminal processes start, or Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is a different animal, okay, I think we run the risk of elongating the statute of limitations indefinitely. And the problem here, these events happened in 1972. I mean, I was 12 years old. I had hair back then. Where do we end this? At what point are we going to make a determination about where this gets cut off?

So if there is ever a case which the statute of limitations for the TVPA should be applied, it is this one. It is this one because this case has also been harder to defend, I'm
sure harder to prosecute because of the unavailability of documents and witnesses and things that have changed. The Trelew prison -- not the prison -- but the military base, you know, it's been altered. It's been painted. It's been plastered. And a lot of things have happened since then. And in a matter -- fairness is part of this, right?

So I understand of course the Court wants to be fair. But the Eleventh Circuit says, listen, we can't have -- we can't just rely on sympathy. But we have to be fair to both parties. We have to be fair to Mr. Bravo who is 79 years old, who has lived here in the United States for God knows how many years, and to have this come out of the blue, it's -- it defeats the purpose of having a statute of limitations. In other words, I realize that the TVPA makes reference to the words justice, but if we open the door to this kind of inquiry after all these years, where is it going to end?

THE COURT: I hear you, Mr. Slade. But you're I think expressly asking me to weigh the evidence. You've characterized the plaintiffs' testimony on fear is not credible, and it sounds like you're expressly asking me to make a fairness choice as opposed to evaluate whether the evidence that's been advanced at the end of plaintiffs' case is sufficient to go to the jury.

MR. SLADE: I don't think it's sufficient to go to the jury. And I am not asking you to weigh the evidence. Although I don't really think that there has been a sufficient proffer of
things like fear that continued up to a point where it would toll the statute of limitations. I'm not asking you to weigh the evidence. I'm asking you to consider the evidence. If you consider what Mrs. Camps said about her participation in the criminal prosecution, like I said earlier, it's absolutely no different than any person in the United States who participates in the criminal process as a witness or a victim.

THE COURT: I have to ask -- when you raised it the first time, I put in my notes to ask you, there's no indication in any of the TVPA cases of the extent of the plaintiff's specific involvement that I found in any reported case other than the court characterizing it as time-consuming. There was no specific facts, or as far as I could tell, even anything that was specific to the plaintiffs there as opposed to an expectation. And so I point this out because you're making the argument that the criminal proceeding or her involvement in it is not like that which we might expect to see in a truth and reconciliation act. And I don't know what your basis for advancing that is.

MR. SLADE: I'm basing it on her testimony.
THE COURT: No. I mean the comparison to make it to.
MR. SLADE: I'm basing it upon the characterization of what the truth and reconciliation process was in the case law in Liberia and Somalia where you had two governments who completely collapsed, and the country made the determination to install these truth and reconciliation-type commissions to basically fix global
problems in the country itself; to do all sorts of things that are not typically done in a criminal proceeding.

In a criminal proceeding, as I understand in Argentina and here, the purpose of it is to establish the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant. My read on what the truth and reconciliation process is in other countries is it's much broader. The purpose of it is to heal the country as a whole. It's not only to deal with guilt or innocence. It's to promote truth telling and reconciliation. I'm not aware that there was any testimony about that here.

Psychological healing for victims, I think what I understand it is that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission provides that. I don't think I heard any evidence or any testimony about Mrs. Camps saying when she went to visit or when she went to see the criminal proceedings in Argentina, they provided any type of psychological healing for her. I don't know whether there is any testimony about whether the purpose of the criminal proceedings in Argentina was to establish an accurate historical record other than with respect to this one thing. And as I said too, CONADEP, which Mr. Langer testified to, was a truth and reconciliation-type process, but in 1983; not in 2005.

Restoring dignity to victims, I'm not aware that that happened. I mean, there hasn't been any proffer about that. I don't have any information telling me that the government of Argentina said: Hey, you know, the victims of this incident, you
know, they really weren't at fault. I didn't hear that.
And I didn't see any recommendations which could result in states or jurisdictions prosecuting perpetrators of violence and promoting justice for victims as a whole.

So it's almost like a -- it sounds to me as almost like a legislative quasi -- a legislative and judicial process together that we're going to have accountability and we are going to fix the country. I don't see that that happened.

I'm going to ask the Court to enter a directed verdict on the statute of limitations. But I will turn the podium over to Mr. Davis unless the Court has any other questions to address other issues in the case for which we don't think the plaintiffs have met their burden.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Slade.
MR. SLADE: Thank you.
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, we'd move for directed verdict as to the claim of Mr. Cappello under the TVPA 28 U.S.C., 1350, you know, he would not be a person who could claim damages. He wasn't alive when his uncle died.

He's not a direct -- so he's not a direct descendant. He is not a brother. He's not a parent, and it would not have -- and I'm just going down the language of the statute itself. I don't have a case that says this, but it's, you know -- and in Florida, as Your Honor I believe knows, that it's limited to spouse, children, parents. But, you know, I know in applying federal law
that he would not be a claimant.
The second part of this -- and I don't know how we would address this -- is Ms. Camps just testified and it is not disputed in this record that her father survived what happened to him at Trelew and then her father was killed in 1977 not by Mr. Bravo and not related to Mr. Bravo and not tied to Mr. Bravo, and whatever damage claim she would have would be limited only to the injuries that he had, and, in fact, it would be like a survivor claim by Mr. Cappello -- excuse me -- by Mr. Camps up until 1977 when he was actually killed. And I don't know what basis there would be for her to have a damages claim under did -- under this factual record.

And then my additional on grounds, Your Honor, would relate to a motion to -- for directed verdict as to the remaining portions of the claims on the merits, but particularly, there has been absolutely no evidence that there was any type of conspiracy in this record. There's been no testimony -- I mean, there's been argument that there was a conspiracy. But there's been no testimony about a conspiracy or even circumstantial evidence on which a jury could infer that a conspiracy exists, and the same thing for -- there is no evidence that there is a joint enterprise or that Mr. Bravo was aiding and abetting in the commission of a TVPA. I would ask that you enter a directed verdict on that. So that's our motion, Your Honor.

So as to the remaining portions of the TVPA claims, but
specifically as to Camps -- Ms. Camps and Mr. Cappello's, as I just described.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me make sure that I understand your positions or the relief that you're seeking. For Cappello, you're seeking a directed verdict in full because he has standing?

MR. DAVIS: Standing was dropped as an affirmative defense by Mr. Sonnett, but he has no damages claim. And so, yes, he has no injury that's recognized by the courts for him to be compensated. So he should not be able to recover damages, and so that is the motion there.

And as to Ms. Camps, we have to tease out how her father survived. She was born after the Trelew incident, and he was killed by others in 1977. So her claim would be a very restricted one as to the time from -- I would assume from when she was born, to the time of her -- to the time of her father's death.

THE COURT: Okay. Two questions.
Mr. Cappello's claims, he also is the personal representative of his uncle's estate; is he not?

MR. DAVIS: And he's the sole beneficiary, yes. Actually, I don't know if he is the personal representative of the estate.

THE COURT: Isn't he? That's how it's pled, and I remember that he described the court process in which he became the estate.

MR. DAVIS: That all may be true.

THE COURT: Okay. So both of your verdict forms sought one entry for damages and punitive damages per plaintiff and did not separate in personal capacity versus in the estate, and I assumed it was intentional since you both did that.

So how does that affect your argument, Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: He is the sole beneficiary. He testified, his grandmother, I'm sure Your Honor remembers, his grandmother was the one who was involved in this -- in 2016, I believe was the time he said his grandmother passed away, and he has picked up the family mantle I guess for the lack of a better word. But he is the sole heir.

THE COURT: So that I understand the relief you're seeking at directed verdict, are you advancing that there has been no evidence of that the estate can assert a claim for damages?

MR. DAVIS: Correct. I mean, there is no evidence -correct, I mean, the pain and suffering would go to first particularly to denominated heirs such as children, parents, brothers and sisters, but not an unborn nephew.

THE COURT: But that's under the statute as opposed to as a matter of -- the law recognizes someone's ability to step in for the estate as he has done here. There's damages and pain and suffering, I think, that arise from killing.

MR. DAVIS: But pain and suffering for whom?
THE COURT: For the descendant for whom he stands in the shoes of the estate, meaning, I don't -- I'm sorry. And this is
not -- if you can advance authority to me so that I can look for additional guidance, but it wasn't my understanding that the plaintiff -- that where the estate is the plaintiff, then the representatives' pain and suffering is the measure.

MR. DAVIS: Well, there is -- well, the whole point is there is no compensable plaintiff in this claim.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand your argument. Okay. So let me turn to -- did you complete your -- you did. You're sitting down.

Okay. So let me turn to the plaintiffs on -- if you don't mind, can I ask you a series of questions?

MR. KRISHNAN: Yes, Your Honor.

## THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KRISHNAN: Although, let me just say that I'm prepared to do a part of the sort of record creating portion of the response to the motions. If there are questions that really go to TVPA law or things like that, you're probably aware that I am not the strongest member of our team to answer them.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Slade's argument with respect to an absence of evidence that, for example, an inability to find him that factor as a basis for tolling cannot serve as the basis to have tolled the statute of limitations all the way up to 2010. Agreed?

MR. KRISHNAN: Correct.
THE COURT: So Mr. Slade will correct me if I'm wrong,
but I understand his argument to parse out the plaintiffs' factual bases for tolling the statute of limitations and requested directed verdict on them individually. Let me try to explain that better how I understood it. But so using that example on which the parties agree, because it is without dispute that the families had identified him in the United States in 2008, inability to find him could not have tolled the statute of limitations to 2010. And accordingly, the defendants would be entitled to a directed verdict as to that theory -- or rather -- I guess more pointedly here that the jury should not be instructed or permitted to find that the equitable tolling as a result of the inability to find the defendant made these claims timely.

MR. KRISHNAN: We agree with Your Honor on every substantive matter. The only question I have is the availability of a directed verdict to one tolling factor, but certainly we do not intend to argue to the jury that this tolling factor proceeds past 2008.

THE COURT: I agree with you procedurally in terms of that was -- while we're making this argument at the directed verdict posture, it is not, you're right, a partial directed verdict, but rather a question of whether or not the plaintiffs have produced competent evidence that should go to the jury; that would ask the jury to find tolling based on, for example, the inability to find the defendant unti1 -- beyond 2008.

MR. KRISHNAN: We agree.

THE COURT: Okay. And then Mr. Slade would also argue that fear could not have been a factor that delayed or rather justified -- tolled the statute of limitations until 2010. Let me just pause and ask Mr. Slade am I understanding your argument right.

Am I?
MR. SLADE: I think Your Honor has hit it correctly.
THE COURT: Okay. So then that's how I'm going to ask you to respond to the motion, which is: What should you still be allowed to argue to the jury? Should you be able to -- is there record evidence that would support your ability to ask this jury to find that the fear was an extraordinary circumstance up to 2010 that permitted you to toll the statute of limitations -- or, rather, that tolled the statute of limitations?

MR. KRISHNAN: We would put forth the following evidence, Your Honor; the plaintiff Raquel Camps testified to the -testified to her grandmother's statement that "silence is health" as of 2002 and her grandmother's refusal to share with her the circumstances of her father's death.

THE COURT: I think that was the grandfather; but any way around it. That was when she was ten.

MR. KRISHNAN: No. This was in 2002 I believe she testified to, Your Honor. There was a conversation with her grandfather when she was ten years old where he said, never ask me about that again.

THE COURT: That's what I thought you were referring to.
MR. KRISHNAN: And then there was a period after she started learning about her father in the '90s, in 2001, where she went to her grandmother and tried to talk to her, and her grandmother -- this was the "silence is health" statement. Do you recall that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I do.
MR. KRISHNAN: That happened in 2002. It came from her grandmother. And the reason why I raise that, and I understand Your Honor is talking about 2010 and that this is eight years before that, but the basis for our ability we believe to go up to 2010 on fear is the extraordinary events that occurred previously in the '70s, the '80s, and even parts of the '90s, that were testified to by many witnesses, death camps, torture, disappearances, such that continued fear -- there was continued fear based on those things, and then I'm going to get to --

THE COURT: I'm going to ask -- I'm going to tell you that I agree with that point. It is candidly why I permitted the latitude that I did with respect to that evidence, because notwithstanding the fact that it wouldn't have been relevant to tolling during that time period, I viewed it at the time as relevant to the family's ongoing fear. And I'11 preview to the defendant so that you can use the remaining time efficiently that I am not going to limit the presentation on tolling with respect to fear. I think that there is record of evidence there.
11 : 09AM
11:09AM

MR. KRISHNAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'11 just add two more points then.

There was record evidence between the 2005 to 2010 period of witness intimidation in the Videla trials in Spain, and from 2012 to 2016 in the La Perla trials that Dr. Brennan discussed, so that was our factual basis for opposing on fear.

THE COURT: I understand. I wouldn't -- I'm hard-pressed to characterize that as competent evidence, but it came in. But it's sort of negated by the finding I've made or ruling with respect to the other evidence with respect to fear.

Okay. I will give Mr. Slade the last word on statute of limitations. The reality is this: You agree this will be the longest, oldest, and on circumstances that no other court has waded into, if this jury comes back and finds that they were, nonetheless, extraordinary circumstances.

MR. KRISHNAN: I don't want to agree to that yet, Your Honor. But I do want to give Your Honor one data point which we developed right now. It was the Harr (phonetic) case. It was -the death occurred, the killing, it was from the Pinochet regime 197--

THE COURT: '73. And the suit was filed?
MR. KRISHNAN: In 2015. So it's six years -- it doesn't answer your question. It's not -- this is still longer.

THE COURT: That's okay. It was a rhetorical question. I just am quite mindful of the ask. But as I mean -- like I said,

Mr. Slade, I will give you the last word. But I think that it would be a mistake to take it away from the jury and that it goes to the jury to ask whether or not these are extraordinary circumstances that tolled the statute of limitations.

Oh, before you do though, I know I told you I was going to give you the last word, and I promise. But I do want to get plaintiffs' response with respect to damages because I've had questions as I listened to the testimony myself. But I am not sure that I also understand the ask.

So what is your response?
MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, on Ms. Camps, I can answer, which is that she's bringing legal -- she's bringing her damages claim on behalf of the estate. So those are the claims of the estate.

Mr. Camps survived. So there was pain and suffering during his life, and that's the claim that Ms. Camps brings.

THE COURT: Oh. But I think that his argument was that her damages should be limited to the pain and suffering he experienced up until his death in 1977 at someone else's hands; right?

Isn't that the argument, Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
MR. KRISHNAN: We don't dispute that. We're not going to try to seek other damages for compensation during his life.

THE COURT: A11 right. Then next. I cut you off.

MS. VARGAS: Your Honor, as to Eduardo Cappe11o, he is the nephew and the only surviving relative, and aside from his role as estate representative, under the TVPA the victims' both legal representative may present a claim, but also any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. And when the -- and that would be under the Florida wrongful death statute.

However, when there is no remedy provided under the state law, courts in the TVPA are directed to look to the law of the country where the violation took place, and I have case law for that. It's ex Rel Tapia v. Drummond, 640 F.3rd, 1338.

THE COURT: Sorry. Slower. 640 F.?
MS. VARGAS: 1338. And I believe that plaintiffs have presented enough evidence that Mr. Cappello is a proper representative and can present claims on behalf of his uncle now that he is the only surviving relative of Eduardo Cappello I in Argentina.

THE COURT: Okay. Do the plaintiffs agree that, for example, let's just stay with Mr. Cappello, the damages that he is limited in seeking here are not his own, but those on behalf of the estate?

MS. VARGAS: We would argue that he can seek them on behalf of the estate, but also inasmuch as he has presented evidence that the death of his uncle affected his -- him personally.

THE COURT: Not from an evidentiary standpoint. I know

he said that, there is evidence to support it legally; is he permitted to present -- I'm sorry -- to demand damages?
MS. VARGAS: As far as I understand the case law, he should be permitted to bring a claim for damages because even if the Florida wrongful death statute would not permit that, I think we have adduced evidence that he has been and is the representative -- or is able to bring -- to continue the criminal claims in Argentina after his grandmother died.
And so he continued -- he is the complainant now in the criminal case that's going on.
THE COURT: I understand the relevance of it now.
Al1 right. I promised to give the last word to you, Mr. Slade, but it's -- while I agree with you that this is unique, I wonder if you appreciate that from my perspective that also cuts against you.
This is your directed verdict to convince this Court that the jury shouldn't decide the matter that as a matter of law, the facts here are not extraordinary and don't toll the statute of limitations.
MR. SLADE: I disagree. I hate to say that. I disagree that it cuts against me. I think it's in my favor. Because the way I look at it is if you want to come to a federal courthouse and make the argument of equitable tolling, you should have some authority to support your position. But if you don't have the authority to support your position, you should be subject to a
directed verdict motion.
But anyway, I have a few things to say. I'm not going to take up much more time on this. I sense the Court's anxious to move on. But I want to clarify -- if you're going to give me more time, I wanted to clarify something. Are we striking that based upon -- I know you said there is no partial directed verdict motion. At least I've heard that.

THE COURT: We will have to look at the jury instruction again if that's what you're asking.

MR. SLADE: Yes; about the unable to locate defendant charge.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. SLADE: I guess what I also would like to know, and this is -- well, again, for the record, I don't think these parties have established due diligence, which is a standard under the Eleventh Circuit case law.

THE COURT: I have considered that heavily. And it is my observation that in order for me to reject their efforts as diligent, I would have to replace my -- I would have to replace my finding for that of the jury, which is inappropriate. I understand and I have given a lot of thought to that.

But whatever my perspective on the diligence, there is evidence that the jury wil1 credit and deduce from.

MR. SLADE: I understand your point. So thank you for clarifying that for me. But the one thing I want to talk about
with respect to fear, and I was really hoping to hear a lot more detail in response to my argument about the lack of fear. But what I heard was that something that was told to Mrs. Camps -- and that doesn't include any of the other plaintiffs, just Mrs. Camps -- by her grandmother in 2002 that "silence is health" that that is going to be enough to prevent a directed verdict on this issue of fear. I mean, this is obviously going to go to the Eleventh Circuit. And we're going to have the Court ruling on whether this one statement by someone's grandmother in 2002 "silence is health" which is ambiguous in and of itself, that's enough, that one statement is enough to take this case and send it to the jury.

THE COURT: I appreciate your frustration, and I caused it. So I cut plaintiff's counsel off in proffer because I felt like I could see where it was going, and I agreed. And so and that's why I made the observation that I had anticipated from their various proffers and outside of the jury argument that it would be the position as it was, and at least the two live plaintiffs testified that their systematic fear -- not their word, mine. I'm just trying to cut to the chase -- stays with them today. And that it was -- you have to link it up to just about everything else that was introduced through the country conditions testimony and everything about the families.

But I could see where Mr. Krishnan was going with it --
MR. SLADE: Okay.
THE COURT: -- because I had dealt with those rulings
throughout the trial. So that is my fault. I just wanted to try to use the time efficiently, and I was satisfied for the purposes of the directed verdict. I just want the record to be clearer that my ruling is not limited to a 2001 ambiguous statement.

MR. SLADE: Okay. I understand. I'm not frustrated. I'm actively engaged in this, and this is a very interesting experience.

But I do believe that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs cannot determine subjectively whether they're in fear forever in order to keep the statute of limitations running or tolled, rather, indefinitely. That's my only other point, and then I will sit down.

THE COURT: I agree with you on that point. Again, the question that I'm precisely being asked is whether or not these plaintiffs on this record will be permitted to argue to the jury that an extraordinary circumstance that tolled the statute of limitations at least unti1 November 1st of 2010 was their fear of persecution if they brought these claims.

MR. SLADE: I understand the Court's ruling. Thank you.
THE COURT: I know you do. Okay. Then take a comfort break before we bring them back, and we will -- when we come back -- I'm sorry. To be clear, I'm denying the directed verdict motion at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence and of course without prejudice to your ability to renew.

I still agree that we need to look at the jury
instruction a second time, but we're going to look at it anyway. So you'11 take your break. We'11 bring them in. You'11 publish and rest. We'11 do the defendant's case. You'11 rest. We'11 take another longer break after the defense case is in, and we'11 have to figure out both how you eat and we get our jury instructions done. We'11 take that up after the defendant's case then.

## Okay?

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Judge.
MR. SLADE: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, do we have a time for

## returning?

THE COURT: Do you have a time for what?
MR. KRISHNAN: Returning.
THE COURT: For returning?
MR. KRISHNAN: Are we taking a break? I'm sorry. You said five minutes?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. KRISHNAN: I'm sorry.
THE COURT: Okay.
(Recess at 11:21 A.M.)
(Jury in at 11:27 A.M.)
THE COURT: A11 right. Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen, from your big morning break.

We're ready to proceed if you are, Mr. Muzzio.

MR. MUZZIO: Yes, Your Honor.
At this time, I would like to read in a portion of Exhibit 79T.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MUZZIO: Can we have access to the ELMO?
Buenos Aires, March 3, 2008.
Mister Judge, I am pleased to address you in connection with File No. 12-4122-year 2006, entitled Sosa, Luis Emilio; Bravo, Roberto Guillermo, et a1., for their alleged perpetration of illegitimate deprivation of liberty, tortures, and aggravated homicides Trelew being processed before that honorable court, and in regards to the international capture timely ordered against citizen Roberto Guillermo Bravo.

In this respect, please be informed that we received the following message from our Interpol counterpart in Washington:
"Matter: Roberto Guillermo Bravo, date of birth 03-07-1942. Concerning our communique on the above, Roberto Guillermo Bravo, who is being sought in Argentina for the crimes of "illegal deprivation of 1iberty" and "premeditated homicide," we hereby confirm that he is currently residing in the State of Florida, U.S.
"Additionally, our preliminary investigation indicates that Roberto Guillermo Bravo is residing in the State of Florida.

Please inform us regarding your intentions of seeking a provisional arrest warrant via a formal diplomatic channel and
your intentions of extradition concerning Roberto Guillermo Bravo.
"Deputy Commissioner Edgardo Rawmundo, Tossetti, second head of the international affairs department Interpol.

MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, plaintiffs now rest.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have now heard all of the evidence in the plaintiffs' case.

And I'11 turn to Mr. Davis and ask if the defendant has a case to advance?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Are you ready?
MR. DAVIS: Yes. We're going to be playing depo
designations. We need the computer access switched to our side.
THE COURT: It shal1 be so.
MR. DAVIS: These are addition -- we're going to start with Carlos Celi.

THE COURT: Just remind the jury of the name.
MR. DAVIS: Carlos Celi. Pardon my pronunciation. He has already testified in part in the plaintiffs' case.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Davis.
(Video deposition of Carlos Humberto Celi played.)
MR. DAVIS: That's the end of that designation, Your Honor.

Next we're going to play one of the plaintiffs you also heard from, Ms. Santucho.

THE COURT: Ms. Santucho, okay.

MR. DAVIS: Judge, do you need a copy?
THE COURT: No, thank you.
MR. MUZZIO: This one actually -- let me -- I think we are okay with this one. No objection.

THE COURT: Admitted without objection.
MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
(P1aintiffs' Exhibit PX129 received.)
MR. DAVIS: I'm going to continue, but I know she's going to talk about the letter, so I wanted to get it in.

THE COURT: Go ahead.
(Video played.)
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, that's the end of the playing.
There is one other matter and just the dates that we talked about.
Your Honor, I think -- can you give me the date -- excuse me -- one moment?
(Brief pause to confer with cocounsel.)
MR. DAVIS: There are three dates that we stipulated, and I just want to make sure that we stipulate to the right dates.
THE COURT: Of course.
Ladies and gentlemen, I will remind you that a stipulation is a fact that's agreed on by the parties. And when they do so as they have in this case, you must treat that fact as found; meaning, it's not in dispute.
MR. DAVIS: Judge, we have the PACER is locked up and somehow. I apologize.
THE COURT: ECF is down in our district right now.
MR. DAVIS: Oh.
THE COURT: Sorry. I knew that. What do you need?
MR. DAVIS: The three dates are the date the extradition was filed, which is February 2010, but I don't know the exact date, but we will get it.
THE COURT: I think it's the 23rd, but I have access. So is that the date you're looking for?
MR. DAVIS: That's consistent with Chanel's recollection.
MR. MUZZIO: And ours.
MR. DAVIS: Okay. And counsel's. So we can stipulate to February 23, 2010, being the date the extradition was filed.
The date the extradition was denied is November 1st, 2010, and the date the lawsuit was filed is October 20, 2020.
THE COURT: Okay.
12:50PM 1
Ladies and gentlemen, do you understand that those three
dates are stipulated to by the parties? Those facts are found.
MR. DAVIS: With that, Judge, we'd rest.
THE COURT: Okay. The defense has concluded its case
now.
And I'11 turn to Mr. Krishnan and ask if there is a
rebuttal case.
MR. KRISHNAN: There is not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
Then, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you've now heard
all of the evidence in this case. The two pieces that involve you
in this courtroom that remain are for me to give you the Court's
instructions on the law and for the parties to give you their
closing arguments. So while you have heard the evidence, it's not
ready for you to start discussing or deliberating over. So that
we have an opportunity to make sure that we're ready to give you
those instructions and closing argument, we're going to go ahead
and take your lunch break. We're going to be working.
But we'11 have you come back -- counsel, can I ask if it
gives you sufficient time if I have the ladies and gentlemen of
the jury come back at $2: 00$ ? It is ten to $1: 00$.
MR. KRISHNAN: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So then that's what we'11 do. You go
those last two pieces. I just want to reiterate my instruction and caution you not to talk about the case, keep an open mind until it's completely finished even though you've heard the evidence. Okay. Thank you for your patience.

We'11 see you at 2:00.
(Jury out at 12:52 P.M.)
THE COURT: Mr. Slade.
MR. SLADE: I was going to ask for a bathroom break; five minutes, is that possible?

THE COURT: Yes, absolutely. So just as a matter then of us figuring out what we're going to do. We're going to finish going through the jury instructions. And then I figured that you would also need and want a lunch break before you go into your closings.

MR. SLADE: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. So you go ahead and take that if we can the five-minute break, and then we'11 do the jury instructions.

MR. SLADE: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Recess at 12:53 P.M.)
THE COURT: Let me lead by just telling you a couple of other things that I identified as issues. If we look together at pages 8 and 9 of your set, they belong at the end. I have moved them to the back. Hyper-technical, I understand. I just want you to understand.

MR. DAVIS: What was the page, Your Honor?
THE COURT: 8 and 9. They're the ones that just -because I told you there are damages, they should be the last thing I say. So I've moved that to the back.

Your page 10, which has currently a heading that says, claims and liability, that second or rather the third paragraph is almost fully redundant to the instruction that sits on page 17, and the version on page 17 is much more fulsome. So it would be my preference to cut the redundant first one leaving the one on 17.

MR. DAVIS: That's okay with the defense.
THE COURT: Any objection from the plaintiffs?
MR. KRISHNAN: I apologize, Your Honor, which was the first one?

THE COURT: 10, page 10 is the one -- that's the paragraph I'm proposing to cut. It's both internally redundant and redundant to page 17.

MR. KRISHNAN: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So we're going to take that out just that last paragraph. Okay.

Similar issue on extrajudicial killing as Ms. Matthews and I were covering earlier, the instruction on Cappello is so succinct and covers none of these extraneous definitions, and I suggest that we follow suit.

After the third numbered paragraph of that instruction, I
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01 : 04PM
would strongly recommend that we trim all of those other definitions out. They're not -- there isn't evidence that goes to these issues. They're not on the verdict form. Plaintiff agrees?

MR. KRISHNAN: Yes, Your Honor, we agree.
THE COURT: Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to cut that. I just think it's confusing.

And then jumping to liability for conspiracy.
MS. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, one quick question: Would the same apply to the attempted extrajudicial killing instruction also on the definition?

THE COURT: No, you're right. It should.
MR. DAVIS: I couldn't hear what she said.
THE COURT: Page 13, Ms. Matthews is right. Thank you. So that would apply to that last page on that last paragraph on page 13, and the numbered paragraphs on page 14, and the paragraph about acting under color of law but not substantial step. That would stand. Right?

MS. MATTHEWS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: Defendant agrees, Your Honor. We agree. I thought I said it.

THE COURT: Okay. On the conspiracy instruction, having revisited Cabello and a couple of other cases, I agree with the
plaintiff that the pronouncement in the Eleventh Circuit of the elements is more consistent with the way they proposed that two or more persons agree to commit a wrongful act. I will deleted the language that I proposed here.

MR. DAVIS: Which means you would be changing
paragraph 1, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, only the first.
MR. DAVIS: So it would be: Two or more persons agreed to a wrongful act?

THE COURT: Commit a wrongful act.
MR. DAVIS: Agree to commit a wrongful act?
THE COURT: Yes. And the second paragraph is where the wrongful act is there defined just as it is.

MS. MATTHEWS: I think the third paragraph is where the wrongful act is defined. The goals of the conspiracy --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, Ms. Matthews. I didn't catch that. Start again.

MS. MATTHEWS: I thought the third paragraph is what defines the wrongful act. But the second -- the goals of the conspiracy, wouldn't that be broad?

THE COURT: I don't know how to contextualize what you're telling me. The only change I'm proposing is, as you requested, that the first element there, the first numbered paragraph, be changed to "two or more persons agreed to commit a wrongful act."

MS. MATTHEWS: I think if you delete "agreed to
$01: 06 \mathrm{PM}$
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deliberately torture, kill, and attempt to kill" in number 1, you would then also have to delete "torture, kill, and attempt to ki11" in number 2 after goal of the conspiracy to make those two consistent.

THE COURT: I think that probably does make it more consistent.

Mr. Davis, your position on those two changes? And then the paragraph 3 continues there to define the torture, attempted extrajudicial killing or extrajudicial killings of the plaintiffs' relatives were committed by someone. So one of the acts in furtherance was committed by somebody in the conspiracy.

MR. DAVIS: I'm trying to follow what the proposed change is. I think I'm okay with it. But I just --

THE COURT: Sure. Let me -- from the top on page 19, there are three numbered paragraphs. The change I am proposing is the numbered element one would now read: "Two or more persons agreed to commit a wrongful act."

Paragraph 2 then would read: "Defendant Bravo joined a conspiracy knowing of at least one of the goals of the conspiracy and intending to accomplish it; and" -- and then we change the third numbered paragraph is to replace "and" with "or."

MR. DAVIS: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: On statute of limitations, at the bottom of your number 23 that last bullet point where plaintiffs were unable to locate the defendant, I would omit. And have either of you had

| 01:08PM | 1 | a chance to consider or propose alternative language for the final |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $01: 08 \mathrm{PM}$ | 2 | numbered or bulleted point on page $24 ?$ |
| 01:09PM | 3 | MR. MUZZIO: We have, Your Honor. We think the |
| 01 :09PM | 4 | instruction is appropriate as is. But I did want to note that the |
| $01: 09 P M$ | 5 | Jane case uses language that's not only consistent with the |
| 01:09PM | 6 | instruction but it's broader in describing both truth and |
| 01 : 09PM | 7 | reconciliation and civilian justice systems. And that appears at |
| $01: 09 P M$ | 8 | pages at 871 of the Jane $W$ case. It says: "Each avenue of |
| 01 :09PM | 9 | potential accountability for the massacre." And this was the |
| 01 :09PM | 10 | massacre of the Lutheran church from the military to civilian |
| 01 :09PM | 11 | justice systems and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission failed |
| 01:09PM | 12 | to punish the perpetrators. |
| 01 :09PM | 13 | MR. SLADE: Your Honor, we stil1 object to the |
| $01: 09 P M$ | 14 | instruction as a whole. But we have not had a chance to talk |
| 01:09PM | 15 | about a potential narrowing, if that's possible. |
| 01:09PM | 16 | THE COURT: You haven't had a chance to talk about a |
| $01: 09 P M$ | 17 | narrowing among your team? Is that what you mean? |
| 01:10PM | 18 | MR. SLADE: I thought you wanted us to talk to opposing |
| 01:10PM | 19 | counsel about it. |
| 01:10PM | 20 | THE COURT: Wel1, I always invite that. What I meant was |
| 01:10PM | 21 | to talk within your team and propose alternative language. I will |
| 01:10PM | 22 | tell you that I had invested some time. The Jane case is also |
| 01:10PM | 23 | what I came up with, and while I agree that the accountability in |
| 01:10PM | 24 | particular uses it as a noun, civil and criminal accountability |
| 01:10PM | 25 | just as a noun in the Jane case. |

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$01: 10 \mathrm{PM}$

In the manner that we're using it, it wouldn't work to just kind of hang out there like that.

Processes I think is too vague. And though what I would propose is accountability proceedings. And I understand your continued objection to instruction that suggests to the jury criminal -- a criminal case, but it is my observation at least that -- because I considered and weighed different options, like judicial proceedings or 1itigation, and all of them are imperfect fits.

And the point that I think is substantiated in the case law, and I think even your argument touched upon the quasi judicial and quasi legislative aspect of those proceedings that have been found to toll the statute of limitations, that they might not fit into a box that we know how to uniquely define, and so it is my goal to advance something to the jury that is narrow and specific enough to give them meaningful guidance without choosing a proceeding that they have to find, because a list of factors should be nonexhaustive.

I think the right answer here is accountability proceedings.

MR. SLADE: Rather than processes?
THE COURT: I thought that proceedings was more specific than processes in giving them guidance about -- that it's something finite; that it's a procedure that begins and ends as opposed to what's a process. That was my thought, Mr. Slade. You
can tell me I'm wrong.
MR. SLADE: I told you, you were wrong before, but I'm happy to do it again. I understand this is your ruling. If it is your ruling, I'm going to just renew my motion to strike, okay, get a ruling from the Court -- granted, denied -- so we'd preserve our record. That's all. Because I don't agree that that's an appropriate instruction in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. To Mr. Muzzio: Accountability processes versus proceedings?

MR. MUZZIO: We agree with Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. And I heard no reaction to my proposal to strike that third bullet point consistent with my discussion with Mr. Krishnan. Going once. Going twice.

MR. MUZZIO: One moment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: While you're doing that, just so I'm moving the ball forward, I am not persuaded by the cases that I looked at on punitive damages that the jury should be told that the defendant bore the burden of proof on that. I think that the instruction as we proposed it is an accurate statement of the law, and I am not persuaded that either case suggests otherwise. So I am not going to add that language to the punitive damages instruction.

I am, however, inclined to separate punitive damages on the verdict form from compensatories (phonetic), again in the manner that the Cabello court did, so that they consider statute
of limitations, liability as to each plaintiff, and compensation as to each individual plaintiff; but then whether the circumstances of the case warrant punitive damages, and then an opportunity to indicate with respect to each of the plaintiffs the amount of punitive damages.

But I agree with the way that it was structured there; that punitive damages should be reached after they finish going through the liability portion. So I've rearranged it in that respect.

MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, I think we can live with that. But I did -- I think we may have had a misunderstanding with respect to -- going back to the statute of limitations, the third bullet point.

## THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KRISHNAN: The conversation I got -- the third bullet point is of the list of nonexhaustive factors where plaintiffs were unable to locate the defendant. I thought the conversation we had was that we would not go past 2008 on that.

THE COURT: That's true. But if you don't go past 2008 with that, then they can't decide in your favor.

MR. KRISHNAN: But they could because -- I mean, just for instance, although let me just think here.

THE COURT: Let me try to say it this way, and then you can respond. Maybe I didn't articulate it well. If the jury were to find that the plaintiffs couldn't locate the defendant and
that's the only factor that they found in your favor on tolling, are your claims timely?

MR. KRISHNAN: No. But -- you're right. You're right on that point, yes, Your Honor. But can I give a different scenario?

THE COURT: Okay.
MR KRISHNAN: They don't buy into the fear, and so the only thing that gets us to 2008 is the inability to find Bravo; right? They might say that fear ended at some point earlier. 1983 is what the defense is proposing, and so we might need the inability to find him to get us to 2008. And then thereafter, we would rely on the bullet 4 to get us the rest of the way.

THE COURT: What page?
MR. KRISHNAN: 23.
THE COURT: Mr. Slade, I saw you on your feet. Did you want to be heard?

MR. SLADE: I think we're going to give the Court an opportunity to review it and then we will --

THE COURT: No, I looked back at it. I'm ready for you.
MR. SLADE: I think he's mixing things up here, Your Honor. There's separate prongs here, and the Court's already ruled about this issue about plaintiffs were unable to locate the defendant. And they're seeking a second bite at the apple. I don't want to make this more confusing. But the Court's ruled on this already, and fear is a separate part of the instructions, which the Court -- you know, it's in there, and it's going to be
there. So fear and unable to locate are two different things.
THE COURT: They are. I resist the qualification that they're prongs that -- at least in my mind -- suggest that these are multiple things that they have to satisfy as opposed to a nonexhaustive list of factors that they can consider. And I agree with Mr. Slade. I thought that this had been decided and we're revisiting it. Because I had understood there to be an acknowledgment on the plaintiff side that the inability to locate him is not a factor on which this jury could rely in finding your claims were timely filed in 2010.

MR. KRISHNAN: I don't think that's exactly what you asked me, Your Honor. You asked me if we only won on that factor.

THE COURT: That's what I just asked you now. But during the directed verdict argument, I thought that that was the concession.

MR. KRISHNAN: I thought I was also being asked that if all you got was that one prong and you didn't get any other prong, we lose. I agreed with that.

By the way, this would go to the jury -- however, it is also an alternative to fear. And so if the jury doesn't believe that fear gets us all the way to 2005 or 2008, they think that the fear should have stopped earlier, then we would be relying on inability to find the defendant, plus the reliance on accountability proceeding. So we would be relying on those two. Those two together would get us there. We couldn't get there on
inability to locate the defendant standing alone. We concede that.

But because in this situation we also have the accountability processes, it could be something that we need to rely on.

THE COURT: I am -- I'm both grappling with the potential for confusion for the jury and the fact that it's a true statement supported by evidence and advanced by the plaintiffs.

MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, I will say that our plan for closing was to explain this; that certain -- you know, the factors overlap and we would use -- we would be explaining it. I understand that it's not the simplest concept in the world. But I think we would be explaining the multiple overlapping factors at different periods of time.

MR. SLADE: Your Honor, is he proposing stacking them on top of one another? Because that's what it sounds like.

THE COURT: Functionally, yes.
MR. SLADE: I don't think that's how it works.
THE COURT: Except that the TVPA cases -- I mean James most recently I think. Ms. Mathews will tell me I'm wrong.

But I think the most recent one that I saw where the court, quite literally, looks at four to six factors and says: Based on all of these, this took you from this period to that period. Maybe you could have filed a suit here, but then it relapses. That's a long way of saying this would not be the first

Court that recognized tolling periods may be different for different factors -- different periods of time based on different factors.

MR. SLADE: I think that's a determination for the Court, first of all. And I think you're going to make this so confusing for the jury -- I just -- I think it's going to confuse the jury.

And I think there's been a stipulation and agreement about 2008, for good reason, because that's what the testimony has shown. So why reinsert an issue into the case that's really not there anymore and the Court's already ruled on it?

MR. KRISHNAN: It's completely in the case, Your Honor. What's out of the case is post-2008. We agree that this factor doesn't get us past there, and we wouldn't argue to the jury otherwise.

And even if Your Honor wanted to include language that limits that factor to 2008 , no later than 2008 , that would be acceptable to us, too. We're not trying to go past 2008; it's just that we might need it to get to 2008.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm editing the last sentence on 23 that begins with the words such extraordinary circumstances to insert the word: "may include, but are not limited to."

I am going to leave the factor that enumerates location of the defendant. I am going to edit the last one to accountability proceedings.

Your objection is preserved, Mr. Slade. I think that
your jury will follow the instructions and understand that these are examples that it may include. Okay.

With that, are there any other changes or issues with the jury instructions?

MR. KRISHNAN: None here, Your Honor.
MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to input those changes, and the law clerks will print a copy for each side for you to inspect during the lunch break.

If you find anything wrong, please immediately bring it to our attention to input the changes. And I'11 see you at five to 2:00 for that purpose; so that you can tell me if there is a problem.

MR. SLADE: Five to 2:00?
THE COURT: Five to 2:00; a half hour. I know it's short, but you're almost there.

MR. DAVIS: We understand. And do we have the verdict form?

THE COURT: If you wait for just five minutes -- not even, hopefully -- the law clerk will bring it out to you right now, and you' 11 have both to review.

MR. KRISHNAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Five to 2:00, and we'11 make sure at that time I will ask you if there are any additional objections not preserved; meaning anything you haven't previous7y raised to
the jury instructions. Okay?
MR. DAVIS: Just for the record, Judge, we would renew our motions for a directed verdict as previously proffered to the Court now at the close of the evidence.

THE COURT: The defendant's motion is recognized, and the ruling is the same as at the close of the directed verdict; that I think the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury.

And I will excuse you all while I make these changes very quickly, and we will get you the instructions.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. SLADE: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. KRISHNAN: We can go back to our room then?
THE COURT: Yes. I'11 have the clerk bring it back to you in your room there.
(Recess at 1:26 P.M.)
THE COURT: Did you get both sets; the instructions and the verdict form?

MR. MUZZIO: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: A11 right. Have a seat.
From the plaintiffs, have you had a chance to go through the instructions?

MR. MUZZIO: We have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You have?
MR. MUZZIO: The instructions, yes.
THE COURT: Any further issues?

MR. MUZZIO: No.
THE COURT: From the defense, have you had a chance to go through the jury instructions?

MR. SLADE: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Are there any further issues?
MR. SLADE: No further issues, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Then let me just ask: Without prejudice to your prior objections that are made and preserved, does the plaintiff have any objection to the manner in which the Court decided the jury instructions?

MR. MUZZIO: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Does the defense?
MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. The verdict form is different than we discussed this morning, I know. Have you had a chance to both look at it?

Plaintiffs?
MR. MUZZIO: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any objection to the verdict form?
MR. MUZZIO: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Tel1 me.
MR. MUZZIO: We would object again to the statute of limitations question being presented before the questions related to the claims.

THE COURT: Okay. Is that the only?

MR. MUZZIO: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. From the defense?
MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. This is the format in which I intend to do it. And it is a complete bar if they find that the claims aren't tolled; so that is, I think, both consistent with the law and what they have to decide now.

So over the plaintiffs' objection, that's how I intend to order it.

So if there are no other objections on either the verdict form or the instructions, then we can go to closings.

MR. MUZZIO: No further objections.
MR. DAVIS: No objections, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Let's bring them in.
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, one thing. I don't think we ever decided. We have both been pretty busy.

My preference is you read the instructions at the end of closing.

THE COURT: Yes. That's what we're doing.
MR. DAVIS: Okay.
MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, are we allowed to refer to instructions during closing; not put them up or anything --

THE COURT: The Court's final instructions, absolutely; totally appropriate. Not your own, but anything that is in the final set, then, yes, absolutely.

Are there any other questions or issues with demonstratives, tech that we need to do before they come out? Okay.

Seeing no hands, are they ready?
(Jury in at 2:01 P.M.)
THE COURT: Okay.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, welcome back. Everyone else, please be seated.

I hope that you enjoyed second your lunch and that you are ready to give the attorneys your undivided attention as they turn to their closing arguments.

We are almost at the conclusion of the case, but not quite there yet. And so, again, please listen carefully to the attorneys as they tell you their arguments.

Mr. Krishnan.
MR. KRISHNAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Could we also please have access to the court's video system?

THE COURT: Do you have it?
MS. LIND: We do, thank you.
MR. KRISHNAN: May I proceed, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. KRISHNAN: Hello again, everyone. Thank you again for the tremendous and generous time and attention that you have given us this week. All four of my clients, including Alicia and Marcela who could not be here today or this week, thank you with
their full hearts for listening to their story, to listening to the injustice that they have suffered, and the pain that they have experienced.

And we now ask you to hold Roberto Bravo accountable. He ruthlessly killed Marcela Sanchuto's pregnant mother, Ana Maria. He killed Alicia Krueger's husband, Ruben Bonet. He killed Eduardo Cappello's uncle and namesake. And he shot Raquel Camps' father, Alberto, and left him to die in a cold prison cell surrounded by death.

I have three simple points to make to you today. And if we can go to the first slide -- the next one. These are the three key points of evidence that I'm going to talk to you about today.

First, that Mr. Bravo conspired to shoot and kill 19 unarmed prisoners and was not acting in self-defense.

Second, that my clients' lawsuit was filed on time in a timely manner.

And, third, that Mr. Bravo must be held accountable for the massacre.

On the next slide, I want to make one point about the attacks on each victim.

Now, there will be a slightly different way when you go into your deliberations that you' 11 have to talk about Alberto Camps compared to the other three victims. And that's because Mr. Camps survived the shooting. He wasn't killed that night. And so as a result, different legal claims will apply with respect to Mr .


Camps than for the other victims.
For Mr. Camps, the legal claims are attempted extrajudicial ki11ing and torture by shooting. If you'11 recal1, Mr. Camps had a survivor statement, and he explained how Mr. Bravo came to his cell, asked him if he would now answer questions, when he said, no, he was shot in the stomach at close range.

Now, that is an attempted extrajudicial killing,
extrajudicial because no judge ordered that. And it was also a form of torture by shooting, which I want to just take a second to explain. Oftentimes we might not think of shooting someone as torture. In this case, it obviously was. Mr. Bravo was trying to elicit information from Mr. Camps as explained in his survivor's statement, and when Mr. Camps refused to give it to him, Mr. Bravo shot him. And, in any event, when you get your jury instructions, you'11 see that torture includes intentionally inflicting severe physical pain, and that is exactly what shooting is.

So the shooting of Mr. Camps will be both attempted extrajudicial killing and torture. Those are claims that will apply with respect to Mr. Camps. And for all of the other victims the claim will be extrajudicial killing, and again, extrajudicial because no judge ordered what happened that night.

If we could go to the next slide. I'd like to talk to you a little bit about the legal standard, the burden of proof that you're going to be applying. It's called the preponderance of the evidence.
$02: 07 \mathrm{PM}$
$02: 07 \mathrm{PM}$

Now, just to set this up, this is not a case that's full of nuance. We've presented a lot of evidence showing that Mr. Bravo and his fellow officers came to the cellblock area on the night of August 20 -- or the early morning of August 22, 1972, to harm the prisoners.

Now, Mr. Bravo, on the other hand is saying, oh, it was all a mistake. We were just trying to shoot Pujadas. Pujadas tried to pull a gun, and maybe we were trying to shoot one or two others who were moving forward, but then we accidentally shot all 18 -- all of the other 18 plus Pujadas.

Now, you're going to have to decide who is right. Those are the two stories that have been presented to you in this trial.

Now, my clients bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but my clients only have to prove -- and this is the important part -- we only have to prove that our claims are more likely true than not true. Even just a little more likely is good enough. And as you see on the scales there, even by a feather, that would be more likely true than not true if you think of the scale as weighing each side's case. But as you'11 see, we don't just have a feather more of evidence. We have compelling evidence that tips the scales conclusively in our favor.

We can go to the next slide. We're going to see that the medical evidence is all you need to find that Mr. Bravo is lying and that he and his fellow officers deliberately killed the
prisoners. Remember, Mr. Bravo clearly testified that he was the closest soldier to the prisoners. He said he was nine to ten feet away. You saw him testify to this in court. There was the question: So Mr. Pujadas and Mr. Sosa were collectively nine to ten feet away? His answer was, yes.

He also testified that the prisoners couldn't move more than one to two steps before they were shot. And he testified that the prisoners were moving towards him. If we go to the next page.

We'11 see that three separate pieces of medical evidence independently, each one standing alone independently, expose Mr. Bravo's story as a lie. As Dr. Anderson, the medical pathologist made clear, at least two bodies, Jorge Ulla and Ruben Bonet had gunshot residue on their wounds, meaning that they had been shot from within 20 inches. And Mr. Ulla's wound was a press-contact shot.

So we have the photo of Mr. Ulla, that's number one. Number two, we see in the text below -- that's from the Ruben Bonet autopsy. It's Plaintiffs' Exhibit 71T at page 4, and it describes -- and Dr. Anderson also discussed that this last bullet was shot from a short distance, and there was fine blackish gunpowder grains observed. As Dr. Anderson testified, that second shot was taken from within six inches.

So you have two different independent pieces of evidence that show that there were close contact shots that couldn't have
been taken with the nine- to ten-foot separation that Mr. Bravo clearly testified to. There is no way that his story can be true. Those officers went in after the survivors and shot them at close range. That's the only way that you can explain those two pieces of medical evidence; the U11a photograph and the Bonet autopsy.

And then we have the photo here of Miguel Marileo. He was the undertaker who treated the bodies. We saw his video testimony during the trial. And this is the clip of him pointing to the back of his neck. And if you recall, he was asked about a young woman's body where he noticed something; that there weren't any other wounds on her body.

And he said: That I found a single wound, a gunshot to the nape, to the back of the neck.

There is no way, there is no way if Mr. Bravo's story is true, there is no way that one of the victims would have only a single gunshot wound at the back of the neck. She was shot execution style. That is the more reasonable view of that piece of evidence.

So there are three pieces of medical evidence that independently show that Mr. Bravo's story is false and that there were execution-style killings, which is exactly what Mr. Camps said in his survivor's statement.

So before I move on, just a quick point about evidence. You will be getting evidence when you go back to the jury room. We've been talking about these exhibit numbers during the course
of the trial. So if there is something that you see during the summation when I'm speaking to you that you want to look at, we have exhibit numbers here, you can take those down so you're able to look at them in the jury room. We have PX11 on the U11a photograph, and we have PX 71T, the Bonet autopsy there.

If we can go to the next slide.
Now, let's see -- can we actually go to the next slide?
The one after this.
Oh, Ms. Lind, are we able to go to the next slide after this? Okay. We11, why don't we take that down for just a second while I talk in another point.

There is a separate piece of evidence that independently exposes -- we talked about three. This is another category of evidence that independently exposes Mr. Bravo's story as a lie. And that is the forensic analysis, those bullet holes in the bathroom door.

Now, you wil1 recal1 -- and unfortunately, I think we're missing the right slide here, but you'11 have in evidence what's marked as PDX9. PDX9 was the drawing that Mr. Bravo made -- oh, here we go. Thank you so much. PDX9 on the left is the drawing that Mr. Bravo made in court, and PX122 is the -- actually, PX 122 isn't showing up properly here. This is Dr. Pregliasco's plan. And what you can't see here -- I think there's probably a tech issue. But remember there was a red trajectory that he marked, which was the only place that he marked a line, the only range of
places where the shooter could have been for those two bullet holes. And what we see is that it was simply not possible for the way that Mr. Bravo described the shooting by Pujadas for the two bullet holes in the door to have appeared.

Now, obviously, the conclusion -- and if you recall, Mr. Bravo came out during his examination. He did a demonstration for everyone. He went down like this. He demonstrated what Pujadas looked like when he is shooting the gun. He said that Pujadas shoved down Mr. Sosa, he came down like this, and he said the gunshot was fired from around here. Later, he said that that gunshot -- the height of the gun was maybe four feet, no higher than five feet. Five feet is probably about here. Even if you give him the benefit of the doubt, the gun was shot at five feet high.

Dr. Pregliasco testified and demonstrated that if you were standing at the place where Mr. Pujadas was supposedly standing according to Mr. Bravo, Pujadas would have to have been shooting like this in order to make the gunshot -- the bullet hole in the door that we saw.

So that piece of forensic evidence independently shows that Mr. Bravo's story is wrong.

What it really shows is that those bullet holes were completely fabricated. And you don't fabricate evidence like that if one of the prisoners is shooting at you, unless what actually happened is that you went in, you killed them, and then you were
creating a counter-narrative that they were coming at us. The prisoners were coming at us. They attacked us. One of them got a gun. They got some shots off.

The existence of those bullet holes at a place that is inexplainable with respect to where Mr. Pujadas was shows that Mr. Bravo's story is false.

Let's go now to the slide that we were at before. I think we're a few slides back. Thank you.

Another piece of evidence that completely exposes Mr. Bravo's story as a lie is the Camps statement.

Now, Mr. Camps' survivor statement was written one day after the shootings, and it tells us what really happened. It's much more consistent with the physical evidence than Mr. Bravo's story. But it also proves that Mr. Bravo is lying; because, remember, Mr. Bravo says that he never spoke to the prisoners while they were at Trelew. If that were so, why would Mr. Camps fabricate a story that identified Mr. Bravo as the wrongdoer if they had never met? How would he even know Mr. Bravo's name when Mr. Bravo says that he never spoke to the prisoners? It doesn't make sense.

And here we see some of the things that Mr. Camps said to him. For instance, Mr. Camps said in his survivor's statement: "The only person who treated us with unjustified harshness was Bravo." Why would he said say that about Mr. Bravo, a person who he had never met before? How would he even know to blame that on

Mr. Bravo? It doesn't make sense that Camps would have identified Bravo in his witness statement. And remember, in Camps' witness statement, he says that he was in the very back, cell number 10 near the north wall. He was nowhere near the front where Bravo claims to be. He wouldn't have even seen Bravo that night. And yet in his witness statement, he identifies Bravo as the man who was interrogating him the week before and was treating him with unjustified harshness.

Let's go to the next slide. Something else that Mr. Camps says in his witness statement: "On Tuesday the 22nd around 0300 hours, I was woken up by the shouts and insults of Captain Sosa and Officer Bravo." Remember, Bravo says even that night he never spoke to the prisoners. He says Sosa went up and down the hall shouting at the prisoners asking them to come out. Why would Camps have put Bravo's name attached to that act if Bravo had never spoken to them before?

And then next on the next slide, we see Mr. Camps also says: "Officer Bravo shooting his .45-caliber pistol at point-blank range wounding me at the level of the stomach." He says that Bravo came into his cell and shot him. He would have no reason to just make up some story about Mr. Bravo if what Mr. Bravo was saying true. If what Mr. Bravo was saying was true that he never met the prisoners before, that he never spoke to the prisoners before, why would it be that Camps would blame Bravo for that?
Notice the one thing that Mr. Camps does not blame Bravo
for. He doesn't blame Bravo for the one thing that Mr. Bravo
actually admits to doing, which is standing in the front of the
hall and shooting down the hall with machine guns. And do you
know why Mr. Camps doesn't blame Mr. Bravo for that? He says he
couldn't see. That's what an honest witness says; that they
couldn't see what was happening up there. He said he heard the
machine gun fire. He jumped into his cell. He doesn't blame
Bravo for the one thing he experienced that Bravo actually did.
And instead, somehow takes this person who he somehow doesn't even
know and blames him for everything else. It makes no sense at
all.
Let's go to the next piece of evidence.
And by the massacre outcome, I am talking about how this all
played out at the end. All of the soldiers were perfectly fine,
not a scratch on them, and all of the prisoners were shot. I just
want to take a second and step back and have us all really
consider Mr. Bravo's absurd story. So there's a prison block
holding 19 prisoners in eight or nine cells, all of the prisoners
are let out of their cells and shot, and not a single soldier was
injured. That's all the people of Argentina knew back in 1972.
And as Dr. Brennan explained, there was huge public outcry about
that. And it's because people wouldn't buy this lie.
And it doesn't get more believable when you hear Mr.

Bravo tell it. Remember, he's now saying that he shot people who he couldn't see. He says that the prisoners weren't running forward. They were just moving forward when he shot. So he's saying, I was very -- I was very scared at the time, it all happened so fast. You know, maybe some people were moving forward. They weren't running, and you know, I couldn't see all the people in the back. And oops. I ended up shooting everyone. I shot through ten rows of people by accident. That's his story.

And then he goes on to say, by the way, also Pujadas shot at us, and he missed. So none of the soldiers get hurt, all of the prisoners get shot, and that's his explanation for how that happens when they were under the control and custody of Mr. Bravo. It doesn't make any sense at all. These are trained military officers who know how to operate their weapons. And by the way, it is highly, highly unlikely that Mr. Bravo is just the logistics guy that he now pretends to be.

The Rawson Prison break was obviously a black eye for the military dictatorship. The military wasn't just going to call a random logistics guy back from vacation, that's Mr. Bravo supposedly, to come to the Trelew base and oversee the prisoners who committed this escape that was a black eye for the military. It just makes no sense that they would have done that.

And remember, the burden of proof in this case is a preponderance of the evidence. The question here is: Are my clients more -- are my clients' claims more likely true than not

true? And this is just simply not a hard case. The evidence falls decisively in my clients' favor.

Then there is the fact that Mr. Bravo and his fellow officers had absolutely no reason for being at the prison block that night. That's another major hole in his story. He doesn't have any corroboration as to why he and three other officers showed up at the cellblock area at 3:30 A.M. People don't show up in an armed group at 3:30 A.M. unless they're looking to mess with someone. And that's exactly what was happening here. What's Mr. Bravo's story? That some sailor told him to come.

If you showed up somewhere for seemingly no reason at all at 3:30 A.M. and all of a sudden, 19 people died, you would want to make sure you knew who the sailor was who told you to go there in the first place. But he still to this day says he doesn't know the name of the person, can't identify the person. There is no way to know who this sailor was who told him to come to the cellblock area. And what did the sailor tell him? That the prison guards guarding the prisoners -- this is what the sailor supposedly told him -- was that the prison guards guarding the prisoners were uncomfortable because the prisoners were doing something. And you see here the question: So the sailor reported to you that the corporals watching the cellblock were worried that something was wrong; right? His answer was, yes. So that's why he came, he says.

But what's the problem with that? Mr. Marandino, the
guard who was actually there at this prison block area, says that that wasn't happening. The prisoners were not acting up. There was no reason for these officers to come. He was asked -- again, remember, his deposition was taken by video, and it was an Argentine judge asking the questions at this point, and she asked: Did you see any behavior that could be considered inappropriate? And he answered: No, no. Everything was calm. In fact, it was a very cold night.

So there was nothing going on at the cellblock area when Mr. Bravo and his fellow officers showed up armed at 3:30 A.M. They came there to shoot the prisoners. The sailor is just a cover story.

And then there is the fact that Mr. Bravo, obviously, let the prisoners out of their cells. This is one of Mr. Bravo's greatest lies in this case. Why did they let all the prisoners out of the cells at the same time? It's completely an unjustifiable thing to do, and Mr. Bravo knows that, and so he doesn't even try to justify it. What does he say? Oh, Mr. Sosa did it. Mr. Sosa let them out. I was just watching. He was my superior officer. I didn't want to say anything. Mr. Sosa let them out of the cells. And by the way, Sosa is now dead, so he can't say otherwise. But it was clearly Mr. Bravo who did it. We have two sources from the same time -- back from that time both of whom -- and both of those sources say that it was Bravo, not Sosa, who let all of the prisoners out of their cells. So you see at
the top, it's Mr. Marandino. He testifies: Lieutenant Bravo asked me to open the cells, and then I was told to leave. It wasn't Sosa. It was Bravo.

And then you also see this -- what we've called the Auditor General's Report. It's DX 2. This was what the military wrote to whitewash what happened saying, oh, all of the soldiers acted appropriately. They're innocent. But it's pretty clear it was Bravo. It says Roberto Guillermo Bravo decided to order the detainees to come out of the cells where they were housed. Two pieces of evidence from back at the time put it on Bravo. The idea that Sosa did it simply isn't true. It's a lie, as is the entirety of Mr. Bravo's story.

Now, we get on to the inconsistencies in his story. And Mr. Bravo used a number of techniques during the trial to conceal the truth. But one of the most common was simply to change his deposition testimony as if that were no big deal. So I should make one thing clear. Depositions involve giving testimony under oath. And if someone is willing to change their deposition testimony so easily, you have no reason to trust their testimony at trial. The most obvious inconsistency in Mr. Bravo's story has to do with whether there were one shot or two shots in that bathroom door and as to whether Pujadas fired one shot or two.

And to be clear, Mr. Pujadas never fired any shots. The whole thing was fabricated. But Mr. Bravo testified at deposition that Pujadas could not have, could not have fired more than one
shot. But here, he changed that story to two. He said two. And he did so to conform his testimony with the magazine article that showed two bullet holes in the door.

So here that's one inconsistency in Mr. Bravo's testimony. There were a litany, but we've given a couple or several of them here. So it was two shots versus one shot. He admitted that during his deposition testimony he said that the prisoners were facing forward towards the soldiers. But during his testimony here at trial, he had them facing each other. He admitted that here at trial that -- or he testified here at trial that he wasn't sure whether Mr. Marandino was in the room. He couldn't see him. But he admitted that during his deposition, he testified that Mr. Marandino was in the room.

He changed his testimony about the positioning of the officers, and for that, you just have to compare PDX9, which was the diagram that he drew today in court -- or a few days ago in court with PX 3, which was the diagram he drew during his deposition, and factor in his deposition. And even earlier at trial, he testified that the Auditor General's Report was perfect and very thorough. And then we looked at all of the inconsistencies between his testimony and the Auditor General's Report, and he took all of that back.

These inconsistencies are all reflective of the fact that Mr. Bravo's story is not true. When you're trying to tell a lie, it's hard to keep it straight.

I now want to go on to a separate point. We've looked at all of the evidence that shows that Mr. Bravo's story is not true. I now want to go on to some of the other issues that you're going to have to think about in the case.

One of them has to do with the forms of group liability. Now, not all legal violations are committed by one person. Sometimes they're committed by groups, and that was the case here. And when there are two or more people who either have an agreement or a plan or try to help each other in doing something wrong, they can all be liable for the bad acts of anyone in the group.

And so why is that important here? Because Mr. Bravo may not have personally shot -- personally himself shot all of the victims, but that doesn't matter. He can still be responsible for the gunfire of all of the soldiers either because he ordered them to fire or because they had a plan to come in and kill the prisoners. And if there was such a plan, he's covered by one of these liability theories. And those theories are -- and you're going to hear the judge explain these to you, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise. So those are forms of group liability that you'11 have to consider when you do your deliberations later today.

It's also important here to talk about circumstantial evidence. As the Court is going to explain to you, circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances that tend
to prove or disprove a fact. And the instructions also say that there is no legal difference in weight that you may give -- no legal difference in weight between direct or circumstantial evidence. What that means is that circumstantial evidence can be just as good as direct evidence.

And that's important for these types of group liability theories because usually people who are in conspiracies don't go around admitting that there was a conspiracy. Instead, you have to use circumstantial evidence to prove that people were in a conspiracy together, that they had a common plan, or that they were helping each other out.

So if we go to the next slide, we're going to see some of the evidence that there was a group plan and that there was a premeditated plan to go in and kill all of the prisoners, kill or shoot.

First, the telephone office was unstaffed. This was critical evidence that came in from a video witness, Mr. Celi. He was the conscript who was responsible for that telephone office. And that telephone office, he pointed out on his map that you saw, is right where the cellblocks are.

And what he said is that telephone office had to be staffed $24 / 7$ because all calls in and out of the base went through that office. When was the one time that that telephone office wasn't staffed? The night of the shootings. It shows that this was a premeditated effort to kill the prisoners.

Mr. Marandino's testimony. When you look -- recall his testimony, he testified by video, what did he say? He said that the officers came in, Bravo ordered me to open all the cells and then leave. Why do you tell a corporal to open all the cells and then leave? Only one reason in this circumstance, which is you don't want him there to watch as you shoot all the prisoners.

It demonstrates that they had a plan, they wanted to get Marandino out of there so he wouldn't see what they were about to do. There was no reason for the officers to go to the cellblock in the first place. Remember, the fact this made-up sailor story -- they made the sailor story up. They just showed up. Four officers showed up at 3:30 A.M., and Mr. Marandino was there at the cellblock area. They just showed up.

The fact that they showed up together with guns is evidence that they came there to kill. They had no other reason to be there at 3:30 A.M. They had to fabricate the reason, oh, some soldier told us something was going wrong. But we know that wasn't true. Marandino said that there wasn't anything wrong. It was all calm. The fact that they came there all together at 3:30 A.M. in the morning for no reason shows that they had a common plan, a conspiracy to come there and kill the prisoners.

The fact that al1 19 prisoners and none -- were shot and none of the soldiers were shot. How does that happen? How do you accidentally shoot al1 19 of them when you can only see a few? The fact that they were -- and that none of the soldiers get hurt,
none of them. It's evidence that that was their plan all along. If that wasn't their plan, they just came, this Pujadas thing happened, and they tried to stop it, it wouldn't be the case that just all 19 of the prisoners were shot, none of the soldiers were harmed.

And, finally, the close range and execution-style shots. This was the medical evidence we looked at, at the very beginning. That is some of the best evidence of conspiracy. Obviously, the fact that they went in to finish off the survivors, execution style, close range shows that they came there to kill. It wasn't that they just started shooting because Pujadas fired off some shots and then stopped when they were done. They went in afterward to finish off the survivors. That's evidence that that was their plan. They came in with that plan.

So we have a lot of circumstantial evidence that these folks were involved in a joint criminal enterprise, they had a conspiracy, and they were aiding and abetting, and Mr. Bravo was aiding and abetting the plan of the group.

Okay. Let's go to the next slide. This is a pretty key point. Al1 of the evidence in the case contradicts Mr. Bravo's story. There were eight third-party witnesses in this case. There were four expert witnesses and four folks like Mr. Marandino, Mr. Ulla, Mr. Celi, Mr. Marileo, the undertaker, all of them testified for the plaintiffs.

Nobody has come here to testify for Mr. Bravo. You saw
the plaintiffs rested their case today; about 45 minutes later or an hour and a half later, we played some video clips of witnesses that already appeared in the plaintiffs' case, and that was it. Where are Mr. Bravo's witnesses? There weren't anybody. Nobody has come here to testify that he was in the right.

Let's look at the medical evidence. The Camps survivor statement, the bullet holes in the bathroom door, the Auditor General's Report, that right there on this slide is all of the evidence from the time, the contemporaneous evidence back from 1972; the witnesses, the medical evidence of who was shot where, Mr. Camps' survivor statement, the bullet hole in the bathroom door and the Auditor General's Report, that's the evidence -- all of the evidence that exists from that time, and all of it, all of it contradicts Mr. Bravo's story. He has no evidence that corroborates his.

Let's go to the next slide.
So that was the first key point of evidence, that Mr. Bravo conspired and planned with the group to kill the 19 unarmed prisoners, and he was not acting in self-defense.

Now, you'11 get a verdict form later today when you'11 have to fill out your verdict. And the first question that you'11 get asked on the verdict form has to do with the statute of limitations, which is the issue that I am going to discuss next.

The second question on your verdict form has to do with claims brought by plaintiff Raquel Camps. And by each of the
plaintiffs, you'11 see these questions against Mr. Bravo. And you're going to be asked whether Mr. Bravo was liable for either the extrajudicial killing, or the attempted extrajudicial killing, or the torture. And for all of those questions, you should answer, yes. He was liable based on the conclusive evidence in this case that we've just looked at.

So -- and I say that only because I want to make sure that everyone has a good sense of how to fill out the verdict form.

The next item I am going to talk about is statute of limitations. That's actually going to be the first issue you see on your verdict form. So the question there was whether my clients filed their lawsuit on time, and they certainly did.

Let's go to the next slide. I actually -- I'm sorry. I should have -- this is a slide that seems to be out of order. It's one that I should have discussed before. Just very quickly, one of the pieces of evidence, and actually there are quite a few that you can see here that demonstrate that Mr. Bravo's story is false, is just all of the evidence of a cover-up afterwards. There was a lot of it.

The fabricated evidence are the bullet holes in the bathroom door, remember that Mr. Celi talked about the fact that the conscripts were ordered to follow an official story. Dr. Brennan talked about the fact that a law was passed after Trelew that criminalized people disseminating information that
contradicted the official military story, there was threatening of witnesses like that undertaker Mr. Marileo. There was the General Auditor's Report that was part of the whitewashing of the events. Mr. Bravo and Sosa and Mr. Marandino were sent off to the United States where they wouldn't be around anymore. They were getting rid of the witnesses from the country. And then they went after and persecuted the families. All of those things are part of the cover up. And why do you cover-up if you have nothing to hide? The cover-up itself is proof of the conspiracy, it's proof of the guilt associated with the killings.

So with that out of the way, let's go to the statute of limitations points, which are next. And the issues that you want to -- that you're going to have to decide with respect to statute of limitations have to do with something called tolling. And we might have touched on it very briefly during openings. But tolling, another way to think about it is just pausing, pausing the statute of limitations. So the statute of limitations in this case is ten years, and the events of Trelew happened in 1972.

This lawsuit was filed 48 years later in October of 2020.
So, obviously, that was more than ten years. However, very importantly, the -- that ten-year period was tolled or paused for very lengthy periods of time, and that's what I'm going to be talking about now. Why was it tolled, and when was it tolled? When was it paused? And there are three main reasons that I'd like you to hear about and I'd like you to be thinking about.
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First of all, the fear of persecution. The fear of the awful, awful things that could happen to you if you were one of my clients in Argentina and you decided to try to do something against Mr. Bravo. If you tried to file a lawsuit, there was a long time in this country's history where that would have gotten you killed, and there was a long time when there was a great deal of fear, which we'11 talk about, that would have legitimately prevented my clients from filing their lawsuit. And that is what paused the statute of limitations.

And you'11 see one of the dates that is really important here is November 1st of 2010. And the reason why I focus on November 1st of 2010 is because there are ten years between that date, November 1, 2010, and October 20th, 2020. There is a little bit less than ten years, but it's about ten years, a little less between that date and the date that my clients filed this lawsuit. And as long as that ten-year period was paused, up until November 1st, 2010, or thereabouts, then my clients' lawsuit was filed on time. And so the period that I'm really going to be focusing on is that period up to late 2010. It's really October 20, 2010, that's ten years earlier, as long as the ten-year period was paused up until that point, this lawsuit was filed on time.

And so the first reason why it was paused at least up until then has to do with the fear of persecution.

The second reason why that ten-year period was paused has
to do with the fact that Mr. Bravo's location was unknown, that takes us at least -- that takes us all the way up to 2008. It doesn't get us al1 the way to 2010. But it takes up to 2008, that's when Interpol found Mr. Bravo.

But then also the other reason why the ten-year period was paused has to do with pursuing accountability against Mr. Bravo in Argentina. And when you see the jury instructions or hear them later today, you're going to hear how accountability proceedings in your home country, in this case in Argentina, those can pause the statute of limitations.

And so here starting in 2005, and it's part of the reason why you heard so much about the criminal trial in Argentina, because starting in 2005, my clients started participating in that criminal trial in Argentina in order to collect evidence about who was responsible for the Trelew killings and in order to go after Mr. Bravo, and those efforts continued at least past that late date in 2010.

So for a combination of these reasons, and the red arrow shows how far each of these reasons extends, the ten-year in this case was paused at least for my clients at least until 2010. And after that comes the ten-year period, which they were entitled to before filing their lawsuit. They weren't just sitting around during that time by the way. They've still been involved in criminal proceedings in Argentina and trying efforts to extradite Mr. Bravo.
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So I just want to talk very quickly about some of the evidence you've heard about these tolling factors.

Let's go to the next slide.
I'm calling this traumatizing fear. And I do not want to really repeat the stories that we heard today about the awful, awful things that happened in Argentina to my clients, to their families. I'm going to go over it briefly. But you know the stories. You heard the stories; torture camp, death camps, disappearances, and getting thrown out of planes, kidnappings, kidnappings of children, awful things. And these are things that thankfully many of us have never had to experience within our own families. But what you have in this case is a situation where my clients had traumatizing fear that really ought to have traumatized them for a lifetime. And I just want to highlight some of the evidence that we've heard about that.

Remember the undertaker Mr. Marileo. He said when he got back from -- after treating -- or sort of preparing the bodies at the naval base the day of the shootings, he was leaving the base, and one of the soldiers threatened him, and said, hey, you didn't see anything here. Remember, you have young children. He was threatened, and this is what he said about that threat. It was a threat that I needed to be silenced and silent forever. That was the nature of the fear in this country, silenced forever.

Remember the story that my client Raquel Camps told about her grandfather. When she was ten years old, she asked her
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grandfather, you know, what happened to my father? And he said: Don't ever ask me again about that. That is the type of fear that these people were dealing with, a lifetime's worth of fear. And Professor Brennan, he didn't experience this himself, but he studied it, the historian. He said: It was a way to instill a sense of overwhelming dread and fear where people would self-censor and exercise a kind of social control. The best kind of dictatorship is one that's internalized; right, where you control yourself, you control everything you say and what you do and who you talk to.

So I just want you when you are discussing and thinking about the pausing of the statute of limitations because of fear, I just want you to think about how devastating that fear is and how long-lasting it could be.

The next slide we see how long lasting it could be. Remember in 2002, over 30 years after the events of Trelew, Raque1 wanted to talk to her grandmother. She had just learned about how her father had died. She goes to her grandmother and asks, and grandmother won't talk to her about it. And she says to Raquel: Silence is health. They're saying this in 2002.

Dr. Brennan testified about witness intimidation that was occurring in the Videla trials, which happened in Spain. The trials happened in Spain, a completely different country, and still there was witness intimidation, accounts of witness intimidation 2005 to 2010 time period. So these, the history of
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and then they were all persecuted. They had no idea who Bravo was. There is no evidence that they knew anything more than his last name.

The defense is going to come up here and say, oh, Mr. Bravo was open, open, living openly, filing stuff with the government in Miami. How is anybody supposed to know that this Bravo was the Bravo that was involved in Trelew? There is absolutely no way they would have known that. Bravo as Ms. Camps testified is a very common name. He was moved to the United States, so people in Argentina wouldn't know where to look. Ms.
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Camps testified that they didn't even know that they had to look outside of Argentina.

And it really wasn't until 2008 when government prosecutors relied on Interpol to find Mr. Bravo that that's when they actually finally knew where he was. Interpol was needed. So the idea that my clients could have found Mr. Bravo before 2008 simply makes no sense. It doesn't matter that he was filing certificates of incorporation with the secretary of state of Miami. Who knew to go look there? Interpol was needed. Government prosecutors in Argentina needed Interpol to find Mr. Bravo in 2008. So the ten-year period is tolled at least or paused at least up until then.

And then on the next slide we see that from 2005 to at least November 1st, 2010, that was the period when my clients were pursuing Mr. Bravo from Argentina under the criminal investigation and extradition proceedings that arose out of it. So that criminal investigation began in 2005. You'11 see in your jury instructions that an accountability proceeding in your home country like in Argentina can pause the statue of limitations. That's exactly what this was. They were trying to hold accountable the perpetrators of the Trelew Massacre.

And remember what they got of that. They got access to that naval base where Dr. Pregliasco could go and perform his forensic analysis. They found out who Bravo was. They found out who the other perpetrators were. Witnesses -- they were able to
develop the evidence that -- some of the evidence that you heard today during this trial. That was a critical investigation and accountability proceeding that they were spending time on in Argentina, and that pauses the statute of limitations. It resulted in Mr. Bravo being found in 2008. That extradition request is filed by 2010. And by November 1st, 2010, when the first extradition request was denied, if the statute of limitations starts running then, our suit filed was on time. It was filed within ten years.

Now, again, they weren't just waiting around for the ten years. They were still trying to secure the convictions in Argentina against Sosa, Del Real, and others. That took them all the way up to 2012. They needed to secure it on appeal and then eventually a second extradition request again.

But even if you think all of that stuff that happened later was a waste of time, it's still the case that our lawsuit was filed within the ten-year period starting from November 1st of 2010. And so this lawsuit was filed on time.

We can go to the next slide. I'm now going to talk about the final key point of evidence that Mr. Bravo must be held accountable for the massacre.

Before I do that, just one quick thing. So your verdict form has statute of limitations questions. Those are the first ones you're going to answer. Question one -- the first question in every set, you'11 get a question like this for each of the
individual plaintiffs. Do you find that plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of evidence that extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of limitations? And I just want to make sure you understand what that means. That means did we prove that the statute of limitations should have been paused because of extraordinary circumstances. And the answer to that question, we believe, is yes. And so we'd like you to respond yes to that statute of limitations question.

And with that, we will get on to the final key point of evidence that Mr. Bravo must be held accountable for the massacre.

THE COURT: Mr. Krishnan, I just want to let you know it's 2:55.

MR. KRISHNAN: Thank you. Your Honor, when did we start? THE COURT: 2:00.

MR. KRISHNAN: Okay. Thank you.
These are the victims. We've seen them already. You are going to have to decide how to value -- how to value the loss that they experienced.

For many of my clients as we discussed, for three of them, it was the death of their loved one, and it's the loss that they experienced for the death of their loved ones. That loss is called compensatory damages. It's compensating my clients.

You will also be asked a question or questions about punitive damages. And punitive damages have to do with punishing, punishing Mr. Bravo. and suffering of not having your mother. $\$ 10 \mathrm{million}$ is what we think is an appropriate number.

Next, you see Ms. Bonet. She lost her husband. Her husband Mr. Bonet. $\$ 5$ million for the pain and suffering associated with that.

And finally, Eduardo Cappe11o, whose namesake is our client, he lost his uncle, and we'd ask for $\$ 1.5$ million associated with that in compensatory damages.

With respect to punitive damages, we ask that whatever number you find for compensatory damages, you triple it and assign that as punitive damages to make it clear that Mr. Bravo should be punished for this heinous, heinous act.

At the beginning of the case, I told you that this case calls out for justice, and it's going to be up to you today to deliver that justice. So we're going to ask you for a liability
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Thank you so much.
THE COURT: Mr. Davis, are you ready?
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, is it possible to have a one-minute break?

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. DAVIS: I need to go outside.
THE COURT: I understand. The jury does too. We're just going to step out for a three-minute comfort break before you hear Mr. Davis's closing. Okay.
(Jury out at 2:58 P.M.)
MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes?
MR. KRISHNAN: I was advised by my team that I might have had a couple more minutes than you had estimated. But I was going to hope to reserve a five-minute rebuttal.

THE COURT: No problem.
MR. KRISHNAN: Thank you.
THE COURT: A11 right. Welcome back.
Mr. Davis, are you ready?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Everyone else may be seated.
(Jury in at 3:03 P.M.)
MR. DAVIS: Good afternoon, members of the jury. It is a privilege to be in front of you this week. We certainly thank you for all of your time and attention in dealing with this.
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THE COURT: Mr. Davis, the interpreters are asking if you could use the microphone.

MR. DAVIS: Okay. This one?
THE COURT: Any one would be fine for them.
MR. DAVIS: Okay. I'11 try and stay sti11. My apologies.

I represent Roberto Bravo. I don't represent anyone else in the Argentine military. I don't represent the country of Argentina. I don't represent anyone else but Roberto Bravo. As I told you at the beginning of this trial, what happened was a tragedy, and what happened was a reaction. It wasn't planned. It wasn't calculated. Mr. Bravo spent a day testifying about what he did, why he did it. One of the big problems and one of the reasons we have a statute of limitations defense in this case is it happened 50 years ago in another country where you can't get witnesses, you can't confront them, and you can't come here -other than have Mr. Bravo -- and tell you what happened. And as I said at the beginning of this case, this is a case about the actions Roberto took 50 years ago defending himself.

Now, the statute of limitations is a very important -- is the important defense that we have. But we also have a self-defense, and you will have an instruction on that. But the thing I want to talk about first is what happened in Trelew.

So let's start at the beginning. What do we know about the prisoners? We know that the week before that 25 of them
escaped from Rawson Prison. You heard about Rawson Prison being a maximum security prison. You heard the fact that it was a -- that a prison guard was killed during that escape. And you also heard that of the --

MR. KRISHNAN: Your Honor, objection. This is directly covered by Mill.

THE COURT: The six?
MR. KRISHNAN: The -- probably the last two bullets actually.

THE COURT: I disagree. Overruled.
MR. DAVIS: You heard six prisoners escaped to Chile back -- Ms. Santucho said her dad -- she told you today her dad went to Chile, and she told you about her life after that.

But 19 prisoners were captured. 19 prisoners were taken to the naval base in Trelew. This is from Defendant's Exhibit 2. It says: On the other hand, I believe that the riot and escape from Rawson Penitentiary, which had taken place only days before by the extremist group that was later housed at the naval base, should certainly have been irrefutable proof of the operative capacity and danger of their members.

This is the fact that we know that it happened and we know how the prisoners ended up in that space. In Defendant's Exhibit 2, we're going to talk about that a little bit more. But you have that in evidence. You'11 be able to see it. It's from the General Auditor's Report. Next slide, please.
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What else do we know about the prisoners? We know that -- and this is from Mr. Camps' statement. It's in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 41T. T is the translated version of the exhibits. And so this is what Mr. Camps said in his statement. He says: On Tuesday, August 15, 1972, our group of 19 people, after escaping Rawson Penitentiary, surrendered in the airport of Trelew to the forces commanded by Captain Sosa, in the presence of the federal judge of Rawson, lawyers, and journalists, and prior confirmation of our perfect health status. From there, they were taken to the naval base. And then they were accommodated in ten prison cells that had an -- that opened to a passageway on the one, closed on the other. You've seen diagrams of that prison ce11 and all of that.

But when these prisoners were taken at the airport and when they are taken to the -- taken to -- and this is from Exhibit 71. And when they're taken from the airport to that prison, there are special risks for this prison. And one of the things I talked about was the fact that we know that these prisoners were perceived to be dangerous. But we also would know that -- and you saw the facilities, that they weren't adequate for what they were trying to do and keep these prisoners there. And there is no evidence as to why they were sent there. There is no evidence this was a black eye to anyone other than whoever at the prison. There is no evidence of that; you've heard no testimony about that.

What else do we know about the base? We know it was not
designed to be a prison. Anyone looking at that configuration
would know that it was not -- that 19 prisoners should have never
been housed there. As you can see, and you heard testimony about
the size of the jail cell, you could barely hold one prisoner.
The doors -- they had doors with small windows, maybe room for a
mattress, the cells did not even have bathrooms. There was no
real place to sit down. Those prisoners couldn't even eat there.
That created a very difficult and stressful situation to
house these prisoners. That is something that we looking back at
that event can say, this is -- this is a powder keg. This is a
dangerous situation.
So the holding area -- and you've seen different
examples -- different diagrams of what the cells were like. There
could be more cells. There could be fewer cells. Dr. Pregliasco
talked about it, but the essential configuration we know this it
was four feet 11 inches wide. We know the cells were
approximately five by eight. We know that that is where all these
19 prisoners were housed in nine or 10 cells. It was a holding
area.
had the primary responsibility -- his primary responsibility on
the naval base was logistics. Whether they like it or not, that's
what he did. He was calculating supplies, dealing with -- in
fact, on the night in question, he was looking at calculating
calories for soldiers. What happened? He was called back to the naval base on August 15th. He was on vacation with his family in Buenos Aires. He was told to come back. The decision -- and we also know about Roberto the decision to put the prisoners in this bad location was not made by Roberto.

And by the way, going back to what we talked about earlier, when the prisoners surrendered, it wasn't a quiet thing. You heard some things about -- you heard testimony about people who disappeared or people were taken to -- I think concentration camps and other things done by the Argentine military. This was a public -- the world knew -- or the people of Argentina knew that these prisoners were in the Trelew naval base.

At some point when Roberto got back, he was ordered to help guard the 19 prisoners. That was one of his duties he was given. It was a special assignment at the prison.

What else do we know? We know that while he was at the naval base -- what did Roberto not do? He did not take prisoners to the bathroom. He did take the prisoners their meals. The guards usually would have the corporals guard them, and they would deal with the day-to-day activities. Corporal Marandino was one of those guards. You heard his testimony in here.

Now, let's talk about August 22, 1972. But going into that night, I've set the stage as to what the situation was. You've got those dangerous prisoners in a small confined area, and the testimony has been that none of these soldiers were trained to
guard these prisoners. Roberto was on the night shift. You heard that a sailor came. Roberto told you a sailor came and told him there's something going on with the prisoners. Come up to see them.

So Roberto goes carrying nothing but his holster. He's got a holster, which he talked about. He goes up to the area where the prisoners are housed. And what happens next? He tells you, and he goes through pretty great detail as to what happened at that time. He tells you that he shows up, talks to the corpora1. He is followed in by Sosa, Herrara, Del Real. And what does he do? Marandino was ordered to open the guards -- the first thing he does, he excuses Corporal Marchan because Corporal Marchan says he feels sick. So he leaves. Uncontested testimony. And what happens after that? Marandino is ordered by Sosa to open the cells.

Now, there's a lot of discussion about Bravo versus Marandino. But Roberto told you the order was given by Captain Sosa, Commander Sosa to open the cells. So Marandino goes, when Marchan left, Roberto took the machine gun that Corporal Marchan had. And then what happened? Back up just a touch.

Then what happened? The cells are opened. Roberto is not -- is -- and he gave you this in detail. It was a tense time for him. It was scary. Remember what we know about the 19 prisoners. Why Sosa is ordering these cells to be opened and unlocked and let the prisoners out, we don't have any testimony of

that, but we know that it was being done. And what happens then? The cells are opened and unlocked. Sosa orders all of the prisoners out. You are told also that Roberto hands his handgun to Del Rea1. And you hear that while Marandino was providing his -- was opening the doors, his machine gun was given to the other officer.

Sosa for some reason walks in -- once the prisoners get out, walks in, walks through, and tells the prisoners whatever, yelling insults, yelling -- telling them to behave themselves. Remember he's going through, and he has to go like this to go through the prisoners. And then when he comes back, Roberto sat here and told you what happened. He told you that Pujadas grabbed Sosa, grabbed his gun, shot twice, and the one thing Dr . Preg1iasco confirmed. He looked at the photographs, and he did tell you this that the only piece of evidence, the only photo we have from 1972 was the picture that shows that there is the two bullet holes on the side of the wall on the south side of the wall where the -- would have been coming from Pujadas's gun.

Now, I know that they're saying it was at seven feet and all this. But Dr. Pregliasco says on the witness stand: Well, you have to have two points. You can't have one point. And the bathroom door that's supposedly hit is not in existence anymore. So I submit to you that that testimony on that issue is not testimony that you should accept.

So we have confirmation that the bullets went that way.

And then Roberto told you -- and I don't think I have to, you know, repeat what he told you about. He felt scared, obviously saw the bullets, reacted, and shot. That's what happened.

It was -- it's a tragedy, and it was wrong that the prisoners got shot. But the circumstances created by the Argentine military led to this impossible situation and tense situation.

So what don't we have in the plaintiffs' case? What don't we have? They say that there is a conspiracy. Nowhere in all of the documents in this case have you heard anyone say that there was an agreement that these people are going to be intentionally shot. No one has said that there was a plan to go shoot these people. And what would be the point for these soldiers to shoot these prisoners? There was no basis other than the reaction to a sudden event. And the fact is, it was that split-second reaction that caused this terrible event.

Now, Roberto testified about what he did. He admits he shot the machine gun. He admits the other machine gun was being shot. But what happened after that? Well, Roberto told you he was in shock. There's smoke in the air. He leaves the room. But he's very clear with you, he never takes his pistol down. He gave his pistol away. He never had a pistol. He never walks down in the cells. And he 100 percent denies Mr. Camps' statement. He did not do that. You heard him. He testified to it. But he did not do that. Mr. Camps' statement is from 1972. But Roberto also
gave a statement in 1972.
So the fact is -- going on to the next one -- everything Roberto did was in reaction, it was in an act of self-defense in an effort to stop the prisoners from advancing towards him, to stop them, to protect him, to protect his fellow soldiers. And this event, the gunshot was over in seconds.

This is also from the general auditor's report where it says -- this is from Roberto's testimony at the time. Lieutenant Bravo started to fire his machine gun, followed by Lieutenant Del Real with a similar weapon and Corporal Marandino -- Corporal Marandino with a handgun.

Go ahead to the next one.
Roberto calls guards for first aid. And as you know, 13 of the prisoners died there, six survived, three later died. The guards come up, the survivors received first aid and were taken to the hospital, and statements were taken from them.

Looking back at Exhibit 2 again, and this is the Auditor General's report, which you'11 have, which is a document prepared on August, talking about what happened on August 22, 1972. It should be stated here that a few minutes after the events took place, the entire health care staff of the naval base went into action in order to treat all those who had been shot.

So remember, this is -- everyone in Argentina, it was well publicized these prisoners were there. They were in a naval base. There were at least a couple of hundred people in the
building where this happened. This is not a place to have an execution. This is not a place to try and kill a lot of people. If you want -- the Argentine military would know how to kill people if they wanted to do this. This was something that happened, as I said, a tragedy. It was a tragedy that happened based upon a split-second reaction and an act by Mr. Pujadas in grabbing the gun and shooting the gun.

Go on to the next one.
I'd like to take you also from 31T. This is also from Mr. Camps' statement where he says: Approximately 30 minutes later, two nurses showed up, turned him around, took his pulse, and he was taken by stretcher to the base infirmary. It was a day already when the deponent, Mr. Camps, was moved in an ambulance with another prisoner, Mr. Haidar, in another ambulance, was also taken to the airport. They were moved to the naval hospital of another location.

But these prisoners were not -- did not die. They were protected.

Also looking at the Camp statement -- again, this is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 31T, and it's in evidence in front of you -it is says: As far as analyzing the conduct of the military personnel that intervened in the events, I should stress that after thorough analysis of the exhaustive investigation that was carried out with the sworn statements, I draw the conclusion -this is actually from the General Auditor's Report. I draw the
conclusion there was no convincing evidence, not even circumstantial evidence, which would allow criminal charges to be brought against the personnel who intervened in the suppression in order to prevent the escape and Pujadas's rash behavior. In this sense, I agree with the opinion of the investigative judge, that the grounds for exemption from responsibility set out in the criminal code come into play for the military personnel's conduct.

Again, Roberto told you, and he's here. He's under oath, he's subject to perjury. He is in this jurisdiction. He is the one who testified in front of you. And he is the one who told you that the charges that Mr. Camps made is just wrong. He never used his pistol. Never had his pistol again, and Defendant's Exhibit 2, the General Auditor Report will show you that this is something that happened that was compiled at the time.

Now, Roberto told you he didn't see the report when it was prepared. And what happened after the incident? Roberto was isolated. He told you that he was interviewed by general -- not general -- not general, Captain Bautista. And while Bautista was preparing his report, he was isolated. So he just -- his stories were not compared with other people. He provided the information. But he never saw the report. He did not say the report was perfect. He did not say the report was totally accurate.

And I went through with him -- and you will remember this. I went through the report with him almost line by line, and he told you a number of places where he disagreed with the reports
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or the factual findings of the report.
Roberto wants you to know exactly what happened that night and exactly what he went through. But he never used a pistol, and he didn't see anyone use a pistol that night.

So the investigative findings continued on. And this is also in Defendant's Exhibit 2. And you'11 see it's the General Auditor's Report, and it says -- and it talks about in the second paragraph here: On the other hand, I believe that the riot and the escape from Rawson Penitentiary, which had taken place only days before by the extremist group that was later housed at the naval air base, should certainly have been irrefutable proof of the operative capacity and danger of their numbers.

Again, self-defense is part of the state of mind. Was it reasonable for Roberto to be fearful of these people who had killed a guard the week before in a prison escape from a maximum security prison?

And one other finding is as far as Lieutenant Bravo: I agree with what was stated that would determine that the previous named officer should not be sanctioned. So Roberto was able to stay in the military.

And here it talks about: He acted appropriately when faced with a very difficult circumstance in which he had to fulfill his task as leader of the guard responsible for guarding the fanatically dangerous detainees. It is evidence that through his actions he not only saved the life of an officer but also
prevented the escape and the almost certain occurrence of other events with unforeseeable consequence.

Now, mind you, once they're out of the ce11, they could have gone anywhere. And, again, we don't know why Captain Sosa ordered them out. But we do know that Commander Sosa is the one who had the responsibility for ordering the prisoners out. And I would invite you to look at Mr. Camps' statement. He talks about Sosa yelling at the prisoners immediately before the shooting. And Mr. Camps' counsel said could not, could not see what was happening up front.

So there is no one to contradict Roberto's testimony about what Pujadas did, not a single witness in this case.

Now, as you know -- and we're going to go down to Roberto's life and the statute of limitations. But Roberto Bravo came to the United States and he went to two air force -- to two military bases. He went to Fort Benning, Georgia. He went to Washington first, then he went Fort Benning, Georgia, then he went to Camp Lejuene, North Carolina. And he worked with the United States military maintaining his time in the Argentine military.

When he moved here, he told you he got his driver's license. He wasn't hiding. But from 1978 for first five years, he was in Washington in addition to Fort Benning and Camp Lejeune.

So in 1978, he retires from the Argentine Navy, and what he decides is: I want to be an American citizen. I want to be in the United States of America. So he becomes a United States
resident starting the long process ultimately to become a citizen. But 1980, he is officially a United States resident.

Then what happened? He moved to Miami in 1982. And he does -- he builds on the American dream. What does he do? He works two jobs to support his family. He registers to vote. He gets a Florida driver's license. Continue on.

In 1984, he buys his first house in Naranja right here in Miami-Dade County. In 1987 he becomes a United States citizen. You can't vote until you become a citizen. But then what does he do? He enrolls in St. Thomas University. And he works in the daytime, goes to school at night, and in 1990, he graduates from St. Thomas cum laude.

And look what happens. We have the documents in evidence. I want to go through this and highlight some of the information we have here; that in 1990, he forms RGB Inc. What is RGB Inc.? RGB Inc. is a company that became quite successful as you heard a lot about, and we're going to talk a little bit about it.

Roberto on what he files with the Florida Secretary of State, he gives his home address at Homestead, Florida. And even look below, he lists his wife Ana Maria Bravo as -- you know, his wife. She is not listed as wife here. But they put their home address here. And this is filed on June 22, 1990, is when the document -- when the company was originally formed. The document you have here, Exhibit 54, which is in evidence, you will be able
to see it was a corporate report filed in 1996.
Another company you'11 see had to deal with Stafford Bookbinding Inc., and that company had also -- again, he lists his wife and him as the directors, and he gives his home address, and acting -- Roberto Guillermo Bravo.

Let's talk a little bit about RGB. You heard a little bit about this. A government contractor. It was doing business with the United States, becomes a qualified small business, he's awarded his first bid with the United States government in 1996. And from there, he builds to a great, great business. From -- for 20 years, he told you he provided medical personnel to the United States Navy, to the United States Marines, to the Department of Homeland Security, to the U.S. Coast Guard, to MacDill Air Force Base, and at one point, he gets up to 500 employees. He's a man who works hard, who wants to work hard and build a better future.

In 1998, he forms One Fountainhead. Again, another company, and notice he also puts his home address here at 2235 Arch Creek Drive, North Miami, Florida. He is in plain sight. There are additional exhibits. Exhibit 55 which talks about Bragio, LLC, which also again lists him and his wife as the managing members and giving the Miami Avenue address.

And we gave you testimony about other companies where he was a registered agent of. And we told you that they're up here on the demonstrative from El Farolito, to American Fiduciary Services.

So let's look to what the law is. And one of the things I want to tell you about here is this case is filed in the Southern District of Florida. And one of the first instructions Judge Louis is going to give you is that you must base your decision on the evidence presented here. You must not be influenced in any way by sympathy for or prejudice against anyone. You must follow the law as I explain it even if you do not agree with the law. And you must follow all of my instructions as a whole. You must not single out or disregard any of the instructions of law.

So let's see. As you know, the case was brought under the TVPA, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and as I said at the beginning of this case, this is the first time a U.S. jury is 1istening to this case. It is important to understand for the plaintiffs to recover damages, they must meet certain requirements. The first requires that the actions taken by Roberto were done in a deliberate, calculated way. We told you and you heard the details from Roberto; that is, that he always acted in self-defense.

But next, the statute of limitations.
Can I get the ELMO on, Your Honor? What do I have to do? Do I have to push this? Got it. Thank you.

The first question you're going to be asked in this case: Do you find that plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of evidence that extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of
limitations? This case requires that, and you've heard some of this from counsel, that it's a ten-year statute of limitations. It is their burden to prove that the statute was appropriately tolled. And what were you told about the reasons for not filing the case on time? The case was late from 2002 on. The TVPA was passed in 1992 when the statute of limitations, ten-year statute of limitations would have expired in 2002.

And there are three factors that they talk about, and the judge is going to instruct you. It says that there are situations when statute of limitations is suspended or tolled. Tolling applies if the plaintiff showed they could not bring the suit due to extraordinary circumstances beyond their control and that were unavoidable even with due diligence. And the plaintiffs must prove that such circumstances existed by a preponderance of the evidence. And so the judge is going to tell you that some of the factors that you are to consider, it says: Extraordinary circumstances include, but are not limited to, were the litigants and witnesses fear or face danger.

You were shown on the initial presentation by counsel that they say the fear ends in 2005, and that's actually consistent with the facts in this case, because that's when the Argentine government recognizes this is that it's going to hold the people from Trelew accountable and that process starts.

At that point, the information about what happened in Trelew is all public. It had been known for a long time. But by
that -- by 2005, the plaintiffs admit that that evidence is all out there. And by the way, looking back at the evidence you heard about all of the stuff, the terrible things that happened in the '70s, and the terrible things that happened in the '80s, that's done by the country of Argentina. Roberto Bravo has nothing to do with that. He was out of the country. He was living here. He has nothing to do with that. And no one is taking on the responsibility for what Argentina did.

But I can tell you these plaintiffs, they know -- and Ms. Krueger who you heard this morning said she knew Roberto Bravo was one of the people involved since 1972 because she filed suit against the navy a month after this happened, and she testified this morning and you heard that testimony.

And so the other factor is whether the plaintiffs could not investigate their claims because of the circumstances in their home country. By 2005, that was done. By 2005, that was done.

Or another factor is were plaintiffs unable to locate the defendant. It is undisputed by every witness in this case that everyone knew by 2008 where Roberto Bravo was. As I showed you from the life that Roberto Bravo lived, he was easily located if anyone who bothered to look from 1987. 1987 on, and certainly from 1990 when the companies were formed.

And then the last one is: Were the plaintiffs did not pursue their claims in the United States participating and relying on accountability processes in the country where the incident
occurred on the defendant was. The defendant was not immune from suit here or in Argentina in 2000 in the -- after 2005. And one of the dates we just got you is that the extradition proceeding Argentina initiated in 2009, but they filed it here in the Southern District of Florida on February 23, 2010.

So under any circumstance, the ten-year tolling -- the statute or ten-year statute of limitations is expired. So my suggestion is that this first question says: Do you find the plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of evidence that extraordinary circumstances tolled the statute of limitations. For all these years, for all the things that we've talked about, the answer to that question is, no. And it's not even a close question.

I'm going to kind of walk through some of the -- oops.
Can you go back to -- Dan?
So the TVPA -- I talked a little bit about it -- has a ten-year statute of limitations. These events took place 50 years ago, and it expired. And the evidence in this case has shown plaintiffs cannot meet the requirements in the law, and the statute should stop running.

Go to our next chart. Kind of go back through what actually happened here.

The date of the event was August 22, 1972. The TVPA was enacted in March 12th of 1992. So that statute allowed people to bring these claims. So let's look at some of the events that
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admitted that he knew Roberto lived here in 2008. Remember, he did some research? He told me he did some informal research and he learned Roberto had a business. He did not file a lawsuit in the United States.

Alicia Krueger, you heard her. She testified today. She learned that Roberto lived in Miami in 2008. She also did not file a lawsuit in the United States. And Ms. Krueger -- and I put in evidence, letters that she sent to the Argentine government.
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And it is signed by a number of the family members. That document is in evidence, and you'11 see it. That document will show you that by 2005, they were all in and going after the prisoners -the Trelew military officers they thought were involved.

Marcela Santucho admitted that she also knew that Roberto lived here in Miami since 2008, and also did not file a lawsuit in the United States.

And then you look at the fear that they have. And there's things that the country of Argentina did in the '70s and '80s that are just deplorable. Again, nothing to do with Roberto Bravo. But we're not sitting here trying to argue for the Argentine government.

But what are we saying? We're saying, and you heard, that each one of the plaintiffs received compensation from the Argentine government. They were not afraid to put their names out there and receive compensation from the government.

The fact is each of them -- Mr. Cappello testified that his grandmother received the compensation. Alicia Krueger told you that she received the compensation. And notice Mr. Cappello has always lived in Argentina. Alicia Krueger, who now lives in France, you saw her again this morning, she has traveled back and forth from France to be here. Raquel Camps, who also testified today, she's always lived in Argentina.

And Marcela Santucho, she moved back to Argentina in 2008. She also sought and received compensation for the Trelew
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> incident.

So I'm going to point out a couple other things in the jury instructions.

When talking about the expert witnesses, you don't have to accept the expert witness' testimony if you don't believe it or it doesn't help you.

It says: And the Court gives you, as the finders of fact, the ability to evaluate what the expert witness means. So it doesn't mean -- and the instruction will say: that doesn't mean you must accept the witness' opinion. As with any other witness' testimony, you must decide for yourself whether you rely on that opinion.

The plaintiffs' experts were Mr. Brenna, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Pregliasco, Mr. Langer. And I submit that the testimony that they gave you talks about issues around the case but doesn't focus on the details of what Roberto physically did at the time of this incident. And Roberto Bravo stood here and told you what happened.

Now, I'd like to look a little further. There's a lot in the jury instructions that you need to evaluate, and you were asked for I think it was $\$ 20$ million by -- $\$ 18$ million by counsel at least for the compensatory damages. And there are some things I would wish to point out about that. That claim is that you are the ones who are to evaluate it. I don't think you get to any of those issues, because the statute of limitations was 100 percent
had expired, it was not tolled, and it was not something that you can allow these plaintiffs to do.

The Court will tell you, you must follow the law as she explains it. And you must apply that law looking at the instructions as a whole.

So what does that mean about where we are right now? We are in a situation where you need to weigh the evidence, weigh what Mr. Bravo said, weigh -- this is an important event to him as well. It's a 50-year -- 50 years since this happened. The statute of limitations has long since expired. There is no circumstance under which these plaintiffs can justify waiting unti1 October of 2020 to sue Mr. Bravo, to sue Roberto. And to do that, not only is it barred by the TVPA, it's barred by fairness, it's barred by the fact that how does he defend himself from things that happened 50 years ago?

I ask you to look carefully at the judge's instructions. I ask you to think carefully about what Roberto told you. I ask you to look at the facts of this case that are not disputed, which are that the case was filed in 2020 for a 1972 incident is barred by the statute of limitations, that these plaintiffs had every ability to file suit.

I went through the education background with all of these witnesses -- all of these plaintiffs were educated, some more educated than others, but they're all educated. They're all -they know that they had the loss that they told you about. But
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the law requires that you have to act within a certain time; that you have to follow what fairness allows you to do and to allow Roberto to defend himself, and to have a case brought on time is something that's fundamental in our court system.

So I will leave you with a couple of thoughts. And that is that this case comes down to whether an 80-year-old man, a grandfather, a businessman who built up a successful life would come into this courtroom and not tell you the truth. He's living here in Miami, and whether or not the plaintiffs did what the law requires of them to timely file this lawsuit, to file this lawsuit. The lawsuit should have been filed 2005, 2006. As soon as they knew they had the information, they should have filed this lawsuit. But they waited, and that has a consequence.

So I ask that you look carefully at the evidence, and we gave you a lot of information, you have a lot of documents to look at if -- as you carefully evaluate this information. But I ask that you consider it, and that you return a verdict finding that the statute of limitations was not tolled and that you do not go any further in the verdict.

But thank you for your attention.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Krishnan.
MR. KRISHNAN: Thank you, Your Honor, and thank you again, members of the jury. I'm going to be brief. I'm going to respond to a little bit of what we just heard.
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them in this prison cell area. It was a perfect way to kill them. It was a kill box. There was nowhere for them to go. They could have gotten this done within minutes except for the fact that en1isted men ended up coming in and interrupting them. Mr. Camps only survived because he played dead. You have his witness statements. It is in evidence. 31T, 41T, please read them. You will see he was playing dead until enlisted people came and interfered with the plan.

| 03:51PM | 1 | You know, I heard a lot of Roberto told you this, Roberto |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 03:51PM | 2 | told you that. Where is the evidence? There was none. There is |
| 03:51PM | 3 | corroborating evidence for Mr. Bravo's story, and it's certain7y |
| 03:51PM | 4 | not that bathroom door. As Dr. Pregliasco demonstrated, the |
| 03:51PM | 5 | bullet holes are fabricated. The only proof that Mr. Bravo -- |
| 03:51PM | 6 | that the bullet holes only prove that Mr. Bravo and his fellow |
| 03:51PM | 7 | officers were fabricating |
| 03:51PM | 8 | On statute of limitations, I want to clarify a couple of |
| 03:51PM | 9 | things. Back in 1972, they on7y knew his last name, Bravo. It |
| 03:51PM | 10 | wasn't enough to find him. That was true all the way |
| 03:52PM | 11 | through 2008. There is not a single piece of record evidence or |
| 03: 52PM | 12 | evidence, period, that shows that the victims or other people knew |
| 03: 52 PM | 13 | which Bravo to be looking for. That's the truth. |
| 03:52PM | 14 | Mr. Davis really ignored a lot of what I said about |
| 03:52PM | 15 | tolling when he was putting up numbers like 2005, you expire in |
| 03:52PM | 16 | 2015; 2006, 2016. |
| 03: 52 PM | 17 | There were two big points I made, and I just want you to |
| 03: 52PM | 18 | keep these in mind. The fear, the terrible fear extended through |
| 03:52PM | 19 | at least 2010, and that's enough to have a timely filed lawsuit in |
| 03:52PM | 20 | 2020. |
| 03: 52PM | 21 | And my clients were legitimately investigating and |
| 03:52PM | 22 | pursuing Mr. Bravo through that criminal proceeding in Argentina |
| 03:52PM | 23 | where they developed a ton of evidence. They found critical |
| 03:52PM | 24 | witnesses, and they were doing that at least until November of |
| 03:53PM | 25 | 2010 when extradition against Mr. Bravo was denied. Those are the |

dates, 2010 dates, you add ten years to those, and you're -- the October 2020 filing of this lawsuit was within the statute of limitations.

And just bigger picture. I just want to say: It is easy for any of us who haven't suffered the terrible trauma and terror that my clients have suffered to nitpick in hindsight their actions. But the circumstances that they were dealing with were truly, truly extraordinary, and they acted reasonably in light of those circumstances.

My last point. This isn't really about the money for my clients. What my clients have been working for since 2005 is to get Mr. Bravo extradited back to Argentina where he can face trial. That's what they wanted. What they can get though, what they have to settle for is this civil proceeding to hold Mr. Bravo accountable. And so that's going to be up to you to do. It's ultimately justice is going to be in your hands.

Thank you so much.
THE COURT: Okay.
Members of the jury, it is my duty to instruct you on the rules of law that you must use in deciding this case.

When I have finished, you will go to the jury room and begin your discussions, sometimes called deliberations. Your decision must be based only on the evidence presented here. You must not be influenced in any way by either sympathy for or prejudice against anyone.
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You must follow the law as I explain it -- even if you do not agree with the law -- and you must follow all of my instructions as a whole. You must not single out or disregard any of the instructions on the law.

As I said before, you must consider only the evidence that I have admitted in the case. Evidence includes the testimony of witnesses and the exhibits admitted, but anything the lawyers say is not evidence and isn't binding on you.

You shouldn't assume from anything I've said that I have any opinion about any factual issue in this case. Except for my instructions to you on the law, you should disregard anything I may have said during the trial in arriving at your own decision about the facts.

Your own recollection and interpretation of the evidence is what matters.

In considering the evidence, you may use reasoning and common sense to make deductions and reach conclusions. You shouldn't be concerned about whether evidence is direct or circumstantial.
"Direct evidence" is the testimony of a person who asserts that he or she has actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness.
"Circumstantial evidence" is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances that tend to prove or disprove a fact.

There's no legal difference in the weight you may give
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either direct or circumstantial evidence.
When I say that you must consider all of the evidence, I don't mean that you must accept all of the evidence as true or accurate. You should decide whether you believe what each witness had to say, and how important that testimony was. In making that decision, you may believe or disbelieve any witness, in whole or in part. The number of witnesses testifying concerning a particular point doesn't necessarily matter.

To decide whether you believe any witness I suggest that you ask yourself a few questions:

Did the witness impress you as one who was telling the truth?

Did the witness have any particular reason not to tell the truth?

Did the witness have a personal interest in the outcome of the case?

Did the witness seem to have a good memory?
Did the witness have the opportunity and ability to accurately observe the things he or she testified about?

Did the witness appear to understand the questions clearly and answer them directly?

Did the witness's testimony differ from other evidence -I'm sorry -- other testimony or other evidence?

You should also ask yourself whether there was evidence that a witness testified falsely about an important fact. And ask
whether there was evidence that at some other time a witness said or did something, or didn't say or do something, that was different from the testimony the witness gave during the trial.

But keep in mind that a simple mistake doesn't mean a witness wasn't telling the truth as he or she remembers it. People naturally tend to forget some things or remember them inaccurately. So, if a witness misstated something, you must decide whether it was because of an innocent lapse in memory or an intentional deception. The significance of your decision may depend on whether the misstatement was about an important fact or an unimportant detail.

When scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge might be helpful, a person who has special training or experience in the field -- in that field is allowed to state an opinion about the matter.

But that doesn't mean you must accept the witness's opinion. As with any other witness's testimony, you must decide for yourself whether to rely on the opinion.

In this case it is the responsibility of plaintiffs to prove every essential part of their claims by a "preponderance of the evidence." This is sometimes called the "burden of proof" or "burden of persuasion."

A "preponderance of the evidence" simply means an amount of evidence that is enough to persuade you that the plaintiffs' claim is more likely true than not.
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should consider each one separately.

I caution you that the defendant does not have to disprove that the plaintiffs' claims, but if the defendant raises an affirmative defense, the only way he can prevail on that specific defense is if he proves that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Under United States law, there is a civil action for recovery of damages for extrajudicial killings or torture committed by an individual acting under the actual or apparent authority of a foreign nation. This law is known as the Torture Victim Protection Act or the "TVPA" for short.

The plaintiffs are pursuing three claims against defendant based on the allegations that Ruben Bonet, Eduardo Cappello I, and Ana Maria Villarreal de Santucho were the victims of extrajudicial killings and that Alberto Camps was the victim of attempted extrajudicial killing and torture, and that defendant is liable for those violations. In a moment I will tell you what the plaintiffs must prove in order for you to find that those violations happened.

Plaintiffs, Alicia Krueger, Eduardo Cappe11o II, and Marcela Santucho contend that their relatives Ruben Bonet, Eduardo Cappe11o I, and Ana Maria Villarreal de Santucho were the victims of extrajudicial killing. To find in favor of a particular plaintiff, you must find that a particular plaintiff's or plaintiff's relatives' death involved the following:

A person or persons deliberately killed that relative; The person or persons killed that particular relative while acting under the actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of the Argentine Republic; and

The killing was not previously authorized by a judgment of a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial

| 04:01PM | 1 | guarantees, which are recognized as indispensable by civilized |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 04:01PM | 2 | peoples. |
| 04:01PM | 3 | Plaintiff Raquel Camps, in her capacity as the personal |
| 04:01PM | 4 | representative of the estate of Alberto Camps, contends that |
| 04:01PM | 5 | Alberto Camps suffered an attempted extrajudicial killing. To |
| 04:01PM | 6 | establish this claim, plaintiff Raque1 Camps must prove by a |
| 04:01PM | 7 | preponderance of the evidence the following: |
| 04:01PM | 8 | 1. That a person or persons attempted to deliberately |
| 04:01PM | 9 | ki11 Alberto Camps; |
| 04:01PM | 10 | 2. This person or persons attempted to kill Alberto Camps |
| 04:01PM | 11 | while acting under the actual or apparent authority, or color of |
| 04:01PM | 12 | law, of the Argentine Republic; |
| 04:02PM | 13 | 3. That the person or persons acted with the purpose of |
| 04:02PM | 14 | carrying out an extrajudicial killing of Alberto Camps and made a |
| 04:02PM | 15 | substantial step toward the commission of the extrajudicial |
| 04:02PM | 16 | killing; and |
| 04:02PM | 17 | 4. That the attempted killing was not authorized by a |
| 04:02PM | 18 | previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court |
| 04:02PM | 19 | affording all the judicial guaranties, which are recognized as |
| 04:02PM | 20 | indispensable by civilized peoples. |
| 04:02PM | 21 | A substantial act is an act or series of acts that mark |
| 04:02PM | 22 | defendant's conduct as a whole liable and strongly corroborate the |
| 04:02PM | 23 | required mental state required for liability. For example, |
| 04:02PM | 24 | certain facts such as detaining the victim, acquiring the |
| 04:02PM | 25 | materials necessary to commit an extrajudicial killing of him, and |


| 04:02PM | 1 | possessing these materials at or near the place where that conduct |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 04:02PM | 2 | was attempted, taken together, may constitute a "substantial step" |
| 04:02PM | 3 | towards the commission of an extrajudicial killing. |
| 04:03PM | 4 | Plaintiff Raque1 Camps, in her capacity as the personal |
| 04:03PM | 5 | representative of the estate of Alberto Camps, alleges that |
| 04:03PM | 6 | Alberto Camps was tortured. To establish this claim, plaintiff |
| 04:03PM | 7 | Camps must prove that: |
| 04:03PM | 8 | 1. Defendant Bravo intentionally inflicted severe pain or |
| 04:03PM | 9 | suffering, whether physical or mental, on Alberto Camps; or |
| 04:03PM | 10 | actively participated in the intentional infliction of severe pain |
| 04:03PM | 11 | or suffering, whether physical or mental, or Alberto Camps; |
| 04:03PM | 12 | 2. Alberto Camps was in the custody or physical control |
| 04:03PM | 13 | of Defendant Bravo; |
| 04:03PM | 14 | 3. That the intentional infliction of severe pain or |
| 04:03PM | 15 | suffering on Alberto Camps was done while acting under the actual |
| 04:03PM | 16 | or apparent authority, or color of law, of the Argentine Republic; |
| 04:03PM | 17 | 4. That severe pain or suffering was inflicted for the |
| 04:03PM | 18 | purpose of intimidation, punishment, or any discriminatory |
| 04:03PM | 19 | purpose. |
| 04:03PM | 20 | Even if Defendant Bravo did not personally torture |
| 04:03PM | 21 | Alberto Camps, he may still be liable for torture if he aided or |
| 04:04PM | 22 | abetted torture, conspired to commit torture, or participated in a |
| 04:04PM | 23 | joint criminal enterprise. I will provide you with further |
| 04:04PM | 24 | instructions on what those terms mean in a moment. |
| 04:04PM | 25 | Defendant has offered evidence of having acted in |

self-defense. If the defendant was not the aggressor and had reasonable grounds to believe and actually did believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which he could save himself only by using deadly force against his assailant, he had the right to employ deadly force in order to defend himself. By "deadly force" is meant force which is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.

Self-defense is a ground for avoiding liability only when the defendant acted reasonably to defend himself or another person against an imminent and unlawful use of physical force. For self-defense to be applicable, the use of force by the defendant must have been proportionate to the degree of danger to the defendant or the other person protected.

The circumstances under which he acted must have been such as to produce in the mind of a reasonably prudent person similarly situated the reasonable belief that the other person was then about to kill him or to do him serious bodily harm.

In addition, the defendant must actually believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm and that the deadly force must be used to repel it. Additionally, continued use of force after the threat has been subdued does not establish self-defense.

If evidence of self-defense is present, defendant must prove by preponderance of evidence that he acted in self-defense.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Bravo directly
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$04: 05 \mathrm{PM}$
perpetrated the extrajudicial killing of Eduardo Cappello I, Ruben Bonet, and Ana Maria Villarreal de Santucho and the attempted extrajudicial killing and torture of Alberto Camps. The plaintiffs also contend that Defendant Bravo is liable for the extrajudicial killing, attempted extrajudicial killing, and torture of their relatives under alternative forms of liability, without prejudice to their claim that Defendant Bravo directly perpetrated extrajudicial killing, attempted extrajudicial killing, and torture of their relatives.

Thus, even if you were to find that the plaintiffs have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Bravo personally extrajudicially killed, attempted to extrajudicially kill, or tortured the plaintiffs' relatives, you may still find that Defendant Bravo is nevertheless responsible for the extrajudicial killing of Eduardo Cappello I, Ruben Bonet, and Ana Maria Villareal De Santucho and the attempted extrajudicial killing and torture of Alberto Camps under -- killing Alberto Camps under one or more of the three following additional theories of liability:

Aiding and abetting;
Conspiracy; and
Joint criminal enterprise.
Each of these is a separate theory of liability and will be explained in more detail in a few moments. You must consider them separately. You only need to find in the plaintiffs' favor
on one of these four theories to hold Defendant Bravo liable with respect to each of the plaintiffs' claims. If you find that the plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proof on any one theory of liability, that finding does not affect any other theory.

Defendant Bravo may be found liable if you find that he aided and abetted others in a wrongful act committed against Alberto Camps, Eduardo Cappe11o, Ruben Bonet, and/or Ana Maria Maria Villarreal de Santucho.

In order to prove the defendant liable for aiding and abetting any of the violations against Alberto Camps, Eduardo Cappello, Ruben Bonet, and/or Ana Maria de Santucho, plaintiffs must prove the following by a preponderance of the evidence; first, that one or more wrongful acts that comprise the claim were committed; second, that Defendant Bravo substantially assisted some person or persons who committed or caused one or more of the wrongful acts that comprised the claim; and third, that Defendant Bravo knew that his actions would assist in the illegal or wrongful activity at the time he provided the assistance.

The second theory under which the plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant Bravo liable for extrajudicial killing, attempted extrajudicial killing, and torture of their relatives is known as "conspiracy." The law of conspiracy makes a person liable if they conspired with another person to commit a wrongful act. To prove conspiracy liability, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of

| 04:08PM | 1 | the evidence as to each claim. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 04:08PM | 2 | 1. Two or more persons agreed to commit a wrongful act; |
| 04:08PM | 3 | 2. Defendant Bravo joined the conspiracy knowing of at |
| 04:08PM | 4 | 1east one of the goals of the conspiracy and intended to |
| 04:09PM | 5 | accomplish it; and. |
| 04:09PM | 6 | 3. The torture and attempted extrajudicial killing -- or |
| 04:09PM | 7 | extrajudicial killings of plaintiffs' relatives were committed by |
| 04:09PM | 8 | someone who was a member of the conspiracy and acted in |
| 04:09PM | 9 | furtherance of the conspiracy. |
| 04:09PM | 10 | For a conspiracy to have existed, it is not necessary |
| 04:09PM | 11 | that the conspirators made a formal agreement or that they agreed |
| 04:09PM | 12 | to every detail of the conspiracy. Proof of a tacit as opposed to |
| 04:09PM | 13 | explicit understanding is sufficient to show agreement. |
| 04:09PM | 14 | The exact limits or scope of the plan need not be known |
| 04:09PM | 15 | to each conspirator, nor is it necessary that the identity of |
| 04:09PM | 16 | everyone involved in the conspiracy be known to all of them. What |
| 04:09PM | 17 | the plaintiffs must show is that the conspirators shared the same |
| 04:09PM | 18 | general conspiratorial objective, even if their motives for |
| 04:09PM | 19 | desiring the result are not necessarily identical. |
| 04:09PM | 20 | Once the conspiracy has been formed, all of its members |
| 04:09PM | 21 | are liable for injuries caused by acts pursuant to or in |
| 04:10PM | 22 | furtherance of the conspiracy and all acts that were the natural |
| 04:10PM | 23 | and foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. |
| 04:10PM | 24 | A conspirator need not participate actively in or benefit |
| 04:10PM | 25 | from the wrongful act in order to be found 1iable. He need not |

even have planned or known about the injurious action, so long as the purpose of the tortious act was to advance the overal1 objective of the conspiracy.
Defendant Bravo may be found liable if you find that he was involved in a joint criminal enterprise that resulted in the harms alleged against the plaintiffs.
Although I have used the term "joint criminal enterprise," recall that you are not being called on to decide a criminal case. As with the other claims, the plaintiffs' burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence and not a higher burden of proof required in criminal cases.
A joint criminal enterprise is a common plan or purpose between two or more people to commit a wrongful act. If Defendant Bravo is found to participate in a joint criminal enterprise, then he is liable for the coperpetrator of the wrong acts that resulted from that enterprise. To establish a joint criminal enterprise, the plaintiff must prove first the existence of a common plan or purpose to commit any wrongful act; second, that Defendant Bravo committed an act that either directly or indirectly contributed to the execution of this common plan; third, that Defendant Bravo committed this act with the intention to participate in and further the common plan; and; fourth, wrongful acts committed in the execution of this common plan resulted in the harm claimed by the plaintiffs.
Defendant Bravo can also be held liable for the acts

| 04:11PM | 1 | committed by a member of the joint criminal enterprise that were |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 04:11PM | 2 | not agreed upon in the common plan as long as the act was a |
| 04:11PM | 3 | natural and foreseeable consequence of the enterprise; Defendant |
| 04:11PM | 4 | Bravo was aware of the wrongful conduct was a possible consequence |
| 04:11PM | 5 | of the joint criminal enterprise; and even with that awareness, he |
| 04:12PM | 6 | continued to participate in the enterprise. |
| 04:12PM | 7 | A common plan of purpose may not be expressed but can be |
| 04:12PM | 8 | inferred from the circumstances; such as the fact that several |
| 04:12PM | 9 | people acted in unison, nor do plaintiffs need to show the plan |
| 04: 12PM | 10 | was prearranged. |
| 04:12PM | 11 | Instead, plaintiffs can show that the plan materialized |
| 04:12PM | 12 | spontaneous7y and without prior preparation. |
| 04:12PM | 13 | Plaintiffs need not prove that Defendant Bravo |
| 04: 12PM | 14 | participated in any of the wrongful acts; nor do plaintiffs need |
| 04: 12PM | 15 | to prove that Defendant Bravo was physically present during the |
| 04:12PM | 16 | commission of the wrongful acts. |
| 04:12PM | 17 | Defendant Bravo has raised an affirmative defense that |
| 04:12PM | 18 | the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claims because they did not |
| 04:12PM | 19 | bring the suit within the time allowed by the 1aw. Defendant |
| 04:12PM | 20 | Bravo must prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of |
| 04:12PM | 21 | the evidence. |
| 04:12PM | 22 | The statute of limitations specify the amount of time a |
| 04:12PM | 23 | person has to initiate legal proceedings after an event occurs. |
| 04:12PM | 24 | The statute of limitations that applies to the law the plaintiffs |
| 04:13PM | 25 | rely on to bring their claims -- the TVPA -- provides that claims |



| 04:14PM | 1 | the defendant was immune from suit. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 04:14PM | 2 | It is my duty to instruct you as to the proper measure of |
| 04:14PM | 3 | damages to be applied in this case if you find that plaintiffs |
| 04:14PM | 4 | have proved each of the elements of their claims. By instructing |
| 04:14PM | 5 | you regarding damages, I am not indicating, one way or the other, |
| 04:14PM | 6 | that I have any opinion regarding whether or not damages should be |
| 04:14PM | 7 | awarded in this case. |
| 04:15PM | 8 | If you find in favor of any and all plaintiffs and |
| 04: 15PM | 9 | against Defendant Bravo, then you must determine an amount that is |
| 04:15PM | 10 | fair compensation for the damages suffered by the plaintiff or |
| 04:15PM | 11 | plaintiffs for any loss or injury you find was actually sustained |
| 04:15PM | 12 | as a consequence of Defendant Bravo's conduct. |
| 04:15PM | 13 | In considering the issue of compensatory damages, you |
| 04:15PM | 14 | should determine what amount, if any, has been proven by the |
| 04: 15PM | 15 | plaintiffs by a preponderance of the evidence as full, just, and |
| 04:15PM | 16 | reasonable compensation for all of the plaintiffs' damages, no |
| 04:15PM | 17 | more and no less. |
| 04:15PM | 18 | Compensatory damages are not allowed as punishment and |
| 04:15PM | 19 | must not be imposed or increased to penalize Defendant Bravo. |
| 04:15PM | 20 | Also, compensatory damages must not be based on speculation or |
| 04:15PM | 21 | guesswork. You may not award compensatory damages for economic |
| 04:15PM | 22 | damages such as lost earnings or medical expenses, but only for |
| 04:15PM | 23 | noneconomic damages, which cover both mental and physical aspects |
| 04:16PM | 24 | of injury, both tangible and intangible. |
| 04:16PM | 25 | The plaintiffs are not required to offer evidence of the |

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$04: 16 \mathrm{PM}$
> actual value of intangible injuries such as physical or emotional pain and mental anguish.

There is no exact standard to be applied. Any such award should be -- I'm sorry -- yes. Any such award should be fair and just in the light of the evidence. It is for you to determine what damages, if any, have been proved. You should consider only the following elements of damage to the extent you find them proved by a preponderance of the evidence as to each plaintiff; the plaintiff's physical and emotional pain, suffering and mental anguish; the plaintiff's physical and mental injury; where the deceased was the plaintiff's spouse, the plaintiff's loss of spousal companionship and protection; where the deceased was plaintiff's parent and the plaintiff was under 25 years of age at the time of death, the plaintiff's loss of parental companionship, protection, instruction, and guidance.

Each plaintiff must prove that the compensation that he or she seeks relates to damages that naturally flow from the injuries proved. In other words, there must be a sufficient causal connection between the injuries sustained and the harm sustained by the plaintiff.

In addition to compensatory damages, you have the discretion to award punitive damages. Unlike compensatory damages, which are imposed to reimburse the plaintiff for their injuries, punitive damages are designed to make an example of the defendant's conduct so that others will not engage in similar
practices. You may award punitive damages to the plaintiffs if they have proven that Defendant Bravo's conduct was wanton and reckless, not merely unreasonable.

An act is wanton if done in a reckless or callous disregard of or indifférence to the safety and rights of others, shocking and offensive misconduct. Punitive damages are appropriate only for especially shocking and offensive misconduct.

If you decide to award punitive damages, you must use sound reasoning in setting an amount. It must not reflect bias, prejudice, or sympathy toward any party.

There is no exact standard for fixing the amounts of punitive damages. You should consider the degree of reprehensibility of Defendant Bravo's conduct toward a plaintiff and the relationship between the harm suffered by a plaintiff and the amount of punitive damages you are considering.

You may also consider the evidence regarding Defendant Bravo's financial resources in fixing the amount of punitive damages.

Of course, the fact that I have given you instructions concerning the issue of the plaintiffs' damages should not be interpreted in any way as an indication that I believe the plaintiffs should or should not prevail in this case.

Your verdict must be unanimous -- in other words, you must all agree. Your deliberations are secret, and you'11 never have to explain your verdict to anyone.
Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only
after fully considering the evidence with the other jurors. So
you must discuss the case with one another and try to reach an
agreement.
While you're discussing the case, don't hesitate to
reexamine your own opinion and change your mind if you become
convinced that you were wrong. But don't give up your honest
belief just because others think differently or because you simply
want to get the case over with. Remember, that in a very real
way, you are judges, judges of the facts. Your only interest is
to seek the truth from the evidence in the case.
When you get to the jury room, choose one of your members
to act as a foreperson. The foreperson will direct your
deliberations and speak in court for you.
A verdict form has been prepared for your convenience.
Where is my verdict form?
I want to go over the verdict form with you now. I know
you saw a little bit. I'm going to show you the whole thing.
Obviously, this is going back into the room with you. Okay.
So after the case caption -- I will try to do this in a
were that you can all see it. After the case caption, it indicates
hour first question is, as you saw, the statute of
you will see.
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$04: 20 \mathrm{PM}$

So this one is followed by a yes and a no, and you'11 see the instructions here that if you answer no here that you go directly to the end, you sign and date the verdict form. But if you answer yes, you go on to question 2, which is on the next page.

And each of these, again, has the instructions for you. Just follow along.

The second question are the claims brought by plaintiff Raque1 Camps. You will answer the question here by checking in the box yes or no with respect to liability. And then you will see here question 2c: If you answered yes to either of these two questions with respect to Plaintiff Camps, then you'11 be asked to answer the question on compensatory damages: What do you find to be the total amount of compensatory damages, if any, to the estate of Alberto Camps?

It's virtually identical for each of the plaintiffs, except, as you heard, that for Plaintiff Camps there will be two questions on the attempted killing and torture. The rest of the three are two questions that you answer. The first, again, you know, has yes or no for the liability question with respect to the extrajudicial killing, and followed by the question about damages, if any.

The last page of your verdict form asks about punitive damages. And again, it asks you whether under the circumstances punitive damages are warranted. There is a yes and a no. And if

| 04:21PM | 1 | you answer yes, then you should also fill out the rest of the |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 04:21PM | 2 | questions here. |
| 04:21PM | 3 | These instructions are on the verdict form for you. But |
| 04:22PM | 4 | it will ask you to assess the amount of punitive damages, if any, |
| 04:22PM | 5 | that you find should be assessed. And this is where you fill that |
| 04:22PM | 6 | out. |
| 04:22PM | 7 | Then your foreperson wil1 put a date here, and you will |
| 04:22PM | 8 | sign it, and that foreperson wi11 print their name on the verdict |
| 04:22PM | 9 | form. |
| 04:22PM | 10 | When you've al1 agreed on the verdict, your foreperson |
| 04:22PM | 11 | must fill in the form, sign and date it, then you report -- you |
| 04:22PM | 12 | wi11 return to the courtroom. |
| 04:22PM | 13 | If you wish to communicate with me at any time, please |
| 04:22PM | 14 | write down your messages or question and give it to the court |
| 04:22PM | 15 | security officer. |
| 04:22PM | 16 | My courtroom deputy is going to give you forms to fill |
| 04:22PM | 17 | out that indicates it's a question from the jury, and your |
| 04:22PM | 18 | foreperson should just fill that -- use that form to communicate |
| 04:22PM | 19 | those questions to me. I will respond as promptly as possible -- |
| 04:22PM | 20 | either in writing or by talking to you in the courtroom. |
| 04:23PM | 21 | Please understand that I may have to talk to the lawyers |
| 04:23PM | 22 | and parties before I respond to your question or message, so you |
| 04:23PM | 23 | should be patient as you await my response. But I caution you not |
| 04:23PM | 24 | to tell me how many jurors have voted one way or the other at that |
| 04:23PM | 25 | time. That type of information should remain in the jury room and |

not be shared with anyone, including me, in your note or question.
And just to be clear that when you have reached a verdict, that is still something you need to communicate to us. Just use the juror note form to tell us that you have a verdict; not what the verdict is, just that you have a verdict so that we can collect the parties and bring you back to the courtroom for that.

A11 right, that concludes your jury instructions. I'm going to send you back to begin your deliberations. You'11 get a knock on the door in just a moment as my courtroom deputy brings in the verdict form. And the parties are going to work together to collect the physical evidence that will also be brought back to you. So you're going to be interrupted twice for those.

Al1 right. Al1 rise for the jury.
(Jury out at 4:24 P.M.)
THE COURT: So as I just advised them, I expect counsel to coordinate and confirm with my courtroom deputy that the physical exhibits that she is about to give them match your notes about what you advanced and what was accepted into evidence so that there is -- I'd like you to do that together so that my courtroom deputy isn't trying to go back through the record and figure it out.

It's my intention -- you can all be seated. I'm sorry. I know I always forget to tell you that. But it's my intention not to cut them off this evening until they tell us that they want
to leave for the evening. So take the time that you need now to get the exhibits together. But I am just anticipating that someone is going to ask me that question, and that's the answer. Okay. Anything else?

MR. SLADE: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor.
MR. KRISHNAN: Nothing here, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. I would be remiss if I didn't use this opportunity now before anything else happens to tell you that this case has been so phenomenally tried, and it has just been a spectacular experience to sit in front of attorneys of this caliber. And your presentation of the case was nothing short of amazing.

I'm just very impressed and want your clients to hear that before we all disburse and I don't get a chance to pay that compliment to you.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. SLADE: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. KRISHNAN: Thank you, Your Honor. And thank you for your attention during the case. And I know that chambers and the court staff have been wonderful. We really appreciate it.

MR. DAVIS: It's pretty good. A week ago Friday, you didn't even know you would be here.

THE COURT: That is true for almost everyone here except one of the two law clerks. But thank you. Okay.

Don't go far, and make sure my courtroom deputy has your
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$04: 26 P M$
phone number.
(Recess at 4:26 P.M.)
(Back on the record at 6:31 P.M.)
THE COURT: We're back on the record. Appearances as previously noted.

You saw the question from the jury?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
THE COURT: My proposed response is just to refer them back to the instructions. I've written it down:

Members of the jury, I have received your question and respond that you've already received all of my instructions on the law, including my instructions on damages. Please refer to the instructions as I have previously provided to you.

Plaintiff's position?
MR. KRISHNAN: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: No objection.
THE COURT: Okay. We'11 send it back.
MR. KRISHNAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Recess at 6:31 P.M.)
THE COURT: I have a note indicating that we have a verdict. Is that correct.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: Please be seated. Anything we need before we bring the jury in?

MR. KRISHNAN: Nothing here, Your Honor.
MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Would you bring them in.
(Jury in at 7:01 P.M.)
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome back. It's my understanding you've reached a verdict in this case.

THE JURY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The parties can sit, and I'11 ask the courtroom deputy to publish the verdict.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: United States District Court Southern District of Florida, Case No. 20-cv-24294-Magistrate Judge Louis.

Raquel Camps, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of A1berto Camps, et al., vs Roberto Guillermo Bravo.

## Verdict

Question 1. Statute of limitations.
Question 1a. Do you find that plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of evidence that extraordinary tolled the statute of limitations?

Answer: Yes.
If you answered no to this question, proceed to date and sign the verdict form without answering any further.

If you answered yes to this question, proceed to Question 2.

| 07:03PM | 1 |
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Question 2. Claims brought by plaintiff Raquel Camps, the representative of Alberto Camps' Estate against Defendant Bravo.

Question 2a. Is Defendant Bravo 1iable for the attempted extrajudicial killing of Alberto Camps?

Answer: Yes.
Question 2b: Is Defendant Bravo 1iable for the torture of Alberto Camps?

Answer: Yes.
Question 2c: If you answered yes to either question 2a or 2 b , what do you find to be the total amount of compensatory damages, if any, to the estate of Alberto Camps?

Compensatory Damages: \$1 million.
Question 3: Claims brought by plaintiff Eduardo Cappe11o I.

Question 3a: Is Defendant Bravo liable for the extrajudicial killing of descendant Eduardo Cappello I?

Answer: Yes.
Answer 3b: If you answered yes to question 3a, what you do you find to be the total amount of compensatory damages, if any, to the plaintiff Eduardo Cappello?

Compensatory Damages: \$250,000.
Question 4: Claims brought by the plaintiff Alicia Krueger.

Question 4a: Is defendant Bravo liable for the
extrajudicial killing of Ruben Bonet?
Answer: Yes.
Question 4b: If you answered yes to question 4a, what do you find to be the total amount of compensatory damages, if any, to the plaintiff Alicia Krueger?

Compensatory damages: \$4,500,000.
Question No. 5: Claims brought by plaintiff Marcela Santucho.

Question 5a: Is Defendant Bravo liable for the extrajudicial killing of Ana Maria Villarreal de Santucho?

Answer: Yes.
Question 5b: If you answered yes to Question 5a, what do you find to be the total amount of compensatory damages, if any, to the plaintiff Marcela Santucho?

Compensatory damages: $\$ 6,500,000$.
Question No. 6: Punitive damages.
Question 6a: Under the circumstances of this case, state whether punitive damages are warranted against Defendant Bravo?

Answer: Yes.
Question 6b: If you answered yes to Question 6a, what is the total amount of punitive damages, if any, which you find should be assessed against defendant on behalf of the following plaintiffs:

For Plaintiff Raquel Camps: $\$ 3$ million.
For Plaintiff Eduardo Cappello II: \$3 million.

For Plaintiff Alicia Krueger: $\$ 3$ million.
For Plaintiff Marcela Santucho: \$3 million.
If you elect not to assess punitive damages against the defendant, you should enter zero as to the amount of damages.

So say we a11, this 1st day of July 2022. And signed by the foreperson.

THE COURT: Juror No. 1, is the verdict as published published your verdict?

JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
THE COURT: Juror No. 2, is the verdict as published your verdict?

JUROR NO. 2: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: No. 3, is the verdict as published your verdict?

JUROR NO. 3: Yes.
THE COURT: Juror No. 4, is the verdict as published your verdict?

JUROR NO. 4: Yes.
THE COURT: Juror No. 5, is the verdict as published your verdict?

JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
THE COURT: Juror 6, is the verdict as published your verdict?

JUROR NO. 6: Yes.
THE COURT: Juror No. 7, is the verdict as published your

## verdict?

JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
THE COURT: That concludes your jury duty service here in the Southern District of Florida; not only for this week, but for this summons.

I can't send you, obviously, back to the clerk's section. It's 7:10, and they are not there.

I do have certificates that can be used to document the fact that you were here, but also something from me that thanks you for being here.

I'm going to the walk back to the jury room in just a moment to collect them from chambers. So if you'll wait for me for just a minute, I'11 give you those certificates and acknowledgments of having been here.

I know that the parties said it themselves, but I'11 just reiterate that we are grateful for your service and your attention this week. With that, you're excused.
(Jury out at 7:09 P.M.)
THE COURT: Okay. With that, if there is anything else, let me know. Other than that, I'11 look for any posttrial motions. But I do want to go address the jury, not hold them here too much longer.

I will ask if there is anything else we need to do this evening, Mr. Krishnan?

MR. KRISHNAN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: A11 right. I appreciate you bearing with them and they completed the case tonight, and I will hear from you when I see your motions. A11 right. Everyone have a good night. Thank you.

MR. KRISHNAN: Thank you,.

> CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

$$
\text { July 2, } 2022
$$

/s/ Vernita Allen-Williams

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